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South Africa’s transition to democracy has been hailed as exemplary in the field of conflict 
resolution and constitution-making. The negotiated settlement was expected to serve as a 
consensual constitutional framework boding well for the newly democratic regime, but by 
2014 evidence was accumulating of an emerging dissensus on the South African 
Constitution.  
The literature on the South African transition does not anticipate this emerging constitutional 
dissensus, or address the possibility that the constitution meant different things to different 
stakeholders.  While there was widespread endorsement of the ratification of the constitution, 
an apparent divergence has emerged about its meaning and what is stands for. Many studies 
addressed the process of constitutional negotiations and the outcome thereof, but few 
examine the meaning that the original negotiators invested into this outcome. 
The study aimed to address whether this dissensus was present during the negotiating process 
(1990 - 1996), and whether the negotiators’ agreement on the formal text of the constitution 
obscures fundamentally diverging interpretations. The study is in the form of a qualitative, 
descriptive case study. This study created a novel conceptual framework within which to 
classify diverse interpretations. Perceptions of negotiated compromises in deeply divided 
societies were conceptualised in the form of Constitutional Contracts, Social Contracts and 
Benchmark Agreements. Original negotiators’ views and opinions were analysed in order to 
identify dispositions reconcilable with each of the concepts identified. 
This framework proved significantly helpful in identifying whether the views of the 
negotiators were divergent – on several levels, differences between negotiators during the 
negotiating period came to the fore. It became evident from the findings that there were 
indeed present among the ranks of the negotiators of the South African Constitution 
diverging interpretations of this outcome.  
It became clear that certain interpretations were more easily categorised than others: while 
being able to locate the views of some negotiators within the concepts of Constitutional 
Contract or Social Contract, identifying those views congruent with the Benchmark 
Agreement proved more difficult. Also, some negotiators’ views can be located within one, 
two or all of the categories. It became evident that while negotiators may be categorised 
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within all three concepts of the framework, their opinions are not necessarily specific to the 
indicators of one single concept. 
This study brought significant insight into several concepts, including the Social Contract in a 
changing society. The Social Contract is identifiable within a system that fosters process over 
institutions, with specific focus on the working of the electoral system. The Social Contract is 
vested in the political culture as opposed to in the written text, but the written text does 
facilitate these types of processes by entrenching mechanisms for ongoing negotiation and 
revision. However, while some of these mechanisms exist within the Constitution, it does not 
mean that they are effectively used. Characteristics associated with the Social Contract, such 
as flexibility and an inclusive process, tend to be associated with longer lasting constitutions. 
The question remains whether South Africans should be actively seeking to build a Social 
Contract, and whether a Constitutional Contract can evolve into a Social Contract. 
  




Suid-Afrika se oorgang na demokrasie word beskou as ‘n uitnemende voorbeeld in die veld 
van konflikoplossing en die skryf van grondwette. Daar is verwag dat die onderhandelde 
skikking sal dien as ‘n ooreengekome grondwetlike raamwerk vir die nuwe demokratiese 
regime, maar teen 2014 het bewyse begin akkumuleer van ‘n opkomende dissensus oor die 
grondwet. 
Die literatuur oor die Suid-Afrikaanse oorgang antisipeer nie hierdie ontluikende 
grondwetlike dissensus nie, en spreek nie die moontlikheid aan dat die grondwet verskillende 
dinge vir verskillende rolspelers beteken nie. Alhoewel daar wydverspreide onderskrywing 
van die bekragtiging van die grondwet was, het daar ‘n klaarblyklike verdeeldheid na vore 
gekom oor wat die grondwet beteken, en waarvoor dit staan. Die proses van onderhandeling, 
sowel as die uitkoms in die formaat van die grondwet, is deur baie studies aangespreek, maar 
min ondersoek die betekenis wat die oorspronklike onderhandelaars in die uitkoms belê het. 
Dié studie is daarop gerig om ondersoek of hierdie onderliggende dissensus reeds tydens die 
onderhandelingsproses (1990 – 1996) teenwoordig was, en of die onderhandelaars se 
ooreenkoms oor die formele teks fundamenteel uiteenlopende interpretasies daarvan verberg. 
Die studie is in die vorm van 'n kwalitatiewe, beskrywende gevallestudie. ‘n Nuwe 
konseptuele raamwerk is ontwikkel waarbinne die diversiteit van opinie hieroor geklassifiseer 
kan word. Persepsies van onderhandelde kompromieë in diep verdeelde samelewings is 
gekonseptualiseer in die vorm van Grondwetlike Kontrakte, Sosiale Kontrakte en Maatstaf 
Ooreenkomste. Oorpsronklike onderhandelaars se standpunte en opinies is geanaliseer om 
gesindhede versoenbaar met elk van die konsepte te identifiseer. 
Hierdie raamwerk was nuttig om te identifiseer of die menings van die onderhandelaars 
uiteenlopend was. Verskille op verskeie vlakke het tussen die onderhandelaars tydens die 
onderhandelingstydperk na vore gekom. Dit is duidelik dat daar wel uiteenlopende 
interpretasies van hierdie uitkoms teenwoordig was binne die geledere van die 
onderhandelaars.  
Sekere interpretasies is makliker geklassifiseer as ander: die menings van sommige 
onderhandelaars kan as kongruent met die Grondwetlike Kontrak of die Sosiale Kontrak 
geidentifiseer word, maar dit was moeiliker om sienings ooreenstemmend met die Maatstaf 
Ooreenkoms te identifiseer. Sekere onderhandelaars se standpunte kan ook in een, twee of al 
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drie kategorieë geplaas word. Dit het duidelik geword dat terwyl sekere onderhandelaars se 
opvattings binne al drie konsepte van die raamwerk geklassifiseer kan word, hul menings nie 
noodwendig spesifiek binne die aanwysers van 'n enkele konsep val nie. 
Hierdie studie het beduidende insig in verskeie konsepte gebied, insluitend die Sosiale 
Kontrak in 'n veranderende samelewing. Die Sosiale Kontrak is identifiseerbaar binne 'n 
stelsel wat die belangrikheid van proses oor instellings beklemtoon. Die Sosiale Kontrak 
berus in politieke kultuur, maar die geskrewe gondwetlike reëls fasiliteer hierdie tipe van 
prosesse deur die vestiging van meganismes vir voortgesette onderhandeling en hersiening. 
Hierdie verskynsel is tipies meer duidelik sienbaar in die werking van verskillende 
kiesstelsels. Alhoewel hierdie meganismes kan bestaan binne ‘n grondwet, beteken dit nie dat 
hulle doeltreffend gebruik word nie. Eienskappe wat verband hou met die Sosiale Kontrak, 
soos buigsaamheid en 'n inklusiewe proses, is geneig om verband te hou met 'n duursame en 
standhoudende grondwet. Die vraag bly staan of Suid-Afrikaners aktief op soek moet wees na 
die bou van ‘n Sosiale Kontrak, en of 'n Konstitusionele Kontrak kan ontwikkel om ‘n 
Sosiale Kontrak te vorm. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Rationale for the Study 
1.1.1. Why this study? Claims to Originality 
South Africa’s transition to democracy has been hailed as exemplary in the field of conflict 
resolution and constitution-making by authors such as Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 
(2011); Harris and Reilly (1998); and Darby & MacGinty (2003 & 2008).  The negotiated 
settlement was expected to serve as a consensual constitutional framework boding well for 
the newly democratic regime, but by 2014 evidence was accumulating of an emerging 
dissensus, or lack of convergence of interpretation of agreement, on the South African 
Constitution.  
One earlier example is found in the Sunday Times of 3 May 1998 shortly after the 
implementation of the 1996 Constitution. The then secretary general of the ANC, Kgalema 
Motlanthe claimed that the ANC would ‘review the power held by independent watchdogs if 
it won a two-thirds majority’ in the 1999 election (Paton & Schmidt, 1998). Motlanthe is 
quoted in this article as stating that by winning this majority, the ANC could govern 
‘unfettered by constraints.’ The Judicial Service Commission, the Auditor General, the 
Attorney General as well as the Reserve Bank would become subject to transformation. This 
statement casts doubt on the actual, authentic intentions of the ANC as to the status of the 
new negotiated constitutional regime. Motlanthe later retracted his comment, but this 
apparent element of discord has persisted into 2014. 
In a speech made on 31 January 2014, F.W. de Klerk warned of the ANC’s intentions 
regarding the Constitution and the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), a goal De Klerk 
claims is superior to the Constitution in the eyes of the ANC. De Klerk finds that: 
The ANC sees itself, not as an ordinary political party, but as a national liberation 
movement with an uncompleted revolutionary mandate. It sees ‘the continuing 
legacy of colonialism and white minority rule’ as the ‘defining reality’ in our 
society… Unlike its negotiating partners, the ANC did not view the constitutional 
negotiations as the means to achieving a final national constitutional accord. 
Instead it saw them as a means to achieving a beachhead of state power – which 
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would enable it to shift the balance of forces further to its own advantage. In the 
process it admits that it had to make constitutional compromises that it regarded as 
temporary expedients necessitated by the then-prevailing balance of forces.  
De Klerk (2014) continues by saying that ‘we’ – implying himself and the other parties who 
helped to draft and eventually ratified the final Constitution – did not ‘sign on for the NDR’.  
In a reply to De Klerk’s comments, Cyril Ramaphosa (2014) cites the fact that the 
Constitution was drawn up by a democratically elected constitutional assembly, which he 
notes ‘represented the collective will of the South African people’. He speaks specifically to 
De Klerk’s criticism of the way on which the ANC have been implementing the Equality 
Clause. He argues strongly that ‘those who wrote the Constitution understood that equality 
cannot be achieved by proclamation’, mentioning that ‘deliberate and sustained action’ is 
needed to achieve this (Ramaphosa, 2014). He goes on to say that ‘As the ANC, we will 
continue to do everything we can to advance transformation – whether De Klerk signs up to it 
or not.’  
The argument about the meaning of the Constitution leads to policy with vital, life-altering 
consequences. An example of this is found in the Policy Bulletin of the South African 
Institute for Race Relations (2014). The article refers to the deaths of three babies in 
Bloemhof, and establishes a ‘direct causal link between the policy [affirmative action] and 
the deaths’ (Kane-Burman, 2014:2). Kane-Burman (2014:8) quotes Cyril Ramaphosa, deputy 
president of the ANC and the country, as saying that ‘race will remain an issue until all 
echelons of our society are demographically representative’, which does not bode well for 
South Africans given its ‘skills profile’, leading to ‘dire consequences.’ 
This persisting discord about the nature and purpose of the Constitution has not yet been 
systemically investigated, though it proves a puzzle that this discord exists over a widely 
supported Constitution. This study will aim to create a novel conceptual framework within 
which to classify this diversity of opinion and will examine whether it was present as early as 
during the substantive negotiations. No published research has made use of this conceptual 
framework in order to describe and classify this initial discord. 
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1.2. The Research Problem 
According to Elkins et al (2009:97), ‘[a]ctors are more likely to enforce the constitution if 
there is consensus about what the law of the land is, and what it should be.’ A clear dissensus 
between De Klerk and Ramaphosa regarding the nature of the Constitution is apparent. The 
puzzle is that this ‘dissensus’ follows from a widely supported negotiation process that 
brought a peaceful end to a long, drawn-out conflict: the ratification of the 1996 Constitution 
received an 85% yes vote in the Constitutional Assembly (Ebrahim, 1998:3). The literature 
on the South African transition does not anticipate this emerging constitutional dissensus, or 
address the possibility that the constitution meant different things to different stakeholders.  
While there was widespread endorsement of the ratification of the constitution, an apparent 
divergence has emerged about its meaning and what is stands for. Many studies addressed the 
process and the outcome, but few examine the meaning that the original negotiators invested 
into this outcome except for Sisk (1995). However, Sisk’s study was completed before the 
outcome of the negotiations was reached. 
Was the condition of dissensus about what the constitution means already present at the 
outcome of the negotiating process (1990-1996), despite the wide-ranging endorsement 
thereof in 1993 and 1996? Did the negotiators’ agreement on the formal text of the 
constitution obscure fundamentally diverging interpretations thereof, that is, disagreement on 
what this document stands for, represents and embodies, and therefore about what was 
achieved through negotiations? This study examines this puzzle and in doing so, aims to 
address this gap in the literature. 
1.3. Research Questions 
 Can a conceptual framework be constructed with which to classify and categorise the 
range of divergent interpretations that constitutional negotiators can assign to 
negotiated democratic institutions which are aimed at resolving long-standing internal 
conflicts? 
 Was there present among the ranks of the negotiators of the South African 
Constitution diverging interpretations of what this outcome embodied at  the time of 
concluding the settlement, that is, did the constitution have different meanings to 
different negotiators? 
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 If divergent, can these interpretations be categorised according to the conceptual 
framework constructed for this purpose? 
 On the basis of the findings to the questions above, does the case study validate the 
said conceptual framework devised for classifying interpretations of consensually 
negotiated constitutions? 
1.4. Research Design and Methodology 
1.4.1. Descriptive, Qualitative Study 
The study is in the form of a descriptive case study, looking at the what and not the why or 
how. The objective is to establish if there were divergent opinions as to the nature of the 
negotiated outcome, that is, the 1993 and 1996 constitutional texts. It is not about the process 
that culminated in this outcome except if the negotiators are of the opinion that the nature of 
the negotiations process affected the substance and meaning of the outcome. 
This study is qualitative, not quantitative. This study will ‘create new concepts and theory by 
blending together empirical evidence and abstract evidence. Instead of testing a hypothesis, a 
qualitative analyst may illustrate or color in evidence showing that a theory, generalization, 
or interpretation is plausible’ (Neuman, 2000:440). The researcher’s goal is to organize 
specific details into a coherent picture, model, or set of interlocked concepts’ (Neuman, 
2000:440). The following figure represents the research design: 








Case Study: Empirically investigate the conceptual typology by 
applying it to a specific case. Address issues relating to external validity. 
Accept, revise or discard conceptual typology based on the findings. 
Theory Development: Development of the Conceptual Typology 
Contextualise the Conceptual Typology: Embed the conceptual 
typology in other works relating to democratic transitions and 
constitutional outcomes. Address issues relating to face and criterion 
validity. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5 
 
Source: Adapted from Swart (2013:9) by the author. 
1.4.2. Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis will comprise of individual negotiators during the South African 
democratic transition, more specifically, those negotiators engaged in the drawing up of the 
texts of the 1993 and 1996 constitutions. For the 1993 Constitution, the units of analysis are 
the members of Codesa I, Codesa II and the Multi-Party Negotiations Process (MPNP), and 
for the 1996 Constitution, it is the members of the Constitutional Assembly (CA).  
1.4.3. Case Study 
Case studies can be used to test a theory, or components of theories such as concepts. Case 
studies are essential in understanding complex social phenomena (Yin, 1984:14). According 
to Yin (1984:14) ‘the case study allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events.’ 
The case study finds strength in being able to include a wide variety of evidence, including 
documents, interviews and observations. By formulating a conceptual framework prior to the 
case study, the direction of data collection and analysis is guided instead of haphazard (Yin, 
2009:18). ‘Case studies… are generalizable to theoretical propositions’ (Yin, 1984:21) and as 
such provide a basis for this study. This single-case study aims to expand and test a 
conceptual framework instead of making statistical generalisations. By using a single, critical 
case, the conceptual framework will be confirmed, challenged or extended (Yin, 2009:47). 
According to Yin (2009:11), case studies provide a good basis for the study of ‘contemporary 
events, but when relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated’. Different from a simple 
chronological retelling, this case study includes interviews with persons directly involved in 
the events being studied (Yin, 2009:11).  
Several concerns have come to light with case studies. Yin (2009:14) identifies ‘the lack of 
rigor of case study research’ as the greatest concern. In order to avoid this pitfall, this study 
aims to be rigorous by employing a typology, creating classifications and assessing these by 
means of a case study. This produces findings that can be tested for validity and reliability. 
Another concern is that case studies ‘provide little basis for scientific generalisation’ (Yin, 
2009:15). This study does not aim to make generalisations to populations of universes, but 
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rather to a conceptual framework. The aim of the case study, and more specifically, this case 
study, is to ‘expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalisation)’ (Yin, 2009:15). It has also been said that case studies 
result in long, unreadable documents (Yin, 2009:15), but the delimitations of this study keeps 
this in mind. 
Yin (2009:40) mentions several criteria for judging the quality of research designs, including 
construct validity; external validity and reliability. Construct validity refers to the 
identification of the ‘correct operational measures for the concepts being studied’ (Yin, 
2009:40). External validity pertains to the definition of the domain within which the findings 
of the study can be generalised. A high external validity means that findings from a small 
group can be generalised to a larger group of findings, or a more broad range of studies 
(Neuman, 2000:172). Reliability is measured by ascertaining whether the operations of the 
study can be repeated and achieve the same result, meaning that the method is reliable and 
can be reproduced (Neuman, 2000:172; Yin, 2009:40). 
Different types of validity come into question: face validity; content validity; construct 
validity. According to Neuman (2000:183), face validity is measured by the ‘judgment of the 
scientific community’ and asks the question: Does the indicator really measure the construct? 
Content validity is concerned with the question: ‘is the content of a definition represented in a 
measure?’ (Neuman, 2000:183). Neuman (2000:183) identifies three steps to content validity:  
1. Specify the content in a construct’s definition.  
2. Sample from all areas of the definition.  
3. Develop an indicator that taps all of the parts of the definition. 
The content validity of this study will be maintained by using several sources of evidence; 
and by establishing a clear chain of evidence, as suggested by Yin (2009:41). By using a 
conceptual framework supported by previous studies and tested theories, the external validity 
of the study will be tested. If validated, this will also enable analytical generalisation, as this 
study aims to ‘generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory’ (Yin. 2009:43).  
Construct validity ‘is for measures with multiple indicators’, which is relevant to this study. It 
addresses the question: ‘If the measure is valid, do the various indicators operate in a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
7 
 
consistent manner? It requires a definition with clearly specified conceptual boundaries’ 
(Neuman, 2000:184). 
The reliability of this study can be upheld by using case study protocol and developing a case 
study database, as suggested by Yin (2009:41). By doing this, the study will aim to be 
replicable in all aspects. The use of the ‘case study protocol’ helps to anticipate problems and 
deal with how the study will go forth (Yin, 2009:82). This is done in part in this first chapter 
and in the third chapter by laying out in detail how the study will be conducted. The 
development of a ‘case study database’ as a ‘formal assembly of evidence distinct from the 
final case study report’ also helps to increase the reliability of a study (Yin, 2009:45). This 
study has set out in detail the data sources to be used and will systematically capture all data 
sources in a bibliography, including interviews and sources other than published documents 
in the public domain. 
In the conclusion of this study, the conceptual framework will be assessed and either 
validated, revised, amended or discarded depending on the validity of the case study. 
1.5. Definitions 
Edward Hall introduced a clear distinction between low-context and high-context cultures in 
1976. Cohen (1997) goes on to use this distinction in elaborating his cultural theory of 
negotiating styles. High-context cultures are associated with allusive communication and 
being communally minded, while low-context cultures prefer direct communication and are 
generally less sensitive to nonverbal communication (Cohen, 1997:31-33). This distinction 
will also be used in the conceptual framing of this study, as explained below. 
1.5.1. Low-context cultures: Negotiated outcomes as Constitutional 
Contracts or Social Contracts 
Protracted conflicts in societies marked by deeply held communal solidarities often tend to be 
settled by way of a ‘grand settlement’ in the form of a constitutional contract. Such 
comprehensive agreements that effectively end mutual hostilities also tend to follow from or 
accompany historic events, such as independence, or major shifts in global politics.   These 
agreements tend to formalise some form of an ethnic bargain between adversaries, where a 
trade is made in the form of reciprocal concessions given, and benefits received.  This 
amounts to a constitutional contract, with the Lebanese “National Pact” of 1943 – 1975 and 
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the Malaysian “bargain” of 1956/7 – 1969 as definitive examples. These ethnic bargains 
conform to the conventional conceptual descriptions of both ‘constitutions’ and of 
‘contracts’. 
In the case of Lebanon, a comprehensive power-sharing agreement was reached between 
various communities, proportional to their relative population size as established by the 1932 
census.  On the basis of these ratios, it was agreed that the President would be a Maronite 
Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Chair of the Legislature would be a Shia 
Muslim, and the deputy chair would be drawn from the Greek Orthodox community. 
Parliamentary seats were appointed on a sectarian basis, a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. 
Civil service appointments and public funding decisions would also be based on sect, in 
keeping with the 6:5 Christian-Muslim ratio (Lijphart, 1977: 148; Teuteberg, 2011:45).   
The Malaysian constitutional bargain comprised of a trade between the Chinese and Malayan 
communities.  The Chinese gained citizenship, in return for the recognition that the Malays 
would dominate electoral politics, and the civil service with preferential appointments in 
terms of a 4:1 Malay-to-Chinese ratio (Milne, 1970:564).  Malays would also be the 
beneficiaries of general economic upliftment, and the Malayan language would replace 
English as the official language in 1967 (Milne, 1970:565). 
Both the Lebanese and Malaysian bargains have been faulted for being too rigid. Social 
contracts can provide more flexibility. According to Sisk (1995: 54) a social contract in a 
post-conflict multi-communal society amounts to the institutionalization of a culture of 
negotiation, that is, a process of mutual compromise, rather than a once-off trade in demands 
codified in a rigid set of rules.  A social contract, in his view, is not identical to a specific set 
of institutions, or a specific set of procedures for decision-making, although both of the above 
would comprise of essential components in making a social contract work.  Instead, the social 
contract is vested in the political and corporate culture of the incumbents of such 
constitutional arrangements. 
1.5.2. High-context cultures: Negotiated Outcomes as benchmarks 
In high-context cultures, the negotiation process is not seen as a ‘specific event with a 
discrete character and finite, clearly demarcated boundaries’ (Du Toit, 2001:102). A 
negotiation process is more likely viewed as one event in a longer process including other 
events and interactions (Cohen, 1997:34).  An agreement, or ‘outcome’, achieved by 
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negotiation is not seen as a fixed point, or as a set ‘codification’ of the relationship between 
those involved. According to Du Toit (2001: 102), ‘[a]t worst, such an event is merely an 
episode in the ongoing relationship, at best a benchmark.’  
In this type of negotiation culture, negotiated agreements do not represent rigid contracts but 
are rather seen as flexible arrangements that are entirely subject to renegotiaiton. In such 
agreements, the relationship is upheld by goodwill rather than good faith. Goodwill derives 
from ‘joint recognition of the justness of the cause of one party over the other, and from their 
joint, but not identical, contributions to right some large historical wrongs’ (Du Toit, 
2001:102). Cohen (1997) states that the difference between whether negotiating in good faith 
or in goodwill depends not on integrity or personal traits, but rather on culture. 
In high-context cultures, the negotiated outcome is seen as merely an episode, a benchmark, 
in a larger process, which reflects the nature of the relationship at the specific time of 
negotiation. This type of outcome has a tendency to become outdated as the relationship 
changes. In high-context cultures, negotiation becomes a continuous process. This means that 
any agreement produced as a negotiated outcome is considered to be merely one of many in a 
long-term, open-ended negotiation relationship (Cohen, 1997:200). The low-context 
perception of a contract as binding (until modified by mutual consent) is not present (Cohen, 
1997:201). Here, agreement signifies the beginning and not the end of an ongoing bargaining 
relationship: ‘the contracting parties will be able to work out future differences in a 
cooperative, rather than litigious, spirit of goodwill’ (Cohen, 1997:201). 
1.5.3. South Africa 
Both Sisk (1995) and Horowitz (1991) explore the problem of the varying perceptions of the 
South African outcome. However, both of these studies were published before the final 
outcome of 1996. Du Toit (2001: 104) notes the limited data available regarding participants’ 
views on the outcome of the South African negotiations. Even from the limited data, Du Toit 
finds several divergent views present among those involved in the process. He notes that the 
ANC and PAC focused on the outcome as part of a liberation process, as a mere ‘landmark’ 
in a larger process. The NP, however, focused on the establishment of a ‘rechtsstaat’ – a 
constitutional contract in itself.  
Du Toit asks the question whether South Africa represents a process based on good faith or 
on goodwill. He concludes that this is a ‘crucial, but under researched aspect of the process.’ 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
10 
 
(2001:104). He found that while the NP failed to officially discuss their position, the ANC 
seemed to openly view negotiations as a ‘fifth pillar of the struggle’ – clearly indicating that 
their view of the negotiation process was far from delivering the irreversible outcome the NP 
wished to achieve. The ANC was, however, split on the issue. Highly influential Nelson 
Mandela appears to have wanted to negotiate in good faith, while Joe Slovo, another seminal 
figure of the struggle, argued that good faith was immaterial to the process and that 
negotiations were but a strategy toward the ANC achieving complete victory. The Slovo 
school of thought cannot be placed within a low-context, good faith negotiation culture. 
Du Toit (2001) sets out a preliminary exploration of this case with the limited available data. 
This study will examine this apparent divergence in greater detail, making use of original 
data and a detailed analysis of other data already in the public domain. 
Current use of the content is very weak. One example can be found in an article titled The 
demise of the Social Contract in South Africa authored by Carolyn Basset (2004). While the 
article aims to address economic policy-making within the so-called social contract (used 
interchangeably with the term social compact), the author does not provide a definition of 
either of the terms. 
1.6. Limitations and Delimitation 
1.6.1. Delimitation 
This is not a study of the context and/or process of negotiation that culminated in the 1993/96 
constitutions in and of itself. The analysis of the process has been done by several authors, 
including Waldmeir (1996), Giliomee (2012); Sparks (1994); De Klerk (1994); De Villiers 
(1994); Welsh (2009); Du Toit (2001); Jeffery (2009); Esterhuyse (2012); Heunis (2007); and 
Wessels (2010) and is not the focus of this study. The process itself is recognised as a factor 
that is inherent to negotiations, which  in turn is located within a specific context. The process 
of negotiation may become of relevance to this study only to the extent that negotiators are of 
the opinion that certain events and/or actions by some negotiators shaped the meaning that 
they assign to the negotiated outcome.  
No assumptions are made by the researcher about whether there was a causal relationship 
between the context, process and outcome of the negotiations, nor is it examined whether 
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such a causal relationship existed, that is, whether the nature of the context, and/or of the 
process affected the nature of the outcome. This would be the focus of an entirely different 
study. 
The focus of this study is on the meaning invested into the outcome itself, as perceived by the 
negotiators themselves at that time. The outcome of the negotiated transition to democracy in 
South Africa under consideration is only that which is found in the 1993 and 1996 
constitutional texts.  
This is not a study in jurisprudence. The aim is to identify, describe and categorize certain 
dispositions (i.e. values, beliefs and attitudes) held by erstwhile negotiators about the 
meaning of the Constitution. It is not about interpreting the constitutional texts in order to 
clarify the substance of the (constitutional) law. 
A strict timeframe delimits the study: events up to the conclusion of the constitutional 
negotiations in December 1996 are considered, but published material relevant to the study 
up to 2014 is used. 
The study does not include the analysis of the establishment and/or functioning of new 
institutions and policies formed within the new democratic regime subsequent to the 
implementation of the final constitution in 1996, such as the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and Nedlac. The question of whether these institutions can serve as indicators of 
a Constitutional Contract, a Social Contract or a Benchmark Agreement is not addressed. 
The study is also not about the perceptions and actions of major stakeholders in the politics of 
the democratic era (that is to say, after 1996), and not about the extent to which they perceive 
the current (2014) democratic political system to be a Constitutional Contract in action, or a 
Social Contract, or as a Benchmark Agreement. 
The study is not about other aspects of the negotiated outcomes, such as economic, cultural 
and social agreements, except to the extent that these feature in and bear on the 1993 and 
1996 constitutional texts, and on the meaning assigned to these texts by the erstwhile 
negotiators. 
This study does not address whether the outcome was ‘miraculous’ or ‘exemplary’ in any 
way. 
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The study is not about the exact substance of the terms of the negotiated outcome to the 
extent that it reveals who conceded most, who conceded least, or whether it was a win-win 
outcome, except to the extent that it shaped the meaning the negotiators themselves assigned 
to the outcome. 
Likewise, the study is not about the constitutional framework of the democratic state and 
regime spelled out by the negotiated constitutional texts, such as the extent to which a power-
sharing executive was established or not, or the extent to which the attributes of a 
constitutional state was written into the texts or not, or how many federal features can be 
identified in the texts, or the extent to which the executive resembles a presidential rather 
than a parliamentary type, except to the extent that these elements/aspects of the 
constitutional settlement are relevant to shaping the perceptions of the negotiators as to the 
meaning of the constitutional outcome itself. 
The ‘meaning of the constitutional settlement’ is understood to be whether it is perceived as 
either a Constitutional Contract, Social Contract or Benchmark Agreement. 
The study does not address the issue of whether the South African negotiated constitution 
represents pivotal events of a process of democratisation, that is, the establishment of a 
democratic regime, or the process of peacemaking, that is, a peace accord, or both, unless it is 
relevant to the negotiators themselves in assessing the outcome. 
The study does not take up the question of which one of the three kinds of outcomes 
(Constitutional Contracts, Social Contracts and Benchmark Agreements) is superior to the 
others in any particular way. 
The study is not about numbers, it is not about representivity. The aim is to examine whether 
divergent opinions were present as to the nature of the negotiated outcomes, and if so, 
whether this diversity of interpretations can be classified according to the categories 
presented in the conceptual framework. It is not the aim to find out how many of the 
negotiators supported one interpretation over the others, and it is not about gaining access to a 
representative sample of these negotiators. 
The units of analysis act as a delimitation to the study. Those who voluntarily abstained from 
the negotiation process will not be included in the study, as the study focuses primarily on 
participants. Participants in formal negotiations, Codesa I, Codesa II, the MPNP, and the 
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Constitutional Assembly, will be taken into account in this study. Should some key 
participants not be able to be interviewed, due to personal or other reasons, other 
interviewers’ data will be used (listed in Data Sources). 
The study will not address the policy implications (the ‘so what’ question). This would 
constitute an entirely different study. 
1.6.2. Limitations 
This studied is limited to 85 000 words as prescribed by the University of Stellenbosch. The 
study aims to stay within this word count in order to keep the study as comprehensible and to 
the point as possible. 
Access to data: 
 Memoirs: some key negotiators may not have written/published their memoirs. Some 
memoirs may not produce data relevant to the research questions. 
 Interviews: some individuals may be unreachable, or may refuse interviews. Some 
key informants may be deceased.  
 Some informants may be approachable, but may be reticent to disclose information 
specific to the research questions, for a variety of reasons. In these cases, other raw 
data will be used, including full text interviews conducted by Patti Waldmeir, 
Hermann Giliomee and Padraig O’Malley, among others. 
Time and resources also act as a limitation to the study. The Scholarship granted by the 
Graduate School of the University of Stellenbosch is valid for three years of study. 
1.7. Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 presents a literature study of negotiated transitions to democracy. The chapter will 
highlight key authors on this subject, as well as comments and critique regarding democratic 
transition. The chapter goes on to discuss in some detail the dynamics of negotiated 
compromise and constitution-making, focusing on the pre-conditions necessary for 
negotiations to start, the phaseological approach to the analysis of transitions, and the details 
involved in substantive negotiations. 
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Chapter Three identifies the conceptual typology being used here to categorise negotiated 
compromises in the form of Constitutional Contracts, Social Contracts and Benchmark 
Agreements. This chapter will then elaborate the research design and methodology taken in 
this study in specifically operationalizing the concepts mentioned above. 
The fourth chapter of this study begins the case study of the South African transition, first 
outlining the context and then going on to focus on the period between 1987 and 1991 
characterised by secret talks and preliminary discussions. The chapter takes a look at the first 
‘pacts’ to be made among the elites taking part in the negotiations, and explores the ANC and 
NP’s original positions regarding the dynamics of the transition, as well as their views on the 
establishment and details of a new constitution. It goes on to assess the shifts in both parties’ 
attitudes toward a new constitution as well as their proposals regarding the details of the 
negotiation compromise. The chapter examines the actual constitution-making process, from 
trust-building until the adoption of the final constitution. The differences between the 1993 
and 1996 constitutions are reviewed. 
Chapter Five identifies aspects of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions that are amenable to being 
interpreted as being indicators of either the Constitutional Contract, Social Contract and 
Benchmark Agreement framework. Specific sections are analysed as being congruent with 
each of the concepts in the framework, allowing for an overall assessment and short 
comparison of the two constitutions. 
Chapter Six presents the analysis of published sources as well as the findings of the 
interviews. These findings will place the interpretations of the 1993/1996 constitutions by 
certain key participants within the framework presented in Chapter Three, whether as 
Constitutional Contract, Social Contract and Benchmark Agreement. 
In the Seventh Chapter, the nature of the outcome of the South African negotiations will be 
assessed as being either convergent or divergent.  It proceeds to assess whether the theoretical 
framework has proved successful and valid in assessing this case study, and whether it may 
be expanded to use in other such cases. The implications for theory will also be discussed. 
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Chapter 2: Negotiated Democratic Transitions 
2.1. Democratic Transitions 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a basis for the conceptual framework in Chapter 3 by 
looking closely at literature regarding democratic transitions and their outcomes. The South 
African negotiated democratisation falls within a larger global process, identified by 
Huntington (1991)  as the ‘third wave of democratisation’, and described and analysed by 
Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986) as part of a larger project concerning transitions 
from authoritarian view with focus on democratisation as part of these transitions. Huntington 
identified South Africa as in the process of a ‘transplacement’, falling within his framework 
of the Third Wave. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a conceptual framework for this thesis. 
2.1.1 Huntington: Third Wave (1974 – 1989) 
In 1991, Samuel Huntington sought to explain why, and how, more than 30 countries around 
the world democratised between 1974 and 1990. Huntington identifies two preceding waves, 
the first was preceded by the American and French Revolutions and reached its peak during 
between 1826 and 1926 (Huntington, 1991:16). The Second Wave of Democratisation falls 
between 1943 and 1962. This wave is preceded by the Allied occupation of several countries 
during the Second World War which promoted the installation of democratic institutions in 
countries like West Germany, Italy, Austria, South Korea and Japan. Turkey and Greece 
followed suit, with several Latin American countries, including Brazil and Costa Rica, in tow 
(Huntington, 1991:18). 
Huntington’s Third Wave (1974 to 1990) kicked off with a coup d’état in Portugal on 
Thursday 25 April 1974 which deposed a dictator of over 35 years, and led to revolutionary 
upheaval in the country and the eventual democratisation of Portugal by 1975 (1991:5). 
Approximately 30 countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America followed, while in several 
other countries with authoritarian regimes, significant liberalisation was taking place 
(Huntington, 1991:21). Huntington (1991:165) finds that ‘compromise, elections and 
nonviolence were the third wave democratisation syndrome’. He identifies two types of 
leaders in transitions: standpatters and reformers. Standpatters are those leaders who are 
content with the status quo and the current political situation in the country, and wish to keep 
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it that way. Reformers wish for a transition from the existing state of affairs, for reasons 
including moral and economic incentives, among others. 
According to Huntington, democratisation in the third phase came in three forms: 
Transformation; Replacement; and Transplacement. Transformations happen when ‘those in 
power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play the decisive role in ending that 
regime and changing it into a democratic system’ (Huntington, 1991:124). In other words, the 
change takes place from within government itself. At the start of this type of democratisation, 
the opposition is usually very weak or insignificant (1991:125). Prototypical cases of this 
include Spain, Brazil and Hungary. Huntington (1991:127 – 128) identifies a five step 
process towards transformation: 
1. A group of leaders within the incumbent authoritarian regime believes in moving 
toward democracy emerges. They may believe democratisation to be desirable or 
necessary – the reason is not important, as long as they advocate democracy. 
2. In some cases, leaders become aware of the risks of not moving toward democracy, 
and wish to reduce these risks by advocating democratisation. It may be that the 
opposition seems to be gaining support, and moving toward democracy may curb this. 
3. In some cases leaders believed that they, or their associates, would not lose office (in 
most cases they were wrong). These leaders sought to renew their legitimacy and gain 
support by democratising. 
4. Some reformers believed that moving toward democracy would hold economic and 
other benefits for the country – including increasing international legitimacy or 
reducing sanctions against the country.  
5. In some rarer cases, reformers believed that democracy was the ‘right’ form of 
government. These reformers believe that their country has evolved towards a 
democratic system and should keep up with other developed countries.  
The second means of democratisation during Huntington’s third wave comes in the form of 
replacement. In this type of transition, the government loses strength while the opposition 
gains strength. The replacement occurs when the opposition has gained enough strength to 
overthrow the government, or when the government collapses (Huntington, 1991:142).  
Usually reformers within the government are either very weak or non-existent, while 
standpatters dominate government thinking and oppose change. This transition involves three 
phases: firstly, ‘the struggle to produce the fall’; secondly, the fall of the government; and 
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thirdly, ‘the struggle after the fall’. The third phase involves groups within the new 
government who fight among themselves to determine the nature of the new regime 
(Huntington, 1991: 143). Before the ‘fall’ (the second phase), opposition groups unite in their 
desire to overthrow the existing status quo. Once they have achieved this, they become 
divided on the ‘distribution of power’ and the ‘nature of the new regime’ (Huntington, 
1991:148). 
Replacements are the rarest form of transition during Huntington’s Third Wave. 
Authoritarian regimes exist because the opposition is not politically strong enough to 
overthrow the government. Replacement occurs only when the government loses enough 
power to become weaker than the opposition, meaning that the opposition has shifted the 
balance of power (Huntington, 1991:143). 
Another means of transition Huntington identifies is transplacement. Transplacement entails 
joint actions by both the government and the opposition toward democratisation (Huntington, 
1991:151). Neither standpatters nor reformers dominate the incumbent regime, but a balance 
exists which makes the government willing to negotiate a change. Some form of push-pull 
needs to be exerted on the government for it to enter into negotiations, this may come in the 
form of a third party, international sanctions, security threats or other incentives. Examples of 
transplacement include Bolivia, Honduras and Poland (Huntington, 1991:151). According to 
Huntington (1991:152), South Africa started the process toward transplacement in 1989 and 
1990. 
For transplacements to be successful, leaders in the opposition and within government should 
recognise that they are not able to determine the political future of the country without the 
input of their rival (Huntington, 1991:152). Both sets of leaders often try to ‘test’ each other’s 
strength before entering into negotiations. At the onset, both parties believe that they could 
unilaterally either keep the status quo or bring about change, but when both have changed 
their beliefs, transplacement occurs (Huntington, 1991:152). 
Huntington identifies four step to transplacement (1991:152 – 153): 
1. Government engages in some forms of liberalisation, but slowly begin to lose power 
and support. 
2. The opposition notes the weakening of government and exploit this by intensifying its 
attempts to gain support in the hope that they will be able to topple government. 
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3. The government responds by forcefully suppressing these actions. 
4. The opposition and government start to perceive a ‘standoff’ or a ‘mutually hurting 
stalemate’ – a situation wherein no party can convincingly win – and explore the 
possibility of negotiations. This step is not, however, inevitable. 
In transplacements, both parties should be roughly equal in strength, or at least perceive 
themselves to be relatively equal. Both sides are uncertain as to whether they will eventually 
‘win’ the struggle outright (Huntington, 1991:153). Government and opposition realise that 
the risks of confrontation are greater than the risks of entering into negotiations and 
eventually compromising. For transplacements to occur, both sides need to be open to the 
risks of negotiations (Huntington, 1991:155). Different from transformations and 
replacements, transplacements require governments to negotiate with opponents whom they 
have previously deemed criminal (Huntington, 1991:159). According to Huntington 
(1991:161) ‘[t]he risks of confrontation and of losing thus impel government and opposition 
to negotiate with each other; and guarantees that neither will lose everything become the 
basis for agreement… mutual reduction in risk prompt reformers and moderates to cooperate 
in establishing democracy.’ 
Huntington (1991:164) goes on to identify three characteristics present in all three types of 
democratic transitions in the third wave: compromise; stunning elections; and low violence. 
One of the key characteristics mentioned is that of compromise among political elites. 
Implicit or explicit bargaining between key parties brought about the transition to democracy. 
While the agreement was not satisfying to all involved, the transition became acceptable 
(Huntington, 1991:165). In all cases, formal or not, implicit or explicit agreement was easier 
to reach when there was not a great discrepancy in power and resources between the parties 
involved (Huntington, 1991:167). The third wave witnessed moderation in tactics, and often 
involved the renunciation of violence and revolutionary actions. Both government and 
opposition worked through elections and other political procedures in order to reach their 
goals (Huntington, 1991:170). Huntington also mentions the importance of culture when 
exploring the willingness and ability of leaders to come to compromise, stating that ‘[s]ome 
cultures appear to be more favourable to compromise than others’ (Huntington, 1991:171). 
Another common characteristic of third wave transitions is elections. Elections act as a means 
of weakening or ending incumbent authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 1991:174). Huntington 
assigns a lot of power to election: ‘elections are not only the life of democracy; they are also 
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the death of dictatorships’ (1991:174). Elections provide authoritarian rulers with a platform 
to renew their legitimacy when they come under pressure, and they sponsor these elections 
with the belief that their legitimacy will be bolstered. However, elections in these cases more 
often than not come out in favour of the opposition, or in the least show poor results for the 
government. These elections are referred to by Huntington as ‘stunning’ as they usually 
surprised both the government and the opposition (1991:175). Huntington lists several 
examples of ‘stunning elections’ (1991:175 – 178), including Chile’s General Pinochet who 
in 1988 sponsored a referendum to his continued rule. He was convinced that he would win 
by a ‘landslide’, but lost by 55% to 43%. The opposition had succeeded in mobilising public 
opinion against General Pinochet. 
Political change is almost always concomitant with high levels of violence, but low levels of 
violence are characteristic of third wave transitions (Huntington, 1991:192). The nature of 
third wave democratisation being through compromise and elections meant that these 
transitions were comparatively peaceful (Huntington. 1991:192). 
2.1.2 Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead: Negotiated Compromise 
The worldwide transition phase of the last quarter of the twentieth century was described by 
Huntington as the third wave. From this model on democratic transitions, Guillermo 
O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and L. Whitehead developed the ‘New Model’: The Transition 
Paradigm. Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986:8) define democratisation as ‘the 
processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political 
institutions previously governed by other principles… or expanded to include persons not 
previously enjoying such rights and obligations… or extended to cover issues and institutions 
not previously subject to citizen participation.’ The outcome of democratisation should be 
peace-making and constitution-making. The ‘transition’ period is the ‘interval’ between 
political regimes. They go on to state that political democracy, in all cases included in their 
study, was preceded by liberalisation, in differing levels of steadiness and significance 
(1986:10). Liberalisation is defined as the extension of rights. However, it is important to 
note that liberalisation can occur without democratisation, and elections can take place 
without democratisation, as seen in Zimbabwe (2002; 2008; 2013) and Russia (2008; 2012). 
Schmitter et al (1986) identify characteristics, trends and threats present during the ‘opening’, 
or what they refer to as abertura, of authoritarian regimes. Two groups typically present in 
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authoritarian regimes are hard-liners and soft-liners. Hard-liners believe that it is not only 
possible, but also desirable (for whichever reason, including moral and opportunist) to uphold 
the incumbent authoritarian regime (Schmitter et al, 1986:16). Hard-liners are compatible 
with Huntington’s standpatters. It may not be possible to distinguish soft-liners from hard-
liners at the start, but as these leaders become aware that the regime could use some 
legitimisation, usually by means of elections, they become identifiable as soft-liners.  
Schmitter et al also find that high economic growth is favourable factor to democratisation. 
In Latin America, liberalisation was concomitant with the demilitarisation of public life, 
which can be linked to the revival of civil society. This sharp increase of political activity is 
usually followed by a sense of ‘normalisation’ as groups and individuals become 
depoliticised (Schmitter et al, 1986:26). The unbanned opposition tends to de-radicalise 
during negotiations, realising that their maximum outcome will not likely be achieved 
(Schmitter et al, 1986:26). Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986:23) identify one 
characteristic present in all cases included in their study: the fear of a coup d’état during the 
transition, carried out by hard-liners.  
2.1.3 Basic Assumptions, Comments and Critique 
In 2002, Thomas Carothers challenged this model in claiming that ‘reality is no longer 
conforming to this model’ and that it was ‘time to recognise that the transition paradigm has 
outlived its usefulness and to look for a better lens’ (2002:6). Guillermo O’Donnell stepped 
in to argue against some of Carothers’ claims, but also to clarify some original points and 
concede some of the weaknesses of the original theory. Carothers (2002) identifies five core 
assumptions of the Transition Paradigm and seeks to refute each individually.  
The first core assumption made by Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986) is that a 
country in the process of moving away from dictatorial rule can be considered in transition 
toward democracy. Carothers (2002:6;9) argues that of the 100 new transitions thrown into 
the transitional paradigm, only 20 at the most can be considered clearly on route to becoming 
well-functioning, successful democracies. O’Donnell (2002:7) agrees that moving away from 
authoritarianism does not necessarily mean moving toward democracy: he explicitly states 
the title of his, Schmitter and Whitehead’s work as ‘Transition from Authoritarian Rule’, as 
opposed to of ‘Transitions to democracy’. He goes on to state that under this title they had 
insisted the open-endedness and uncertainty of the transitions. 
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The second assumption made by Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986) and identified 
by Carothers (2002:7) is that democratisation unfolds in set stages: opening; breakthrough; 
and consolidation. Carothers (2002:9) holds the argument that transitional countries often fall 
into what he calls a ‘political gray zone’. This means that countries have negative as well as 
positive aspects, for example having regular elections, but low levels of political 
participation. Countries are then termed ‘semi-democracies’; electoral democracies; pseudo-
democracies; or any other term relating to a type of ‘qualified democracy’. O’Donnell argues 
that neither he nor his co-editors held the view of set stages within a transition (2002:7), 
reiterating his own warning on ‘illusions about consolidation’ in 1996.  
The third assumption, ‘the belief in the determinative importance of elections’ (Carothers, 
2002:7), refers to the value granted elections of giving governments legitimacy and 
broadening political participation. It is assumed that elections are fundamental in generating 
democratic reforms. Carothers (2002:10) identifies two broad political ‘syndromes’ present in 
political gray zones which undermine the power of elections: ‘feckless pluralism’ and 
‘dominant-power politics’. 
Feckless pluralism is defined as the political dynamics within countries with significant 
democratic aspects like political freedom, alternation of power between different groups, and 
regular elections, but which are marred by weak political participation outside of elections, 
corrupt political elites, and a state that remains weak (Carothers, 2002:10). Countries where 
one party dominates the system with little chance of being ousted even by means of elections 
have fallen into the dominant-power politics syndrome (Carothers, 2002:12). O’Donnell 
argues that neither he nor his co-editors give elections ‘magical powers’, but he restates the 
importance of elections, arguing that ‘feckless pluralism’ is still democracy, even if it is 
flawed (2002:8). He does however state that dominant-power systems are not democracies at 
all, but rather authoritarian regimes that hold elections (O’Donnell, 2002:9). O’Donnell also 
mentions that in their original work, he, Schmitter and Whitehead identified these 
‘syndromes’ as democradura (feckless pluralism) and dictablandas (dominant-power 
politics). 
According to Carothers, the fourth assumption made by the transition paradigm is that ‘the 
underlying conditions in transitional countries – their economic level, political history, 
institutional legacies, ethnic makeup, sociocultural traditions, or other ‘structural’ features – 
will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process’ (2002:8). 
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This assumption had arisen from the unlikely number of countries with no existing 
preconditions for democracy democratising, like Albania and Mongolia, in the early period of 
the third wave.  
Carothers argues that there are a number of factors which influence the outcome of the 
transitions, including the institutional legacies from previous regimes (2002:16). He goes on 
to cite several scholars who analyse the role of structural conditions like economic wealth and 
social class in democratic transitions, but notes the lack of integration by scholars on both 
subjects (2002:16). O’Donnell cites Przeworksi (2000) when agreeing that socio-economic 
factors are not pre-requisites for democracy, but when it comes to durability, ‘socio-economic 
factors are significant… the mortality rate of poor democracies is higher than that of rich 
ones’ (2002:10). 
The fifth assumption noted by Carothers (2002:8) is that the ‘democratic transitions making 
up the third wave are being built on coherent, functioning states’. Carothers argues that state-
building has been much more difficult than envisioned by the transitional paradigm, as the 
study of transitions away from authoritarianism has left countries in the lurch concerning 
fundamental state-building (2002:16). In many countries, weak states have severely curbed 
the growth of democracy – state-building is either a low priority, or it is done in such as way 
as to gain power and resources as quickly as possible (Carothers, 2002:17). O’Donnell 
concedes that their original literature may not have addressed the problem of weak or non-
existent states, but that weak states in general were more susceptible than strong states to 
transitions. He also mentions that in the 1990s ‘political scientists and sociologists argued 
that a reasonably effective and viable state is a crucial condition for, among other things, 
democratisation’ (2002:11). 
2.2. Transplacement – The Dynamics of Negotiated Compromise and 
Constitution-making 
This next section will embed the literature on democratic trasplacement within the broader 
field of negotiated conflict resolution. The section presents a standardised conceptual 
framework for the description of the dynamics of bargaining and negotiation. This framework 
will be used to provide conceptual clarity to the chronology of events comprising the South 
African negotiated transition, presented in Chapter 4. 




Most literature on peace processes focus on the content of the settlement itself as vital to 
conflict resolution. However, more and more focus is being placed on the timing of the 
negotiations or efforts toward resolution as equally important as the substance of the 
proposals (Darby & MacGinty, 2003:19). 
Parties to the conflict must feel that they are not being forced to join the peace process, but 
rather that they are willing participants (Rubin & Brown, 1975:7). Each party should believe 
that he will gain more by participating in bargaining rather than refusing to join the peace 
process. One of the most important pre-conditions is the existence of a contract zone, or at 
least the perception that a contract zone exists. 
2.2.1.1. Contract Zone: The Space to Make a New Constitution 
The contract zone has many names – the middle ground, the common ground, or the 
‘bargaining range’ - but all describe the social space where the two parties’ interests and 
preferred outcomes overlap and potential agreements exist (Barry & Friedman, 1998:346). As 
represented in the figures below, this area is where the negotiating parties’ interests overlap 
(Atkinson, 1977:43). For bargaining to occur, a contract zone must exist. Parties’ interests are 
mainly divergent, but without some commonality, bargaining cannot take place (Rubin & 
Brown, 1975:10). Kelley and Thibaut (1969, in Rubin & Brown, 1975:10) support this 
observation: ‘[i]f the interests are totally congruent, there is nothing to bargain for; and if they 
are totally opposed, there is no basis for bargaining’. 
Participating parties must determine a ‘reasonable settlement’ – this entails a settlement with 
maximum gain for each party, while still having a good chance of being agreed to by the 
other side. Rubin & Brown refer to this as the ‘minimax solution’ – a solution to the conflict 
representing ‘the best he can obtain in the face of the other’s opposition’ (Rubin & Brown, 
1975:11).  
As mentioned before, each bargainer must believe that a ‘contract zone’ or ‘middle ground’ 
exists. In other words, each bargainer must believe that ‘at least one [solution] with which he 
will be satisfied’ exists (Rubin & Brown, 1975:8). One settlement point in the contract zone 
is ‘Pareto-optimal’ – this means that it includes all parties’ ‘best possible outcomes, given 
any possible outcome for its opponent’ (Lawler & Bacharach: 1981:8). No party will agree to 
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a settlement that does not give it as much as it would ‘win’ from not negotiating at all, and 
‘neither will accept a solution if another solution would give it a higher pay off without 
requiring the other party to accept a lower one’ (Lawler & Bacharach: 1981:8). If reasonable 
solutions to inequalities are not evident, negotiation may not take place at all (Johnson, 
1993:12). Parties must recognise that a solution exists for negotiations to begin (Zartman & 
Berman, 1982:45). 
Ideal Settlement 
When entering a bargaining relationship, each party must determine an ‘ideal settlement’ (IS) 
which represents the most beneficial settlement that can, within realistic means, be achieved 
in negotiation. Atkinson (1977:42) calls it ‘realism with a touch of optimism’ Negotiation is 
usually opened at this level, with each party presenting its ‘best imaginable deal’ (Johnson, 
1993:22). 
Realistic Settlement 
The ‘realistic settlement’ (RS) is the point that each party calculates as being within reach 
with reasonable skill in negotiation and where unforeseen circumstances don’t negatively 
affect the negotiation (Atkinson, 1977:43).  Zartman & Berman (1982:63) refer to this 
position as the ‘expected outcome’: ‘the maximum he feels he can realistically obtain from 
the other party’. 
Fall-back Position 
The ‘Fall Back Position’ (FBP) is the point ‘beyond which confrontation will be preferred’ – 
meaning that this is the least favourable outcome that parties will be satisfied with. Should 
the outcome go beyond this point, parties would rather step out of negotiations and choose 
direct (often violent) confrontation, as they feel they would be ‘better off’ doing so 
(Atkinson, 1977:43). This position represents the last resort of the parties involved. Johnson 
(1993:22) refers to this as the ‘worst acceptable deal’, and Zartman & Berman (1982:63) call 
it the security position, which is estimated by doing a cost-benefit analysis.  
Bargainers’ limits, or Fall-Back Positions, are made on instructions from constituents, ethical 
principles, principles of fairness, and equated with the value of no agreement: bargainers 
should feel that they are better off in this ‘last-resort’ agreement than they would be should 
they fail to agree (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992:537). This position also indicates which issues 
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can be settled by negotiation, which can be settled by joint agreement and which ‘by power 
bargaining’ (Atkinson, 1977:43). Barry & Friedman (1998:346) refer to this as the ‘resistance 
point’ or the ‘bottom line’.  
Figure 2.1: Range of Possible Outcomes 
 
Source: Compiled by the researcher, adapted from Atkinson (1977:45) 
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Figure 2.1 (a) represents a situation where not only a contract zone presents itself, but there is 
also an overlap of the parties’ respective Realistic Settlement points (RS). In this type of case, 
settlement can be reached with some ease.  
Another type of situation presents itself in Figure 2.1 (b). The contract zone in this case 
represents a wide range of possibilities. Each party has the possibility of achieving its 
Realistic Settlement, or even better, but reaching this settlement is not guaranteed and will 
take some skill on the part of the negotiator. In this case, if one party reaches Realistic 
Settlement or better, the other party will not. Instead, for the party not reaching its Realistic 
Settlement, the outcome will fall closer to its Fall-Back Position. Point A represents the 
outcome in which Party 1 will be better off than Party 2, as the outcome is closer to Party 1’s 
Ideal Settlement, and further from Party 2’s Realistic Settlement Point. Point C represents the 
opposite of this outcome – the outcome is closer to Party 2’s Ideal Settlement, but further 
from Party 1’s Realistic Settlement Point, meaning that Party 2 is better off than Party 1. 
Point B represents the Pareto Optimal point of outcomes – the point at which both parties are 
equally well-off and both have their best possible outcome. 
In Figure 2.1 (c) a contract zone has presented itself in the form of an overlap of the Fall-
Back Positions (FB). Settlement is within reach here, but can only be achieved with some 
difficulty and excellent negotiating skills. Both parties will have to be willing to make several 
concessions in this instance. 
Figure 2.1 (d) represents a situation where no contract zone exists, and therefore negotiations 
would be least likely to lead to a settlement of any kind. In this case the conflict situation 
often has not reached a point of ‘ripeness’ (elaborated further in section 3) and parties should 
re-evaluate their positions before entering into negotiations. 
2.2.1.2 Mutually Hurting Stalemate/Ripe for Resolution 
Calero (1982:33) stresses the importance of timing when starting negotiations. While it is 
difficult to determine the ‘perfect’ timing, prematurely forcing issues may weaken a party’s 
negotiating position (Calero, 1982:34). The most optimal moment to initiate negotiation is 
when power relations have shifted in such a way that parties become more equal (Zartman & 
Berman, 1982:54). A Mutually Hurting Stalemate presents itself when neither party is able to 
solve the conflict on its own, but each party is necessary to create a solution. In this situation, 
each party holds some of the cards, but no party has the complete upper hand. By making this 
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fact apparent to all involved, a stalemate may be converted into negotiations (Zartman & 
Berman, 1982:77). Good tactics in the prenegotiation stage means that parties to the conflict 
make it clear to their opponents that the situation will only deteriorate for both parties should 
negotiations not go forth (Zartman & Berman, 1982:82). 
A ‘ripe moment’, or moment optimal to start the peace process, exists when parties perceive a 
Mutually Hurting Stalemate. The Mutually Hurting Stalemate is ideally coupled with a 
catastrophe, whether impending or past. Zartman (2003:19) defines the Mutually Hurting 
Stalemate: 
The concept is based on the notion that when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict 
from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them 
(although not necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek an alternative 
policy or way out. 
Parties opt for ‘cost-benefit analysis’. Public choice notions of rationality show that each 
party will lean towards its preferred alternative, unless increased pain associated with the 
current situation induces a decision to change (Zartman, 2003:20).  
When parties perceive a ‘deadlock’, negotiation tends to come about. Only when all parties 
realise that neither can obtain total victory, and that continuing with violence will be too 
costly, does negotiation become an option (Harris & Reilly, 1998:61). This does not mean 
that the parties to the conflict are necessarily militarily evenly matched, which is rarely the 
case, – the stronger party needs only to perceive that the weaker can prevent it from winning 
outright (Harris & Reilly, 1998:62). A Mutually Hurting Stalemate often occurs ‘because of 
the absence of change’, but negotiation becomes a feasible, even attractive, option because of 
contextual changes (Harris & Reilly, 1998:63). 
The Mutually Hurting Stalemate rests solely on the parties’ perception of whether it exists. 
The ‘secret of negotiation’ lies in changing the perception of the parties so that the issues, or 
items, at stake can be used to the advantage of all involved (Zartman & Berman, 1982:13). 
Parties hoping to entice their opponent into joining negotiations aim to divide the items at 
stake into ‘goods valued more by one party than they cost to the other and goods valued more 
by the other party than they cost to the first’ (Homans, 1961, in Zartman & Berman, 1982:13-
14). If the parties perceive the Mutually Hurting Stalemate to be present, then it is, whether 
perceived as such in someone else’s view or not (Zartman, 2003:20). Parties will only choose 
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to enter into negotiations if they perceive it to be in their interest to do so (Harris & Reilly, 
1998:61).  
Another element essential to the perception of a ripe moment is the Way Out. While parties 
need not be able to name a solution, they should ‘sense’ or perceive that a solution is possible 
through negotiation, and that the other party (or parties) share this willingness (Zartman, 
2003:20). In other words, parties need to perceive a Contract Zone before entering into 
negotiations. If the parties do not sense a Way Out, parties may feel they have ‘nowhere to 
go’ in negotiating with the other (Zartman, 2003:20). 
Zartman (2003:21) mentions Stephen J. Stedman’s reinforcement of the idea that the 
perception of a Way Out is equally important as the perception of a stalemate: all parties may 
see a very favourable outcome should they opt for negotiation. Stedman also mentions the 
perception may be induced by the supporters of the parties, or by interested third parties, not 
the parties alone. 
Leadership change can lead to a change in the perception of a situation, and the perception of 
the Mutually Hurting Stalemate may arise where it had not been before. Threats from within 
a faction toward incumbent leadership may serve as the source of approaching catastrophe, 
therefore strengthening the Mutually Hurting Stalemate (Zartman. 2003: 21).  
The existence of ‘ripeness’ does not in itself guarantee or in fact lead to the initiation of the 
peace process. Parties should ‘seize’ the moment, or a third party should persuade parties to 
do so (Zartman, 2003:20). 
There are some complications associated with the concept of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate. 
Parties may choose to react negatively toward this type of ripeness – instead of initiating 
negotiations, parties take the ‘don’t give up without a fight’ attitude and reinforce their 
stronghold against the opposition (Zartman, 2003:24). Parties may feel like they are being 
pushed into a corner, or are too wary of their opponents, and react negatively. Another 
complication arises when pressure on a party leads to a worsening image of the opponent, 
which then in turn lessens the chances of reconciliation (Zartman, 2003:24). 
Also, unfortunately, the Mutually Hurting Stalemate is dependent on conflict. While by 
definition the Mutually Hurting Stalemate does not require a high level of violence, it does 
point out the difficulty of accomplishing successful preventative conflict resolution. The 
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South African peace negotiations (1990-1994) are a remarkable example of a perception of a 
Mutually Hurting Stalemate from both major parties, both parties fully aware of an 
impending catastrophe and not of ‘present casualties’ (Zartman, 2003:24).  
Lijphart (1977) identifies the ‘self-negating prediction’ as being essential to joint 
commitment to pursue a settlement (Du Toit & Gagiano, 1988:7). The self-negating 
prediction is defined as such (Du Toit, 1989:213):  
The self-negating prediction involves an awareness of the destructive conflict 
potential of deeply divided societies, which motivates elites to cooperate with one 
another in order to avert such conflict. The very real prospect of violent conflict 
provides the incentive for leaders to act in order to avoid it. It consists of an 
assessment of perceived future costs and benefits in a conflict relationship that 
provides the catalyst for preemptive action to forestall these perceived costs of 
escalating conflict by deescalating it instead. 
By making the self-negating prediction, negotiators find that seeking a negotiated settlement 
is more profitable than induced violence in divided societies (Du Toit, 1989:212). These 
negotiators, often the political elite, realise that by not cooperating they will be further 
dividing the already polarised society. 
2.2.1.3 Security Dilemma 
Peace processes often take place amidst periods of violence and have to deal with fears of ex-
militants influencing the negotiations. The South African National Peace Accord of 1991 did 
not ban arms, but instead dealt with this fear by requiring that firearms be displayed at public 
meetings (Darby & MacGinty. 2008: 347). A security dilemma is linked with the perception 
of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate. Parties to the conflict have up until the negotiations used 
displays of strength, often military, in order to show their dominance. Parties also feel that 
they should be able to defend themselves during negotiations, but this would also mean 
entering into negotiations in some degree of bad faith. The banning of arms symbolises good 
faith, and trust, in opponents. However, in situations that have been violent for years, parties 
fear letting go of their defence mechanisms.  
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2.2.1.4 Trust and Good Faith 
Bargaining in good faith means that ‘once a bargainer makes an offer it cannot be retracted, 
and an agreement, once reached, is enforceable’  (Lawler & Bacharach, 1981:9). The 
principle of negotiation in good faith is a widespread standard across negotiation processes, 
and has become a custom or is even protected under law in some cases (Gulliver, 1979:102). 
Overt offers cannot be withdrawn in favour of higher offers at a later stage. 
 ‘Negotiations tend to focus on issues, but their success depends on people’ (Harris & Reilly, 
1998:63). Successful processes focus not only on the issues at hand, but also on creating an 
effective working relationship between parties in order for them to negotiate in good faith 
(Harris & Reilly, 1998:64). The ‘psychological dimension’ of the conflict should be broken 
down in order for those engaged in the negotiations to develop trust. Perceptions must be 
changed for negotiations to be successful (Guelke, 2003:53). In extensive experimentation, 
Schurr & Ozanne (1985:948) found that when bargainers are perceived as trustworthy, there 
are higher levels of cooperation and more concessions made. 
Each phase of negotiation is precarious and requires a degree of trust between bargainers. 
Bargainers enter a high-risk environment in order to ascertain whether the other participants 
are serious about bargaining. Good faith is especially important in the early stages of 
negotiation as the chances of collapse are high. Distrust, the involvement of third parties and 
secrecy are rife in the initial phase. Parties often demand ‘signals of good faith’ in order to 
build confidence – this may include ceasefires or public statements of intent (Darby & 
MacGinty, 2003:7).  
Rubin & Brown (1975:15) refer to this as the ‘dilemma of trust’. Parties should show their 
integrity to their opponent, while not jeopardising their bargaining position by appearing 
weak or divulging too much information: ‘No party can be completely trusting, since he 
would be at the mercy of the other’s deceptions, and no party can be completely 
untrustworthy, since he would destroy the possibility of any agreement’ (Zartman & Berman, 
1982:28). 
The possibility does exist that one or more parties make a commitment to a normative 
element in bad faith, meaning that a party may have made a promise they do not intend to 
keep. This means that the existence of a settlement does not guarantee its success. The 
existence of such failures does not mean that normative elements in settlements should be 
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discounted. In fact, peace processes may not even reach this stage – parties are most often 
accused of ‘bad faith’ when ceasefires or the ending of violence is not sustained (Guelke, 
2003:56). 
Another factor that encourages negotiators to act cooperatively is the tradition of elite 
accommodation (Lijphart, 1977:100). Lijphart (1977:100) refers to Daalder’s argument on 
the traditions of political accommodation in the Netherlands and Switzerland and how these 
traditions eventually facilitated the move toward democracy. 
2.2.1.5 Valid Spokesperson 
Another element that has been periodically linked to ‘ripeness’ is the availability of a valid 
spokesperson for each side (Zartman, 2003:22). Strong representation in the form of 
leadership from parties involved can deliver that party’s compliance in productive and 
successful negotiations. Negotiators in South Africa went so far as to become ‘evangelists for 
peace’: Nelson Mandela became the face of peaceful negotiations and provided significant 
incentive to other parties to become involved (Darby & MacGinty, 2008:339).  
2.2.1.6 Spoilers 
Weaker parties may feel that a settlement in their favour is unattainable and instead choose to 
attempt the destruction of the peace process itself. In conflict situations where serious 
inequalities are present, envy and hatred are rife. This introduces the possibility of spoilers. 
Parties who feel that reasonable solutions are not within reach may aim to make negotiation 
difficult if not impossible. Parties who feel marginalised may become spoilers, and parties 
with military capability represent the greatest threat to negotiations. 
2.2.2 Process: The Phaseological Approach 
The phaseological approach to the study of negotiation aims to ‘fulfil a clarifying role 
regarding the timing and development of a bargaining relationship’ (Kruger, 1998:2). This 
approach can be easily integrated with other approaches to the study of negotiations. 
Several authors propose theories regarding this approach. Ann Douglas (1962) developed the 
first theoretical framework on negotiations based on the notion that negotiations occur in 
stages. Douglas’s framework did not show the phases as chronological, but rather as 
functional. She set up a framework based on three stages: (1) Establish the Bargaining Range 
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– this stage often involves violence as negotiators attempt to defend their positions and try to 
establish the boundaries within which the negotiations will take place; (2)Surveying the 
Bargaining Range – in this stage, proposals are made without official commitment; (3) 
Precipitating the Decision-Making Process – this is the stage where parties to the conflict 
officially commit to negotiations (Stephenson et al, 1977:231). 
A few years later, in 1968, Daniel Druckman moved away from identifying specific phases 
and focused on the preparatory phase of negotiations (Druckman, 1968:368). Ian Morley and 
Geoffrey Stephenson (1977) built on Douglas’s work by identifying the importance of the 
interpersonal relationship between bargainers during each phase of negotiation. A few years 
later, Gulliver (1979:121) built a model of successive phases in negotiation. He found that 
certain phases were given more attention by negotiators and as such built this model. While 
mentioning that in practice the phases are not necessarily linear or chronological, he found 
that ‘progress in one phase… opens the way to the succeeding phase…’ Calero (1982:38) 
built on previous work by mentioning the ‘intuitive awareness’ of negotiators that 
negotiations happen in phases.  
By 1982 Zartman & Berman identified ‘stages, sequences, behaviours, and tactics’ used in 
order to improve the practicability of negotiation theory, and in turn better the chances of 
successful negotiations (Zartman & Berman, 1982:1-2). In 1985, Harold Saunders brought 
the focus back to the pre-negotiation phase (Saunders, 1985:254-258).  
In 1989, Pierre du Toit reduced these phases into a comprehensible, overarching three phases, 
each inclusive of several elements of negotiation. These include (1) Bargaining about 
Bargaining, of which the main function is to encourage parties to accept that negotiation is 
the only viable option, that ‘outright victory’ is highly unlikely if not impossible, and that 
complete defeat isn’t necessary. The second phase, Preliminary Bargaining, focuses on the 
establishment of agendas, arenas, tactics, rules of conduct and other preconditions. The third 
and last phase, Substantive Bargaining, is focused on resolving the issues on which the 
conflict was originally based. In this phase, parties could secure a settlement within the 
contract zone. 
In 1998, Peter Harris and Ben Reilly brought the focus back to the pre-negotiation phase. 
These researchers stressed the fact that this phase was not to be used for addressing the 
outcome, but rather was to be used as ‘negotiation over process’ (1998:67). Harris and Reilly 
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once again made clear the importance of this phase in ensuring, or at least aiding, a successful 
outcome. This phase is equal to Du Toit’s definition of Preliminary Bargaining, followed by a 
similar Substantive Negotiation phase. While Harris and Reilly do not completely bypass the 
essential first phase mentioned by Du Toit, they place more emphasis on the phase where the 
framework, structure, roles and agendas are set up (1998:67). 
In 2003, Adrian Guelke once again broadened the framework of the phaseological approach. 
Guelke (2003: 56) identified seven phases in the process: (1) the pre-talks phase; (2) a phase 
of secret talks; (3) the opening of multilateral talks; (4) negotiating to a settlement; (5) 
gaining endorsement; (6) implementing its provisions; and (7) the institutionalisation of the 
new dispensation. While not arguing that these phases were present in all negotiations, 
Guelke argued that at least these seven phases were present (or should be) during difficult 
negotiations (2003:56). 
I have chosen to use Du Toit’s basic approach while incorporating important aspects from 
different models within this framework. I choose this as it provides a comprehensive, simple, 
three-phase model on which to ground my analysis. This model has previously been used 
effectively to analyse the South African negotiations in Kruger (1998). I add an Aftercare 
section (Darby & MacGinty, 2008:352).in order to encompass the later focus on the 
implementation of settlements, especially in securing their long-term success.  
2.2.2.1 Pre-negotiation (Talks about Talks) 
Negotiation often takes time, starting with pre-negotiations. Harris & Reilly (1998:66) refer 
to this phase as ‘talks about talks’, while Du Toit (1989:215) refers to this phase as 
‘bargaining about bargaining’. At this time in the process parties are often unwilling to enter 
into negotiations. It may be very difficult for parties to enter into negotiations – they may not 
be able to meet, levels of trust could be so low as to completely discourage talks, one or all 
parties may be too angry or too proud (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992:533). Some parties may seek 
violent means when faced with the possibility of having to accept undesirable settlements 
(Johnson, 1993:12).  
Conditions resulting in a willingness to negotiate rarely, if ever, coincide for all parties 
involved in the conflict (Darby & MacGinty, 2008:352). Rivals in conflict may propose talks 
in turn, but this very rarely happens simultaneously. ‘Windows of opportunity’ are rare, but it 
is only during this window that a settlement can be reached. 
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Pre-negotiation, or the ‘pre-talks phase’ (Guelke, 2003:57), often relies on the existence of a 
Mutually Hurting Stalemate. Though this concept has been criticised as ‘too passive’, 
Zartman (in Darby & MacGinty, 2008:353) maintains that ‘unripeness should not constitute 
an excuse for second or third parties’ inaction’. The Mutually Hurting Stalemate will be 
explored further in the next section.  Parties seek motives in order to enter into negotiations. 
One motive may be that seeking negotiation gives them a ‘measure of legitimacy’, implying 
that the conflict cannot end without their participation (Guelke, 2003:57). 
Parties have divergent reasons for entering into talks, and the desire to negotiate needs to 
coincide. While certain favourable circumstances do exist, Guelke (2003:57) refers to this as 
‘coincidence’ rather than set in stone. Guelke (2003:57) refers to Zartman’s argument that the 
intent of parties to ‘arrive at a joint outcome’, a crucial ingredient for talks, is often 
completely absent. In this phase, parties determine whether they should strive for complete 
victory or whether a mutually beneficial and acceptable settlement can and should be sought 
(Du Toit & Gagiano, 1988:7).  
This phase provides parties with a platform to ‘probe and explore, and to show the other side 
examples of possibilities’ (Zartman & Berman, 1982:71). However, this is not a time to make 
binding promises. In this phase, parties try to explain their perception of the conflict to their 
opponent, making clear their meanings and understanding of the conflict in order to better 
understand each other before entering into binding negotiations (Zartman & Berman, 
1982:95). 
For the negotiation process to officially begin, parties should make a deliberately calculated 
conscious change in their perception of the conflict, and this usually occurs during this phase 
(Zartman & Berman, 1982:43). Such a new perception, which follows from a newly 
(re)calculated cost-benefit analysis, is often/can be induced by major structural changes to the 
political environment of antagonists, such as the end of the Cold War which induced some 
changes in the South African political landscape.  This type of ‘fortuitous event’ often plays a 
role in helping parties to re-define their perceptions. 
An ‘era of secret talks’ often follows these ‘pre-talks’ and falls within the pre-negotiation 
phase. Parties to the conflict fear reaction from their supporters and as such these talks are 
often conducted in secret. These talks are ‘exploratory’ rather than substantive and parties 
have not yet committed themselves to negotiate with the view to clinching a mutually 
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beneficial settlement (Guelke, 2003:58). Truce or ceasefires usually don’t occur during this 
phase. During this stage, the public may become aware of the existence of talks, although not 
necessarily the content of the talks. The public reaction to this often plays a vital role in 
whether the parties continue toward negotiations (Guelke, 2003:58). Should the public react 
positively, parties may see this as a go-ahead for more substantive talks, but public upheaval 
may result in abandoning the talks altogether.  
Zartman (2003:26) identifies items to be explored during pre-negotiation: 
 The Parties involved in the conflict and essential to a settlement should be identified; 
 The issues that can be resolved should be separated from those not resolvable in the 
conflict; 
 Alternatives to the current conflict should be identified; 
 Opponents should develop contact between each other; 
 Risks and costs to negotiation should be made clear; 
 A reciprocal relationship should be established; 
 Support from each partaking party’s followers should be garnered. 
2.2.2.2 Preliminary Negotiation 
Preliminary negotiation and pre-negotiation are sometimes used synonymously. In this study 
a distinction is made between the two. Preliminary negotiation is one step further than the 
pre-negotiation phase described in the section above. Du Toit & Gagiano (1988:7) define 
preliminary negotiation as the phase where issues like tactics, preconditions and arenas are 
discussed and determined, in other words, defining the bargaining relationship.  
Distrust, negative stereotypes and hostility between conflicted parties become entrenched 
during years of violence. Parties often view their opponents as ‘cohesive, devious and 
successful’, and tend to view themselves as discouraged and divided. This does not create an 
environment conducive to successful negotiations (Darby & Mac Ginty, 2008:355). Darby & 
MacGinty (2008:355) address the issue of building confidence during preliminary negotiation 
and the establishment of rules and procedures in order to move forward with negotiation: 
Israel’s recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as legitimate 
representatives of the Palestinian people in the Oslo Accord, coupled with acceptance of the 
Palestinian right to self-determination, had great symbolic significance. There and elsewhere, 
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the fact that negotiations are taking place at all presumes an acceptance, often implicit, that 
the representatives of militants have been admitted to negotiations in return for giving up 
violence. Their inclusion, whatever pressures it imposes on the process, admits militants to 
the common enterprise and applies a moral pressure on them to preserve the process in the 
face of violence from dissidents or spoiler groups. 
Oftentimes radical differences concerning bargaining preferences are apparent at the onset 
(Atkinson, 1977:57). It is then up to the parties to structure the bargaining process in such a 
way as to satisfy both sides. This is where preliminary negotiation comes in. This phase 
provides a platform for setting up the framework of the negotiation itself – such as the agenda 
and the procedures the negotiation can take on. Preliminary negotiation is not concerned with 
the issues themselves, but rather the framework within which these issues will be discussed 
(Harris & Reilly, 1998:67). Items to be addressed during preliminary negotiation include 
whether or not to set a time limit to negotiations and symbolic issues including 
representation, procedures and venue (Guelke, 2003:59). While this may delay the 
substantive negotiations, these issues are instrumental in determining a positive outcome. 
Harris & Reilly (1998:67) stress the importance of these talks. They list some major elements 
of this phase (Harris & Reilly, 1998:69): 
 Agreeing on the basic rules about procedures; 
 Agreeing on who should participate in the process, and how they will be represented; 
 Dealing with preconditions for negotiation, like ceasefires or disarmament; and 
barriers to dialogue, where parties refuse to enter into negotiations with a specific 
party/person or on a specific subject. This may be ratified by the influence of a third 
party; 
 Creating a level playing-field for the parties – no party should be shown to have a 
marked advantage entering into negotiations. Governments have easier access to 
resources (like arms and allies) than rebel groups who often have to fight for these 
resources. The equality need only exist within negotiations; 
 Resourcing the negotiations – who will fund the physical aspects of the negotiations? 
Negotiators may opt to each fund themselves, seek contributions from other actors, 
domestic or international, or one party may offer to fund all or most of the 
negotiations; 
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 The form the negotiations will take on: this is determined by the number of 
participants as well as the issues on the agenda. The negotiations may take on the 
form of a conference, a summit, round table discussion, bilateral discussion or any 
form that the negotiators choose as most suitable to their unique situation; 
 Venue and location: the choice of venue has the potential to become a contentious 
issue; 
 Communication and information exchange: parties should choose whether to keep the 
proceedings transparent in whole, in part, or not at all. There are benefits to each of 
these choices – transparent talks reduce suspicion and allow for positive use of the 
media, while closed talks allow for more candour on the part of the negotiators; 
 Discussing and agreeing upon some broad principles with regard to outcomes; 
 Managing the proceedings: this includes questions as to who will chair the 
proceedings and who will be responsible for what. For example, in Ireland, a former 
US Senator was chair of the process, while in South Africa the position of chair was 
rotated among parties; 
 Decision-making procedures: it should be determined in advance how decisions will 
be reached and how to define the agreements as binding; 
 Process tools to facilitate negotiations and break deadlocks; 
 The possible assistance of a third party. 
2.2.2.3 Substantive Negotiation 
Substantive negotiation involves ‘the process of resolving the dispute from which the original 
conflict of interest arose’ (Du Toit & Gagiano, 1988:7). This phase of negotiation seeks a 
settlement within the contract zone acceptable to all parties (Du Toit, 1989:216).  Formal 
talks involving all parties to the conflict are vital to the peace process (Guelke, 2003:59). The 
commitment of the parties to a negotiated settlement is demonstrated by the formality of the 
juncture. Inclusion of the divergent parties involved is essential to the legitimacy of the talks 
(Guelke, 2003:59). 
Inclusive negotiations do not guarantee political settlement (Guelke, 2003:59). Each side’s 
minimum requirements have to be reconciled in order for there to be settlement. In other 
words, the existence of a contract zone needs to be apparent to all parties involved before 
substantive negotiations are attempted. 
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Structural components greatly affect the behaviour or bargainers (Rubin & Brown, 1975:42). 
This section takes a closer look at some structural aspects that influence bargainers. Every 
one of these structural aspects is the subject of preliminary negotiations. 
a) Participants 
Because of the militant and violent nature of conflict, it may seem natural to want to exclude 
certain parties from negotiations. More extreme parties have the ability to undermine the 
agreement or obstruct the process (Harris & Reilly, 1998:69). However, inclusion is essential 
to the success of negotiations. Inclusion does not only refer to opposing parties but also to 
different factions within parties (Harris & Reilly, 1998:70). It is also vital that the negotiators 
be recognised as such by their followers as well as by the opposition (Harris & Reilly, 
1998:71). 
More often than not, more than two parties are involved in a bargaining exchange. The more 
parties are involved, the more time is needed, the more tangible and intangible issues need to 
be discussed and agreed upon, the more audiences are to be held in account, and the greater 
the likelihood of the formation of coalitions (Rubin & Brown, 1975:64).  
Figure 2.2: The Formation of Coalitions 
 
Source: Compiled by the researcher, adapted from Rubin & Brown (1975:64) 
Coalitions are defined by Rubin & Brown (1975:64) as ‘the unification of the power or 
resources (or both) of two or more parties so that they stand a better chance of obtaining a 
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Coalitions are most likely to form in bargaining when power is perceived to be unevenly 
distributed and parties seeking specific outcomes see coalition formation as advantageous to 
themselves (Rubin & Brown, 1975:67). Rubin & Brown (1975:71-72) mention some 
inhibitors to the formation of coalitions: the initial distribution of resources or power inhibits 
the effective and fruitful formation of coalitions; parties choose to opt out of potentially 
effective coalitions because of external issues, like loyalty to an audience, and differences, 
like race issues or differences on key policy, which inhibit them from recognising common 
interests. Figure 2.2 represents the process of the formation of coalitions. 
When these inhibitors are not present, weaker parties form alliances with other weaker parties 
in order to go up against stronger parties. It is highly unlikely for weaker parties to seek 
alliances with stronger parties, and opt for weaker parties with less power and resources 
instead. Stronger parties seek exploitative or manipulative coalitions with weaker parties in 
order to ensure an advantageous outcome for themselves. Coalitions may be formed in order 
to increase intangible gains only (Rubin & Brown, 1975:74). Parties have a tendency to form 
coalitions against historically advantaged parties (Rubin & Brown, 1975:76). 
Parties with more power are more attractive coalition partners (Rubin & Brown, 1975:78). 
Parties who initially have equal power and resources are more likely to have an equal 
division of outcomes. Differential power within coalitions and resources and status usually 
results in unequal distribution because stronger parties demand a larger share of the outcomes 
(Rubin & Brown, 1975:79). However, it is not necessary for parties to be exactly alike or 
equal in every way in order for them to negotiate with each other (Johnson, 1993:11). Instead, 
parties should perceive equality in the ‘playing field’ of the negotiations.  
b) Rules 
A stable set of rules is vital during negotiations. Rules provide stability to an unstable 
situation (Atkinson, 1977:47). Atkinson (1977: 38-47) designed a set of basic rules conducive 
to successful bargaining. Items 1, 2, 4 and 7 are all conducive to good faith bargaining and 
resonate with Lawler and Bacharach’s (1981:9) definition of good faith mentioned in section 
2.2.1.4: 
1. Only those issues put on the agenda during preliminary negotiations may be bargained 
on; 
2. All standing agreements must be upheld during negotiations, and implemented; 
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3. A time limit or time scale should be determined early on and honoured by all; 
4. Parties to the negotiations should be willing to move from their original position; 
5. Parties should not manipulate or abuse means of achieving movement; 
6. Sanctions are allowed, but should not overshadow bargaining. Sanctions are preferred 
when a party has no faith in the process and views it as the best (or only) method of 
gaining its outcome. Bargaining expertise may be able to counter sanctions, but often 
need to be countered by ‘equal or greater’ power. It should however become clear to 
negotiators that sanctions are not effective in the long term; 
7. ‘Bargaining should be fair’ 
 Once an offer is made it should not be withdrawn without sufficient 
warning or significant changes in circumstances; 
 Parties should refrain from denying previously accepted norms, rules, or 
issues; 
 Only when direct negotiation has failed are parties allowed to appeal to 
actors outside of the negotiations (e.g. the opponent’s followers); 
 Bargainers should demonstrate a willingness to bargain on previously 
identified negotiable issues; 
 Informal settlements and confidential information should be treated as 
such and not exploited in order to achieve formal commitment; 
 Even in defeat, bargainers should be able to maintain credibility (or ‘save 
face’) to his own side; 
 The final settlement should be free of dishonestly and deceit; 
 Once the settlement has been formally agreed upon, it must be 
implemented as is. 
c) Venue 
The choice of venue during negotiations affects the psychological climate of the negotiations 
as well as the amount of power each party has over the physical arrangements of the 
exchange. Should the negotiations be conducted on one party’s territory, it has power over 
the physical arrangements of the site, which in turn affects all parties involved (Rubin & 
Brown, 1975:82). This gives the host party a distinct advantage, i.e. ‘home ground 
advantage’. Bargaining on one’s own territory is a potential source of strength in assuring 
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assertiveness in bargaining. Guests to the site may view themselves as inferior and behave 
accordingly (Rubin & Brown, 1975:83). 
Not only the neutrality of the site, but also its appropriateness (size, location, and 
availability), its distinctiveness (can this venue later be used symbolically as representing the 
place where great cooperation took place?) and its openness to the public may determine its 
selection (Rubin & Brown, 1975:86). Openness is often undesirable, but parties sometimes 
wish to use openness to their advantage by ‘marshalling for public opinion’ or publicly 
enhancing its standing (Rubin & Brown, 1975:87). The venue for the South African 
negotiations in Kempton Park is an excellent example of a neutral venue.  
d) Agenda 
Preliminary negotiations provide a platform for determining the broad subject matter and 
negotiable issues of the substantive negotiations. Bargainers should be aware of these issues 
ahead of time in order to effectively prepare for the negotiations (Harris & Reilly, 1998:86 – 
87). The initiation of talks surrounding an issue not agreed upon may destabilise the process. 
It is thus vital to define the agenda ahead of substantive negotiations (that is, during pre-
negotiations) - in other words, listing and defining the issues to the satisfaction of all parties, 
but not addressing the issues (Harris & Reilly, 1998:86 – 87).  
Bargainers assign different ‘importance rankings’ to issues and as such the agenda has to be 
set up in order to satisfy all sides’ perspective of size of the issues at hand (Rubin & Brown, 
1975:136). Intangible issues such as precedent and concerns with national survival often 
determine, and increase, the scale of value of tangible issues (Rubin & Brown, 1975:136). 
By adding certain issues, parties can gain power. The same sort of power can be gained by 
keeping items off the agenda. Adding issues may also be viewed in a positive light when 
adding issues leads to enhancing or creating a contract zone. When issues are separated, it 
may reduce the chance of settlement. Linking issues, however, could make for advantageous 
agreement (Sebenius, 1983:314). 
Carnevale & Pruitt (1992:534-535) mention the necessity of reconceptualising or reframing 
issues to such an extent that agreement becomes an option. They refer to this as the ‘joint 
utility space’ which may be approximated with the contract zone. This ‘space’, like the 
contract zone, shows options for settling issues that satisfy all parties involved. 




Time is of the utmost importance in most bargaining exchanges (Rubin & Brown, 1975:121). 
Divergent arguments prevail for and against timeframes and deadlines. One side argues the 
necessity of deadlines in order to push toward success, another argues that bargainers may 
use ‘delaying tactics’ if there is endless time, while yet another argues that without time 
limits, urgency to concede and come to a settlement is missing (Harris & Reilly, 1998:89).  
Time limits can be ‘explicit or implicit, self-generated or imposed from without, flexible or 
rigid, and viewed in similar or dissimilar ways by the parties involved’ (Rubin & Brown, 
1975:121). Harris & Reilly (1998:90) list some of options for timeframes: 
 Parties may opt to set no time limits and remain in negotiation until  all the issues 
have been resolved; 
 Parties could choose to ‘pre-arrange’ a time limit; 
 Parties can put a realistic limit on the amount of goals to be achieved in the time that 
is available; 
 Parties may aim to comprehensively settle ‘all aspects of the dispute’; 
 Parties could opt for further negotiation should the original timeframe be insufficient, 
therefore opting for a flexible timeframe based on certain goals. 
f) Decision-making Rules 
How decisions are made and agreed upon during the negotiating process is very important to 
ensure the contentment of all parties involved. By what criteria/rules is agreement reached? 
All parties must accept decisions as legitimate and binding once these decisions have been 
reached. These measures must be established in advance (Harris & Reilly, 1998:91). 
Parties may choose to abide by a numerical majority, the choice of which will mean having to 
establish a system of voting. Another option is to accept agreement by the judgement of an 
outside party as to when an issue has been agreed upon, this can be the form of adjudication, 
arbitration or go by another name suitable to the situation (Zartman & Berman, 1982:46) 
Modern peace processes are rarely bilateral and include many divergent parties and opinions.  
Should small parties carry the same weight in decision-making as major parties, the process 
has the potential of being stalled by the veto of smaller, less influential, parties (Darby, 2003: 
343). The South African peace negotiations provide a good example of dealing with this 
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eventuality. These negotiations were based on innovative approaches, for example, a system 
of ‘sufficient consensus’ was used in decision-making in order to ensure that the process not 
be stalled should the minority disagree with those in the majority (Darby, 2003: 341). This 
meant that when the two major parties agreed, the decision could not be stalled by smaller 
parties. Smaller parties’ dissent was recorded, and they could remain in the process and 
decide whether to support the eventual outcome when it had been reached (Darby, 2003:344).  
2.2.3 The Process of Bargaining 
Bargainers entering into negotiations wish to reach some form of settlement, but on terms 
most favourable to themselves. This presents the bargaining problem (Lawler & Bacharach, 
1981:4). However, if bargainers did not want to cooperate, they would not be at the 
negotiation table (Lawler & Bacharach, 1981:4). The bargaining process is, basically put, the 
‘convergence of offers and counteroffers over time’ (Lawler & Bacharach, 1981:5). 
The activity during the process of negotiations is sequential, as represented by Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3: Negotiation Activity 
 
Source: Compiled by the researcher, adapted from Rubin & Brown (1975:14). 
It is vital that the negotiation process remains flexible. Overly detailed pre-conditions have a 
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of new groups or ideas which in turn ‘generates a vital constitutional politics, in which groups 
have a stake in the maintenance of certain core elements of the constitutional bargain even as 
more peripheral elements change’ (Elkins et al, 2009:82).  Parties should also be willing to 
move from their original position – otherwise bargaining becomes impossible (Atkinson, 
1977:42). 
2.2.3.1 Intangible issues 
While bargaining relationships focus on the division of tangible resources, the resolution of 
intangible issues (like honour, self-esteem or principle) is essential to bargaining activity 
(Rubin & Brown, 1975:11). Inherent in the bargaining relationship are two goals: firstly, 
‘winning’ a favourable outcome to oneself; and secondly, to acquire and maintain the 
appearance of being ‘powerful as well as lovable’ (Rubin & Brown, 1975:12). In other 
words, to save face during negotiations. 
Parties who wish to appear strong to the opposition or to other audiences generate intangible 
issues like public image and self-esteem. Parties suppose that in order to receive favourable 
outcomes, they need to appear strong and protect themselves from injuries. Bargainers who 
have a high need for power or who hold themselves in low self-esteem are most susceptible 
to intangible issues as mentioned above (Rubin & Brown, 1975:136).  
Parties to a conflict are often, and mostly, very concerned with upholding ‘face’. Sometimes 
parties become so obsessed with protecting themselves from loss of face that it overtakes 
tangible issues and causes very intense conflict that can hamper movement toward settlement 
as well as increase the costs of the process (Brown, 1977:275). Insults and unnecessary 
intimidation, one’s outcomes being unfairly reduced, and events causing public humiliation 
pose threats to face (Brown, 1977:276). Any event that can be construed as casting doubt on a 
party’s ‘capability, strength, status, prestige, or reputation in the eyes of salient others’ is 
cause for a party to feel that it might lose face (Brown, 1977:276-277). 
Face-saving is defined as ‘anticipatory and preventative, and as becoming evident when A 
attempts to prevent, forestall, or block action by B that A supposes could cause him to look 
foolish, weak, or incapable’ (Brown, 1977:277). Face-saving behaviour is essentially 
anticipatory and preventative, which means that it is future-orientated and offensive. Face-
saving techniques aim to hide, prevent, moderate or defend against the disclosure of 
information that could potentially cultivate an appearance of weakness. Face-saving 
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techniques also aim to curb the occurrence of events that could construe the victimised party 
as vulnerable (Brown, 1977:278).  
Face restoration stand in contrast to face-saving as it is defined as ‘reparative of damage 
already done and as reflected in attempts by A to seek redress from B, whom A believes has 
already caused him to look foolish, weak, of incapable’ (Brown, 1977:277). Face restoration 
actions aims to repair face that has either been damaged or lost. These techniques can be 
either verbal or physical actions (Brown, 1977:281-282):  
(1) Verbal expressions like retractions or modifications of statements that have been 
either misinformed, inaccurate or inappropriate and have caused one to look weak or 
vulnerable; 
(2) Face restoration actions include the use of threat. Had a party been intimidated by the 
opposition they may choose to use threat in order to repair damage to their self-esteem 
and public image. 
2.2.3.2 Bargaining Power 
Bargaining power has been described as the ‘the crucial variable’ in conflict situations. The 
capacity of ‘power’ in negotiations is the ability to effectively pressurise one’s opponent and 
is often used in the form of threats or the promise of reward (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992:550). 
Atkinson (1977:12) refers to Neil Chamberlain’s explanation of bargaining power: ‘We may 
define the bargaining power (of A let us say) as being the cost to B of disagreement on A’s 
terms relative to the cost of agreement on A’s terms’. Thus, the power of A is based on B’s 
‘dependence on the benefits that can be provided’ by A, and vice versa (Lawler & Bacharach, 
1986:191).  
2.2.3.3 Bargaining Tactics 
Bargaining can be portrayed as a game where the players try to manipulate information to 
their advantage (Lawler & Bacharach, 1981:42). Determining how to use bargaining power is 
based on tactical action. Tactical action is the link between bargaining power and bargaining 
outcomes (Lawler & Bacharach, 1981:47). Bargaining power is used by means of tactics, and 
effective tactics can ensure positive, or favourable, outcomes. Parties may choose to 
manipulate the impression of their bargaining power by using ambiguities or other tactics. 
The perception of power can have the same effect as actual power, depending on how 
effectively tactics and ambiguous speech are used to manipulate perceptions. It is the task of 
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the negotiator to persuade its opponent that it has control over resources that the opponent is 
in need of, and that the negotiator is willing to use that power to its advantage (Lawler & 
Bacharach, 1981:51).  
2.2.4 Aftercare: Nurturing the Settlement 
What happens after negotiation is essential to a successful peace process, but is often 
neglected. A settlement should identify general principles and parameters of what was agreed 
upon during negotiations. The implementation of the settlement prolongs the peace process in 
establishing functioning institutions and carrying through reforms (Darby & MacGinty, 
2008:352). 
According to Guelke (2003:62) the last phase of the peace process is when the ‘irreversible’ 
entrenchment of the settlement becomes evident. In order for the negotiated settlement to be 
perceived as institutionalised, it requires international legitimisation, which in turn depends 
on the internal response to the settlement. Elections play a big role in legitimising new 
agreements. In 1994 in South Africa, elections served the purpose of ‘retrospective 
endorsement of the settlement and its partial implementation’ (Guelke, 2003:60-61). 
Endorsement may also be gained by referendum (Guelke, 2003:61). Darby and MacGinty 
(2008:360) use Reilly’s statement that these elections or referenda should be viewed as ‘the 
beginning of a long-term process of democratization, not the end-point’. Once again, this 
indicates that a negotiated settlement in itself does not assure long-lasting peace.  
Guelke (2003:61) asserts that the less detailed a settlement, the more difficult it will be to 
implement. Contrary to the commonly-held belief amongst American constitutional scholars 
that constitutions that are ‘loosely drafted’ are superior, a certain amount of clarity and 
specificity may be useful in facilitating enforcement (Elkins et al, 2009:84). The argument is 
that a document that provides a clearer and more specified framework is more easily and 
widely understood (Elkins et al, 2009:84). A less detailed settlement leaves room for 
interpretation, which in turn may invoke disputes over the settlement itself. An effective 
trade-off should be made regarding the flexibility of the settlement versus its specificity. 
The balance of forces may shift during implementation which in turn may make it ‘apparent 
that one side has won’ (Guelke, 2003:62): The foundation of the situation may be destabilised 
by the reality of the balance of forces. This could result in the settlement being implemented 
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disproportionately, bringing into question the legitimacy of the settlement itself, as well as its 
implementation. 
Darby & MacGinty (2008:359) list post-accord reconstruction and conflict transformation as 
the final phase in negotiations. In countries like El Salvador and Guatemala, where peace 
agreements have been hailed as exemplary and enduring, high crime rates and weak 
economic growth threaten stability. The lack of economic regeneration and social equality in 
South Africa led to a ‘growing sense of disillusion with peace itself’ (Darby & MacGinty, 
2008:360). New administrations are left with problems from years of violence and have to 
deal with these as well as continuing disputes. Many explanations exist as to why peace 
accords don’t survive or lead to positive peace. Explanations include (Darby & MacGinty, 
2008:359):  
 War leaves states in weakened positions, and many of these states are impoverished 
and have weak institutions to begin with; 
 Peace processes may not have included or sufficiently resolved all the fundamental 
issues, which may prolong the dispute; 
 Leaders fail to gain sufficient acceptance from their followers for the agreement, 
which results in discontent when benefits do not live up to expectations or are 
delayed; 
 The agreement may not be comprehensive or detailed enough, which often leads to 
failure to implement the terms of the agreement; 
 Economic restructuring may simply not be sufficient for post-war reconstruction; 
 Unanticipated developments may impede the peace process, such as the 2004 
Tsunami or the USA War on Terror 
2.3. Chapter Summary 
This chapter sought to identify important literature on the study of negotiated transitions to 
democracy. Key authors on this subject were highlighted, and comments and critique 
regarding democratic transition were extensively explored. The chapter went on to discuss in 
detail the dynamics of negotiated compromise and constitution-making, focusing on the pre-
conditions necessary for negotiations to start, including the existence of the contract zone, the 
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Mutually Hurting Stalemate, security dilemma, trust and good faith, valid spokespersons and 
spoilers. 
The phaseological approach to the analysis of transitions was explained and examined. This 
chapter sought to set the platform for the next chapter which will look at the outcomes of this 
type of transition and negotiation. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
Negotiations about protracted communal conflicts within national states invariably require 
written constitutional outcomes. These outcomes range from written Constitutional Contracts 
to more loosely drafted contracts and social contracts. Some may not even be defined as 
contracts at all. This study focuses on three types of outcomes: the Constitutional Contract; 
the Social Contract; and the Benchmark Agreement. 
This chapter sets out to operationalize these three concepts, which were introduced in Chapter 
1. Each concept will be explored, looking at supporting literature, in order to form an 
operational definition. From this literature, a set of indicators for each concept will be 
identified. These indicators will assist in the qualitative case study to follow, allowing for 
focused study of the data sources, listed in section 3.4.1.  
3.2. Outcomes: Negotiated Constitutions, a Conceptual Framework 
When parties have reached a consensual settlement it means that all parties ‘freely consent to 
make the particular agreement and that [all] parties feel substantial responsibility for the 
nature of the agreement’ (Lawler & Bacharach, 1981:202). The more responsible parties feel, 
and the higher levels of mutual consent, the more committed they will be to the settlement, 
and as such, more content with the implementation thereof (Lawler & Bacharach, 1981:203). 
Before an accord can be negotiated, the question whether the issues surrounding the conflict 
can be resolved within the framework of the national state needs to be addressed. The 
alternative to this is secession and autonomy – Darby & MacGinty (2008:358) refer to Yash 
Ghai who questions whether this is a viable option by mentioning the ‘paradoxes of 
autonomy’:  
It (a) seeks to solve the problem of territory, and yet may aggravate it; (b) is intended to solve 
the problem of identity, yet it may accentuate identity and stimulate the ‘manufacture’ of new 
communities; (c) seeks to increase pluralism, yet depends for its own success on pre-existing 
traditions of pluralism; and (d) aims to resolve conflict, yet aggravates disputes. 
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These so-called ‘paradoxes’ or tensions make the option of secession less favourable, and 
most contemporary peace processes tend to find an outcome between secession and  
reformation of the status quo. This often involves power-sharing (Darby & MacGinty, 
2003:358). Darby & MacGinty (2008:358) rely on Timothy Sisk to highlight the importance 
of ‘guarantees’ to major stakeholders in conflict, more specifically, guarantees concerning 
‘permanent political representation, decision-making power, and often autonomous territory 
in the post-war peace’. This type of power-sharing is widely encouraged by international 
mediators.  
Constitutional settlements not only focus on political agreement, but also on other elements: 
‘a central deal on democratic access to power; the establishment of human rights institutions; 
and some mechanisms to address past human rights violations’  (Darby & MacGinty, 
2003:358). 
Guelke (2003:67) states that if a settlement is not based on some normative foundation 
separate from ‘power political considerations’, then it will most likely not survive in the long 
term. For Ramsbotham et al (2005:175) a ‘good’ settlement ‘should not only bridge the 
opposing interests, but also represent norms that are public goods from the wider community 
in which the conflict is situated.’ 
There has been some focus by writers of conflict on refining the positions of parties in order 
to achieve an outcome that favours the goals of all the parties – in other words, a positive sum 
outcome (or win-win). This approach aims to do more than simply ‘split the difference’ 
between the positions of the parties (Guelke, 2003:63). 
Integrative approaches, otherwise known as positive sum approaches, seek ways ‘if not to 
reconcile the conflicting positions, then to meet the underlying interest, values or needs’ 
(Ramsbotham et al, 2005:173). This can be achieved by putting the issues into a wider 
context, or by framing the parties’ issues so that they become compatible. Integrative 
negotiation creates the potential for win-win outcomes – all parties ‘win’ or gain in some way 
(Barry & Friedman, 1998:346). These outcomes are non-zero-sum, and also not negative sum 
(lose-lose), meaning that each side has a possibility to gain from negotiation, even if not 
equally so (Barry & Friedman, 1998:348). Integrative situations call for more communication 
and effort so that parties are able to discover joint, mutually beneficial outcomes. Parties in 
these situations bargain best when needs and interests are openly displayed. This means that 
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to bargain effectively in integrative situations, all interests must be taken into account (one’s 
own as well as that of the opponent) (Barry & Friedman, 1998:348). 
Distributive outcomes constitute win-lose situations – one party wins while the other party 
loses. In a distributive bargaining situation, the issues at stake involve ‘fixed sums of goods 
or resources to be allocated among the negotiating parties’ (Barry & Friedman, 1998:346). In 
cases that are purely distributive, parties’ interests are negatively correlated – this means that, 
as one party’s gains increases, the other’s gains decrease. Most negotiations have integrative 
and distributive characteristics. Rubin & Brown (1975:137) refer to Gallo’s argument that 
conflicts where tangible issues are involved most often result in non-zero-sum settlements, 
while those with intangible, symbolic issues are likely to produce zero-sum outcomes. 
Ramsbotham et al (2005:175-176) identify characteristics of successful settlements, in line 
with characteristics noted by Elkins et al (2009) and Horowitz (1991): 
 Settlements and negotiations toward them should be as inclusive as 
possible of all affected parties;  
 Settlements should be precise, detailed and well-crafted about transitional 
arrangements (such details regarding ceasefires and voting rules); 
 Settlements should offer some flexibility in balance with clear 
commitments; 
 Incentives and/or ‘rewards’ should be offered to parties to be (and stay) 
involved; 
 Settlements should have provisions on mediations and renegotiation; 
 Settlements should include and deal with the core issues of the conflict and 
‘bring about real transformation’ by integrating norms and principles to 
which the parties are required to subscribe, while ‘creating political space 
for further negotiations and political accommodation’; 
 Settlements should not undermine international standard on justice, human 
rights, and respect for individuals and groups. 
3.2.1. What is a constitution? 
The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science defines a constitution as ‘a collection of 
written and unwritten principles and rules that identify the sources, purposes, uses and 
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restraints of public power’ (Bogdanor, 1991:142). Another notable definition is that of Strong 
(1972:10): ‘A constitution may be said to be a collection of principles according to which the 
powers of the government, the rights of the governed, and the relations between the two are 
adjusted.’ Duchacek (1973:3) defines the text of a constitution as ‘the official blueprint for 
the uses of public power is accompanied by numerous provisions for controls and restraints 
of the exercise of power’. Other noteworthy authors in this field include Blaustein & Flanz 
(1971) and Friedrich (1950).  
S.E. Finer’s (1997:1502) definition of constitutions as ‘codes of rules which aspire to regulate 
the allocation of functions, powers and duties among the various agencies and offices of 
government, and define the relationship between these and the public’ presents a clear and 
comprehensive definition for the purpose of this study. 
3.2.2. Constitutional Contract 
It is clearly difficult, if not impossible, to ensure the unanimous consent of all groups and 
individuals present during negotiations. A certain amount of ‘give and take’ occurs during 
negotiations and stakeholders may be unhappy with certain aspects which have been placed 
in the constitution at their own cost.  
A Constitutional Contract is a written document demarcating a set of institutions. A 
Constitutional Contract is not necessarily vested in political culture and does not necessitate 
the nurturing of the contract within a changing society. A feature of Constitutional Contracts 
is the exchange of concessions, based on quid pro quo: ‘this-for-that’. The Constitutional 
Contract is inherently based on these strict terms of the trade. This type of contract is made 
up of constitutional rules and democratic institutions and is not concerned with ongoing 
bargaining in the social and political arena. A Constitutional Contract is not necessarily 
focused on the ‘aftercare’, but is rather a set of rules on paper, instead of being concerned 
with becoming entrenched in the hearts and minds of citizens. Constitutional Contracts tend 
toward including ‘group rights’, and are attractive because of the ‘immediacy’ of the gains 
vested in the contract (Horowitz, 1991:151). Horowitz (1991:151) calls this ‘treaty making’. 
Contractually based constitutions have the strength of clarity, but they also have weaknesses. 
According to Horowitz (1991:149), Constitutional Contracts are ‘based on reciprocity, and 
they have all the characteristic problems all contracts have: the preferences of parties change 
over time; conditions also change; the returns to the parties from the deal are uneven; and the 
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deadlines laid down inevitably arrive.’ One of these weaknesses is what Horowitz (1985: 
584-585) calls the Incommensurables pitfall.  This occurs when the expected terms of trade, 
the quid pro quo, does not materialize, due to the incommensurability of the nature of the 
goods traded.  In the case of Malaysia, the Chinese received citizenship, which was 
accomplished through executive decision and bureaucratic policy implementation.  They 
received it quickly, and were able to gain the benefits of citizenship immediately.  The other 
side of the bargain, however, was for Malays, a largely impoverished community, to gain 
economic betterment.  At best, lifting an entire community from poverty takes decades, and 
generations, and is not immediately available as a benefit to all.  The fairness and equity of 
the bargain soon came to be undermined, and was effectively terminated with violent anti-
Chinese riots after the 1969 election (Horowitz, 1985: 584-585).  The bargain was again re-
instituted in 1971 in a revised form.  
When contracts are drawn up, there is generally some ‘splitting the difference’. Some 
provisions made at the time of adoption in order to moderate aspiration may later create 
discontent with the settlement itself (Horowitz, 1991:149). Without sufficient provision for 
amendment, a contract in itself does not provide grounds for long-lasting accommodation 
(Horowitz, 1991:149).  
Another common feature of Constitutional Contracts in communally divided societies is 
built-in quotas. This often serves as a ‘quick fix’ to parties vying for long-term power, and 
seeing this power entrenched in a contract placates hostilities. However, quotas may also 
become a weakness within a contract: Horowitz (1985:586-587) identifies this as the Frozen 
Quota pitfall. The Lebanese National Pact is an apt example, with the ethnic quota for civil 
service appointments set at a 6:5 ratio, based on the 1932 census.  While this ratio could still 
serve as a fair guide in 1943, in subsequent decades it lost its legitimacy, with presumed 
differential growth rates in the various religious communities.  The actual demographic shifts 
were never measured as the potential destabilizing consequences of a new census were so 
large that a new census was never conducted.  The pact itself lasted from 1943 to 1975, when 
Lebanon succumbed to civil war, as part of the regional turmoil in the Middle East at the time 
(Horowitz, 1985:586-587). The Malaysian quota of 4:1 in favour of Malays over Chinese was 
less deeply frozen, because it did not extend to professional and technical services. 
Constitutional Contracts tend to be based on constraints rather than incentives. Constraints 
are rules that bind ‘only because it was agreed to at the outset. It has no continually binding 
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force based on present interest’ (Horiwitz, 1991:154). Incentives, alternatively, are binding 
because they are in both the present and anticipated future common interest of all actors 
involved. Incentives are more likely to be found in Social Contracts, explained below. 
Settlements among opposing groups can become self-destructive: to endure, settlements 
should be flexible, but to be settled on, they should be considered permanent (Horowitz, 
1991:149). Overall, the assessment by Horowitz (1985: 588) is that contractual constitutional 
agreements tend to lose legitimacy as benefits and costs accrue unevenly, both within and 
between groups. More elastic agreements are required.   
Many have asked whether the ideal of a lasting contract is attainable. Lessnoff (1986:151) 
attempts to answer this question. He argues that while the difficulties, including different 
values, goals and interests of stakeholders, are daunting, ‘the application of even modest 
contractarianism need not be confined to modern western society; it should be applicable to 
any society that recognises the need for a just resolution of conflicting individual interests’. 
3.2.3. Social Contract 
Sisk (1995:54) defines a Social Contract within communally divided societies by the 
institutionalisation of a culture of negotiation. While a set of institutions or procedures for 
decision-making comprise essential components in the making of a Social Contract, it is not 
identical to a Social Contract. The Social Contract is lodged in the political culture of the 
incumbents of these constitutional arrangements (Sisk, 1995: 252): 
…a social contract reflects a breathing, living commitment to the regulation of conflict 
through ongoing bargaining and reciprocity within the non-violent confines of the new 
democratic state.  It can be measured, however, by the extent to which the centripetal forces 
of moderation on deeply divisive themes such as race and ethnicity withstand the attempt of 
outbidders in their communities to arouse extremism and undermine intergroup moderation.   
Nor would it simply be manifested in a single document like a constitution; rather, it would 
be multi-faceted agreement in which bargaining institutions in the political arena are 
reinforced by ongoing bargaining in the economic and social arenas, and vice versa.  
Constitutional rules and democratic institutions are, in this view, necessary but in themselves 
still insufficient devices for nurturing, enabling, enacting and maintaining a Social Contract.  
For Sisk these institutions could include a bill of rights, institutions that reconcile majority 
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rule with minority rights, institutions that provide for equality before the law, and for equal 
economic opportunity, among other examples (1995: 250).  Within these institutions citizens, 
policy makers and opinion-leaders should alike nurture and act upon the political culture of 
ongoing negotiation, and the politics of moderation and accommodation that is the essence of 
the Social Contract.   
According to Horowitz (1991:150-151), ‘bitter experience is more likely to produce public 
policy making through the Social Contract mode than to produce treaty making through the 
simple contract mode’. He goes on to define public policy as ‘arrangements that do not 
merely reflect transient group interests but a design for living together premised on incentives 
for accommodative behaviour transcending group interests at the moment of enactment’ 
(1991:151). These public policies include institutions and arrangements, like those mentioned 
by Sisk as being present in a Social Contract that reward accommodative behaviour and do 
not solely reflect the transient nature of group interests. A Social Contract is vested in public 
policy, and is represented by processes that emerge from institutions, instead of the 
institutions themselves. Interests, in this case, are both present and future, as anticipated, or 
even unanticipated. Social Contracts may therefore be less attractive as they produce 
unforeseeable gains and losses. 
Getting the institutions right takes time, especially when dealing with a Social Contract as 
building these institutions is not simply based on trading concessions. Another element of the 
Social Contract is to convince those in doubt of the legitimacy and efficacy of the process 
(Horowitz, 1991:280). These aims are more easily (and successfully) achieved when all 
parties to the conflict are involved, but the more parties are added, the more time-consuming 
and difficult the consummation of the arrangements become. But, for the product to be 
credible as a long-lasting constitution, it should not exclude major stakeholders. The process 
should be open to wide participation, however, some may choose not to take part, and every 
‘shade of opinion’ need not be embraced (Horowitz, 1991:280). 
Kotzé and Du Toit (1995:34) believe that the ‘values, skills, and decisions’ of formerly dis-
unified opinion leaders play a big role in determining the success, or failure, of 
democratization. The ideas, values and motivations revealed by individuals during 
democratic processes shape that democracy (Garcia-Rivero et al, 2002:166). The origins of a 
Social Contract should therefore be found in the values, beliefs and attitudes of the original 
negotiators of the peace agreement as well as in the institutions that they constructed. 
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The actors present in the negotiations are often divided on big issues (Horowitz, 2007:1228). 
It is widely accepted that the success of such a process of negotiation depends on, amongst 
others, that all participants make a fundamental re-definition of the nature of their opponents, 
and the nature of the conflict (Sisk, 1995:54). Dealing with these issues is essential to the 
effectiveness of negotiated settlements (Du Toit, 2004:195). Former opponents should 
commit to mutual trust and give in to the uncertainties of an electoral process (Sisk, 1995:54). 
Opponents should come to be seen as potential co-citizens of a democratic state and society, 
each and every one the holder of identical rights and obligations.  Previously held demonized 
views of one another have to make way for appreciating the inherent reasonableness of each 
other. And the nature of the conflict has to be re-defined from one that is perceived in zero-
sum terms to one that is seen to hold positive-sum results (also called “win-win” outcomes). 
According to Sisk (1995:55) a democratic Social Contract leads parties to ‘voluntarily reject 
mutual fear in favour of mutual gain’.  The parties need to find a sense of ‘shared destiny’, 
which is then consolidated in a set of institutions constituted through negotiation (Sisk, 
1995:55).  According to Sisk (1995:54), a Social Contract ‘in a democratizing multi-ethnic 
society can evolve when formerly antagonistic and deeply divided political leaders, parties, 
and organizations of civil society choose to escape self-defeating conflict and bind together to 
create a democratic polity that institutionalises the principles of intergroup bargaining and 
cooperation’. This once again shows the preference of process over institutions within the 
Social Contract, and the importance of the values, beliefs and attitudes with which leading 
stakeholders enter constitutional negotiations. 
While these negotiators experience the formative process of direct, interpersonal contact with 
one another, with ample opportunity to learn from one another on a first-hand basis, a Social 
Contract has to be established on the continuation of this learning experience: ‘a culture of 
ongoing negotiation is institutionalized’ (Sisk, 1995:54). New subsequent generations of 
leaders, who did not experience the founding negotiations, have to be successfully inculcated 
with these values and beliefs.  And they have to establish this political culture among fellow 
citizens. 
Agreements made on good faith in low-context cultures, like Constitutional Contracts and 
Social Contracts, generally hold a more binding status than those made in high-context 
cultures. Cohen refers to the idea of agreements such as these as a Western one, within a low-
context culture (1997:199). Entering into negotiation amounts to a commitment to reach 
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agreement: ‘[n]egotiation is viewed as a discrete, finite process that terminates with the 
conclusion of an accord’ (Cohen, 1997:199). The implementation stage that follows 
agreement is governed by the mutual conviction that contracts will be honoured. In this 
instance, agreements tend to stay fixed and static until all parties to the agreement agree to 
revisit the arrangement. 
The durability of constitutions is examined in a study by Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton (2009).  
In a comparative study incorporating every democratic constitution since 1789, except that of 
Britain, they find that durability is a function of constitutional design, in interaction with the 
challenges faced by such regimes as they emerge from the particular environments they are 
embedded into. The key dimensions of design are those of inclusion (of the relevant social 
and political actors), flexibility (referring to ability of constitutions to adjust to changing 
conditions, as measured in the ease of constitutional amendment) and specificity (the level of 
detail written into the formal constitutional document).  Their general finding is that 
constitutions that are more rather than less flexible, more rather than less inclusive, and more 
rather than less specific tend to be more enduring, and more capable of surviving 
environmental challenges. There is an obvious tension between specificity and flexibility: to 
be flexible, a constitution should not be too specific, but in being specific, a constitution 
becomes less flexible. This finding offers a framework within which Constitutional Contracts 
and Social Contracts can be compared.  Social Contracts, one would predict, tend to be more 
flexible than contracts, but less specific, while both could be equally inclusive.  Which one is 
more effective for conflict resolution in communally divided societies, and hence, more 
durable, is not directly taken up by Elkins, Ginsberg and Melton, but both Horowitz and Sisk 
favour Social Contracts over Constitutional Contracts (Horowitz, 1991 & Sisk, 1995). 
3.2.4. Benchmark Agreement 
As mentioned in Chapter One, in high-context cultures a negotiation process is more likely to 
be viewed as one event in a longer process including other events and interactions, as 
opposed to a single negotiating event in which participants aim to secure a concrete and fixed 
point in the form of a contract (Cohen, 1997:34). During this study, this type of agreement 
will be referred to as a ‘Benchmark Agreement’. Benchmark Agreements are flexible and 
subject to renegotiation at any point. While contracts tend to be based on good faith, 
Benchmark Agreements are based on what Cohen (1997) terms ‘goodwill’, which Du Toit 
(2001:102) sums up as  the ‘joint recognition of the justness of the cause of one party over the 
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other, and from their joint, but not identical, contributions to right some large historical 
wrongs’. Cohen attributes these differences to culture, but expresses no clear preference for 
low context negotiating styles (associated with good faith) over high context negotiating 
styles (associated with goodwill).  
Cohen (1997:37) uses the American and Japanese negotiating styles as an apt illustration of 
the difference between low- and high-context negotiating styles, referring to the American 
style as ‘can-do’, or ‘manipulative’, as opposed to the Japanese ‘adaptive’ style. Cohen 
(1997:37) relies on Kinhide to define this American style of negotiation: it rests on the idea 
that ‘man can freely manipulate his environment for his own purposes’; while the Japanese 
style ‘rejects the idea that man can manipulate the environment and assumes instead that he 
adjusts himself to it.’ 
In his book Negotiating Across Cultures (1997), Raymond Cohen sets out to explore the 
‘effect of cultural differences on diplomatic negotiations between the negotiating parties’ 
(1997: 10). He asserts that, for purposeful dialogue to take place, those taking part should 
share a ‘complex and extensive body of shared knowledge, conscious and unconscious, of 
what is right and fitting in human communication and contact’ (1997:14 – 15). When this is 
not the case, the result may be confusion. For parties to understand each other, they should be 
drawing from the same ‘semantic assumptions’.  Cohen (1997:26) notes that ‘…content 
encoded by the sender must be consistent with the content decoded by the receiver’. This 
occurs most easily when parties share a common culture and/or language (Cohen, 1997:26). 
By examining a series of cases, Cohen identifies several trends among cultures when 
negotiating (1997:18). 
When negotiation takes place across cultures, these shared ‘semantic assumptions’ are often 
absent and present persistent problems in understanding.  Parties’ perceptions and 
interpretations are formed by cultural experiences and cannot be defined with a simple 
dictionary definition of concepts (Cohen, 1997:27). 
One dimension of the difference between high- and low-context cultures can be seen in the 
different ways that they use language to communicate. High-context cultures tend toward 
allusive communication as opposed to direct communication. High-context cultures are 
concerned with the implicit content of a message, the nonverbal clues and ‘hinted-at nuances 
of meaning’ (Cohen, 1997:31). High-context cultures are very concerned with maintaining 
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face, and therefore, the loss of face is seen as a penalty to be avoided. Cohen (1997:32) 
identifies this type of cultures as being ‘shame oriented rather the guilt oriented’.  
Low context cultures do not attribute meaning beyond the transmission of information to the 
use of language: ‘what has to be said is stated explicitly’ (Cohen, 1997:33). The focus here is 
on results, as opposed to the fostering of relationships. The maintenance of face is not as 
important to those within low-context cultures as to high-context cultures. Low-context 
cultures assign importance to the ‘truth ethic’, building trust by remaining truthful and 
accurate in their negotiations. Lying undermines trust and has negative implications for good 
faith. Guilt, rather than shame, is the ‘psychological price paid for misdemeanour’ (Cohen, 
1997:33). Low-context cultures are not as concerned with outward appearances, but rather 
with an ‘internalised sense of responsibility’.  
Another dimension of difference is found in how the importance of time is understood by 
negotiators in both high- and low-context cultures. High-context cultures find urgency to be 
futile, as this would undermine the relationship-building nature of the negotiations. Low-
context cultures place more focus on ‘getting things done’, arguing in favour of time 
restraints (Cohen, 1997:35). When looking at negotiating styles, high- and low-context 
cultures differ greatly. Low-context cultures favour results, rather than the building of 
relationships, while for high-context cultures, negotiation becomes ‘simply one episode in an 
ongoing relationship’ (Cohen, 1997:37). However, the terms of renegotiation is a function of 
the ongoing relationship, especially the power relationship, in which the parties are not 
always seen as equals. 
As relationships change, agreements become outdated. A Benchmark Agreement allows for 
revisiting and changing agreements as relationships change, making negotiation a continuous, 
ongoing process. Cohen (1997:201) contends that in high-context cultures, unforeseeable 
difficulties arising in future are renegotiated in a ‘spirit of goodwill’, which itself is derived 
from an interpretation of the context within which the dispute arises. High-context 
negotiators insist that the context reveals historical wrongs committed by one party over the 
other. ‘Goodwill’ then, as derived from the above, requires the perpetrator to appease the 
victim in the negotiating process, and places pressure on the perpetrator to accept terms of 
settlement that go some way to amending these historical wrongs. Therefore, a culture of 
ongoing negotiation is cultivated and required. 
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In high-context cultures, a single agreement, which may come in the form of a contract, is 
‘certainly not a conclusion’, but merely a document of transitory status in which ‘nothing is 
ever definitively closed’ (Cohen, 1997:200). High-context cultures tend not to view contracts 
as binding in the low-context sense. Relationships are open-ended, and as such, so are 
agreements within those relationships. The agreement is subject to the relationship and the 
predominant aspect of the relationship is the power relationship.This does not mean that high-
context parties enter into contracts in the low-context idea of ‘bad faith’, or with ‘malicious 
intent’, but rather (Cohen, 1997:201): 
…they lack the low-context conception of the centrality of contracts, or the 
connected assumption that a good agreement should guide future relations by 
covering every conceivable contingency, viewing agreement as the beginning, not 
the end of an arrangement, it is simply assumed that, if the relationship is healthy, 
the contracting parties will be able to work out future differences in a cooperative, 
rather than litigious, spirit of goodwill. 
3.2.5. What happens when parties hold opposing contextual perspectives? 
Du Toit (2001:103) clearly states the importance of establishing a ‘clear and explicit 
understanding’ between negotiators regarding the approach to be taken on negotiations. He 
goes on to mention four problems (2001:103-104) associated with the absence of an explicit 
understanding among negotiators regarding their approach to negotiations: 
First, it may lead to a disagreement on the importance of procedures, the establishment of 
procedures and the following of procedures. Second, in low-context cultures, tactics beyond 
the negotiating table are ‘discreet’ from official negotiations, while in high-context cultures, 
these types of tactics form part of and complement official negotiations. 
Third, in low context cultures, the outcome is considered contractually binding. However, in 
high-context cultures, the outcome is ‘just another platform for further contestation and for 
remoulding’ the power relations between the parties. Fourth, low-context cultures consider 
negotiators as equal when coming to the negotiating table. Negotiators from high-context 
cultures ‘insist on recognition of their own high moral superiority’ (Du Toit, 2001:104). 
Confronted with high-context negotiators, low-context negotiators can accuse their opponents 
of bad faith, while when high-context negotiators are confronted with opponents from a low-
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context culture, they may claim those negotiators to be morally insensitive. Differing 
definitions of how agreements are made and interpreted in the long run may cause disruptions 
in conflict settlements. 
3.3. Operationalisation 
The research problem is concerned with what the constitution stands for, therefor its 
meaning, what it represents, and the interpretation thereof, and what it embodies. In other 
words, it is about attributes or dispositions (values, beliefs and attitudes) about properties 
(content and structure) of the written document. The operationalization will identify certain 
properties of the content and structure of negotiated constitutions that are open to, amenable 
to, and susceptible to interpretation by negotiators. These interpretations are dispositions 
(values, beliefs, attitudes) about these properties: the actual interpretations as found in the 
writings and words of the original negotiators. 
The operational indicators identified here are properties that can readily be interpreted as 
being consistent with, congruent with, and/or indicative of one or the other concepts: the 
Constitutional Contract, the Social Contract and the Benchmark Agreement. 
3.3.1. Constitutional Contract 
3.3.1.1. Nominal Definition 
Taken from section 3.2.1, a Constitutional Contract can be described as: a written document 
describing a set of institutions. It is not necessarily vested in political culture and does not 
necessitate the nurturing of the contract within a changing society. The Constitutional 
Contract is made up of constitutional rules embodied in democratic institutions, and is not 
concerned with ongoing bargaining in the social and political arena. It is a formal written 
text, with a specified status as being a constitution that is viewed as fundamental law.  
3.3.1.2. Trades and Deals/Bargains 
Trade-offs, exchanges and deals or bargains all form part of a Constitutional Contract. 
Making a trade-off is where one item, or issue, is traded directly for another item or issue. In 
the view of the stakeholders the traded items are usually ‘equal’ in terms of value, and as 
such constitute a direct barter or exchange. This creates a situation where one party ‘loses’ on 
one issue in order to win on another, and vice versa; or meet one another in the contract zone 
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through mutual concessions. This can happen when parties attribute different levels of value 
to issues or items at stake. 
Deals and/or bargains are made in order to gain/win on issues that are deemed more 
important by one party. A party may choose to concede on one issue in exchange for the 
opposition’s concession on another issue. In this way, parties may ‘win’ on issues more 
important to them or their constituents but lose on seemingly less important issues. 
In Constitutional Contracts, trade-offs and deals made are conclusive and can be seen in 
terms of immediate gains and losses. Bargainers may refer to ‘giving up’ a certain item or 
issue in exchange for another, or to ‘giving in’ on one issue in order to have their way on 
another. 
Bargainers involved in Constitutional Contracts tend to speak in terms of quid pro quo, or 
give-and-take. This generally means that in order to gain something, a party must give up 
something else. This is not something that is realised over time, but immediately with the 
implementation of the agreement. By identifying the details of the bargain that was struck the 
following can be determined: 
- Who received what from whom? 
- Who conceded what to whom? 
3.3.1.3. Core vs. Non-core issues  
Contracts are comprised of what can be termed core and non-core issues. Core issues refer to 
issues which, in the eyes of the negotiating stakeholders, signify the foundation of the 
agreement. These core issues form the basis of the agreement and after having been agreed 
upon, become non-negotiable. Should these issues come into question, the fairness of the 
trades made in the entire agreement would come into question. Non-core issues are those 
issues which, in the eyes of the negotiators, may become subject to renegotiation, and the 
renegotiation of which would not constitute the overall weight of mutual concessions in the 
entire agreement becoming unbalanced, or unfair. 
When parties exchange goods (as per contracts) they generally remain committed to only that 
which was received.  In a Constitutional Contract, the core comprises of the terms of the 
trade, which stipulate who conceded what and who gained what in return. 
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3.3.1.4. Breach of contract 
What constitutes breach of contract in the eyes of the negotiators provides insight into the 
foundation of the agreement. Within Constitutional Contracts, it can be said that a unilaterally 
determined change to any element of the core of the agreement may be viewed as breach of 
contract, as the agreement when made was perceived as final and not subject to change.  
Determining what elements would constitute breach of contract to the 
negotiators/stakeholders will also aid in identifying the core and non-core issues in the 
agreement. 
3.3.1.5. Quotas 
Quotas, sometimes ethnically or religiously based, often form part of Constitutional Contracts 
in resolving conflicts in communally divided societies. The use of quotas ensures certain 
groups’ continued participation in decision-making, and is often associated with minority 
rights. Quotas are often found in Constitutional Contracts as they ensure immediate, tangible 
gains and show a fixed solution based on numbers.  
3.3.1.6. Fixed Targets/ ‘Fixed Terms’  
Constraints on amendments to the original agreement may be an indication of how ‘fixed’ the 
contract is. Constraints on how amendments are made can come in the form of fixed targets 
or ‘fixed terms’: whenever an agreement is termed ‘fixed’, or a time constraint is put in place, 
stakeholders and implementers are left with rigid constraints within which to implement the 
agreement.  
3.3.1.7. Amendment procedures  
How easy or difficult is it to change the terms of the contract? The more difficult it is to 
change any part of the original agreement, the more ‘fixed’ the agreement is. Little room for 
movement or inflexibility is a structural feature that is often found in constitutions usually 
described as Constitutional Contracts. An example of an inflexible amendment procedure is 
having special majorities for specific issues, increasing the difficulty of bringing about a 
change in the details of the agreement. Constitutional Contracts are usually very specific 
about amendment procedures, setting up precise and rigid rules within which renegotiation is 
warranted or allowed. In the terms of Elkins’ et al (2009) framework, Constitutional 
Contracts tend toward being less flexible, and more specific. It is not the purpose of this study 
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to build a model measuring amendment procedures; Elkins et al (2009) as well as Lutz 
(1994) provide detailed models for the measurement of the amendment rates. 
3.3.1.8. Permanence 
The core of a Constitutional Contract is usually seen as a permanent fixture. It is not subject 
to any form of change, except for those specified in terms of formal amendment procedures; 
or to a changing power relationship, demographic or leadership. All future leaders will be 
subject to the rules determined by the original agreement, in the form of a lasting contract. 
3.3.2. Social Contract 
3.3.2.1. Nominal Definition 
As mentioned above, Sisk (1995: 54) defines a Social Contract as ‘the institutionalization of a 
culture of negotiation’.  A Social Contract is not identical to a specific set of institutions, or a 
specific set of procedures for decision-making, it is lodged in the political culture of the 
officeholders of such constitutional arrangements, and as expressed in public policy and 
political action by stakeholders. Horowitz (1991) defines a Social Contract in a communally 
divided society as ‘process over institutions’. The Social Contract is usually derived from a 
formal, written text. 
3.3.2.2. National Consensus 
On entering into negotiations, a dissensus on the rules of the political game can be seen 
between contending parties. Upon concluding (successful) negotiations, the aim is that this 
dissensus dissipates and a new era of consensus is nurtured. Social Contracts are associated 
with the concept of a ‘national consensus’.  While this term is not necessarily quantified, it 
leans on the principle that stakeholders will act according to a shared understanding of what 
the constitution means and stands for. While consensus in this sense is not equal to unanimity 
on the nature of the core, it does strive for a continued national agreement on basic 
fundamental issues, making for a political culture of ongoing negotiation.  
Bargaining power comes into play during prenegotiation, preliminary bargaining and 
substantive bargaining. Parties who choose to use their bargaining power, or who choose to 
manipulate information in such a way that their resources can be construed as bargaining 
power, have more control over the outcome of negotiations. In order for a Social Contract to 
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be constructed, all parties involved should feel that they have contributed equally to the 
settlement, as well as having equal, or perceptively equal, shares in the implementation of the 
settlement. Should bargaining power be used in such a way as to convince other parties 
involved of the shared nature of the successful settlement, right from the prenegotiation stage, 
then bargaining power is conducive to gaining a Social Contract. However, negotiators have 
been known to abuse bargaining power. In retrospect, parties involved may feel that they 
have been manipulated or coerced, which would mean that they are not content with the 
settlement in the long run, and this hampers the establishment of the Social Contract. 
3.3.2.3. Core vs. Non-core issues  
Core and non-core issues also come into play in the Social Contract. The content of those 
issues perceived as ‘core’ by the original negotiators provide some indication as to how these 
negotiators view the entire agreement. Within a Social Contract, a bill of rights may be 
considered core, while other issues may become subject to renegotiation. However, the basis 
of the Social Contract is that negotiators/stakeholders become committed to the process 
which is facilitated by certain key, or core, aspects of the agreement. Institutions conducive to 
such a process are at the core of the contract. A Social Contract may be found when opposing 
parties assign value to the same issues, or establish the same issues as ‘core’ or ‘non-core’. 
Within a Social Contract, what is core would be those institutions which generate an ongoing 
dynamic negotiation, and are critical to generating a political culture of compromise and 
negotiation. 
3.3.2.4. What kind of amendments will ‘break’ the ‘spirit of consensus’? 
The element of trust, or trustworthiness, is very important to the creation of a Social Contract. 
The nature of conflict is based on mutual mistrust – during negotiations, this perception of 
one’s opponent should be broken down in order for a settlement to be made in which all 
parties feel they have cooperated and conceded only as much as their opponents. Trustworthy 
bargainers induce high levels of cooperation and concessions, which means that in order to 
create a settlement to which all parties feel responsible and all have a stake in, all parties 
should cooperate and concede. This means that a high level of trust is necessary in order to 
produce a Social Contract. 
When settlements are made in good faith, which implies trust, parties have the tendency to 
become committed to the arrangements that they have helped to shape. Parties may go so far 
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as to become committed to each other, transcending cleavage lines. Here, parties may 
establish coalitions of convenience (formed after the election), or, in the sense of a Social 
Contract, coalitions of commitment (formed before the election). This type of commitment 
induces the defence of the settlement should outsiders or even unhappy insiders attack the 
settlement (Horowitz, 1991:280). This type of commitment is only possible if both sides 
agree that the negotiations have taken place in good faith, and that the settlement that has 
been produced is an amalgamation, a synthesis, of all sides’ points of view and favourable 
outcomes (Horowitz, 1991:280). In other words, an integrative, not distributive, outcome. 
According to Elkins et al (2009:99), ‘constitutions with lower thresholds for amendment will 
be more flexible and likely to survive in the face of constitutional crisis.’ Lower thresholds 
for amendment are associated with the Social Contract. 
Determining how negotiators and stakeholders interpret ‘breaking the spirit of consensus’, 
which should be established within a Social Contract, will allow insight into their 
understanding of whether the negotiated settlement is taken to be a Constitutional Contract or 
an incipient Social Contract, as well as revealing the boundaries of the consensus. 
3.3.2.5. Institutions 
According to Sisk, institutions that can serve as foundational building blocks for a Social 
Contract include a bill of rights, institutions that reconcile majority rule with minority rights, 
institutions that provide for equality before the law, and for equal economic opportunity 
(1995: 250).  It may also include electoral rules, and it has to include every institution that is 
favourable to the process of securing and consolidating a political culture of compromise. 
3.3.2.6. Changing perceptions 
The mutually hurting stalemate presents a good opportunity for the start of mutually 
cooperative negotiations. Leaders should not only feel that they have no other choice but to 
enter into negotiations, but also that the power in the relationship has equalised, making for 
the optimal moment for negotiations. Parties may have to be convinced that the moment is 
ripe, whether by an opponent, their constituents, or a third party, but the choice of entering 
into multiparty negotiations should remain that of the party. When parties realise that they 
cannot solve the problem on their own, they recognise the importance of the participation of 
all parties to the conflict. The perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate is thus essential to 
the formation of the Social Contract. 
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This situation is conducive to the creation of a Social Contract. Parties entering into 
negotiations often have high hopes for resolutions. Though these resolutions need not be 
quashed, prenegotiation provides an optimal time for perceptions to be changed. It is not 
necessary for parties to become friends, but cooperative behaviour is essential. The mutually 
hurting stalemate rests on the fact that parties have no other viable choice but to negotiate. 
This is the most viable platform to change this perception to ‘negotiation is the best option, 
not the only option’. 
3.3.2.7. Process 
When assessing whether an agreement has successfully created a Social Contract, questions 
can be asked whether the agreement initiates a process with incentives for moderation and 
accommodative politics, including whether there are rules that initiate certain processes that 
promote accommodative behaviour. As an example of such a process, Horowitz (1991) uses 
the Malaysian electoral system. The Malaysian bargain provided for the formation of an 
interethnic coalition, ‘flanked by ethnically based political parties’ (1991: 152). This coalition 
provided a platform for ongoing compromise between rival ethnic parties. A First-past-the-
post system based on a single candidate list (or single slate) within a ward system was 
implemented, which in turn facilitated coalitions of commitment. The coalition arrangements 
(Horowitz, 1991:154-155): 
…forced Malay and Chinese politicians, in heterogeneous constituencies, to rely in 
part on votes delivered by politicians belonging to the other ethnic group. Those 
votes would not be forthcoming unless leaders could portray candidates as 
moderate on issues of concern to the group that was delivering its vote across 
ethnic lines, in other words, vote pooling. Consequently, compromises at the top of 
the coalition were supported by electoral incentives at the bottom. 
Here, a short look at electoral options for Social Contracts is warranted. Sisk (1996:33) asks 
‘[i]n deeply divided societies, which kinds of institutions and practices create an incentive 
structure for ethnic groups to mediate their differences through the legitimate institutions of a 
common democratic state?’ Both Lijphart (1977; 1985) and Horowitz (2003) address this 
question. When dealing with the issue of electoral systems, Lijphart (1977; 1985) favours the 
party-list proportional representation system in which all parties that receive a certain number 
of votes (the threshold being as low as possible), receive a percentage of seats in parliament 
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directly corresponding to their percentage of votes won. This system produces proportional 
representation. He believes that the consociational model fosters faith in assurances of 
minority protection. Horowitz (1985) notes some weaknesses within this approach, including 
the tendency of parties to form ‘coalitions of convenience’ as opposed to ‘coalitions of 
commitment’. 
Horowitz (2003) argues strongly against this model, advocating a process of incentives and 
rewards to encourage interethnic cooperation. Sisk terms this the ‘integrative approach’ 
(1996:34). Horowitz argues that the institutions most likely to produce proportional results 
are the alternative vote system; the second ballot majoritarian system; the first-past-the-post 
system (Malaysia); and Single Transferable Vote (STV) (2003: 116). Each system comes 
with its own set of problems: the simple first-past-the-post system may permanently exclude 
minorities; and a lack of ‘floating’ voters who base their votes on ‘other-than-ascriptive 
criteria such as class’ (Sisk, 1996:32). However, in these types of systems, parties are 
‘encouraged to create coalitions before elections’, which in turn leads to more broadly 
representative governments (Sisk, 1996:35). Accordingly, party-list proportional 
representation is least likely to produce the process essential to a Social Contract. 
Horowitz (2003:118) specifically mentions the option of vote-pooling in producing moderate 
politics and compromises between opposing groups.  He mentions a system based on 
‘ethnically reserved seats, multi-seat constituencies and common-roll elections’ formulated in 
Lebanon, which ‘gives politicians very good reasons to cooperate across group lines, for they 
cannot be elected on the votes of their own group alone. They must pool votes (that is, 
exchange support) with candidates of other groups running in different reserved seats in the 
same constituency’ (2003:118). Within this type of system, politicians ‘vie to appear the most 
moderate’ in order to gain votes from ‘voters who would not ordinarily vote for them’ (Sisk, 
1996:43). Vote pooling is essentially a process of ongoing compromise, facilitated by 
electoral rules, and is consistent with the concept of a Social Contract as ‘process over 
institutions’. 
3.3.3. Benchmark Agreement 
3.3.3.1. Nominal Definition 
In high-context cultures a negotiation process is more likely to be viewed as one event in a 
longer process including other events and interactions (Cohen, 1997:34). This type of 
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agreement, referred to as a ‘Benchmark Agreement’, is flexible and subject to renegotiation 
at any point, as initiated by the party with the dominant power. The agreement is produced 
from and a reflection of the bargaining relationship at that time. The agreement does not 
always come in the form of a formal written text.  
3.3.3.2. Historical Context and Moral High Ground 
Historical context plays a formative role in how high-context negotiators react toward each 
other, and as such has the ability to shape, or at least act as a factor in, negotiations and their 
outcome. Within high context cultures, a lot of focus is placed on who holds the moral high 
ground in negotiations. Historical context may favour one party over the other in terms of 
morality, or one party may view itself as having the moral high ground because of past 
injustices. Third parties may also assign participating parties moral high ground when 
entering into negotiations.  
Parties who enter into negotiations believing they hold the moral high ground may see 
themselves as being entitled to the bargain falling in their favour. Those who believe 
themselves to hold the moral high ground tend to expect more concessions from their 
opponents. 
This perceived ‘unequal standing’ usually stems from past injustices where one party is 
considered by the other party to have acted immorally, unfairly or wrongly toward the other. 
While in low-context cultures, parties who enter into negotiations accept/endorse the 
principles of equal status., high context thinking changes the way that the bargaining 
relationship is shaped. Parties tend to think in terms of a perpetrator/victim mentality: this 
means that one party believes that it has been treated unfairly, or has been the ‘victim’, while 
another party has been in the wrong, as the ‘perpetrator’. This type of thinking is present in 
the high context, benchmark culture. To low-context negotiators, like negotiators from the 
United States, the idea that something that occurred in the past is relevant to problem-solving 
in the present is ‘almost incomprehensible’, while the Chinese typically continue to refer to 
past injustices (Cohen, 1997:35). Cohen (1997:36) mentions Mexican, Egyptian, Japanese 
and Indian negotiators as being conscious of previous injustices, whether racist or imperialist, 
during the colonial era. According to Du Toit (2001:102): ‘From this perspective, the 
goodwill necessary for sustaining the process of negotiating for peace has to derive from joint 
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recognition of the justness of the cause of one party over the other, and from their joint, but 
not identical, contributions to right some large historical wrongs.’ 
The mention of moral high ground, past injustices, unequal standing or victim/perpetrator 
juxtaposition by negotiators and stakeholders may indicate a high context culture, which in 
turn may shape the perception of the outcome as a Benchmark Agreement. 
3.3.3.3. Subject to a larger, superior, objective 
Present within the benchmark perception of the outcome is the idea that the outcome, or 
bargain, is subject to a larger, and definitely superior, objective. The settlement, or outcome, 
reflects only the commitment and relationship at the time of the negotiations, and is not 
intended to be governing ‘law’ with any sense of permanence. The settlement is a means to a 
larger end.  
Instead of signifying the end of a relationship between the opposing parties, the negotiations 
and the outcome thereof signifies the beginning of an ongoing and changing relationship. The 
settlement is instrumental in reflecting the power relationship at the time of the negotiations, 
and may further shape the relationship, but will become obsolete as the relationship changes. 
Indicators to look for when assessing whether a stakeholder or negotiator holds the 
benchmark view of the outcome can be found in the following themes: means to a larger end; 
instrumentality; subordinate (to a larger goal or objective); reflecting a changing power 
relationship; and a Gramscian ‘war of position’, which means that each party is constantly 
vying for the upper hand in order to dominate the power relationship, which is then reflected 
in the changing agreement. As one party gains power over the other, whether by tangible or 
intangible means, the agreement changes to reflect the change in the power relationship. 
Parties constantly try to gain power in order to change the agreement in their favour. 
‘Means to a larger end’ would mean that the end-goal in mind is not the settlement. The 
settlement is viewed as one element in realizing a larger goal. The settlement, or agreement, 
is instrumental to attaining the larger goal, instead of signifying an end point. Once made, the 
settlement does not become the chief determining factor: it remains subordinate to the larger 
goal. The settlement will not determine the power relationship: it will change to reflect the 
power relationship, indicating a constant war of position between parties. 
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3.3.3.4. Agreement as temporary 
The view of the settlement as temporary as opposed to permanent is the basis of the 
benchmark view. Du Toit (2001:102) terms it as such: ‘The agreement does certainly not 
hold the status of an irrevocable contract, but is always subject to renegotiation, to 
reinterpretation, and is as fluid as the ongoing relationship is indeterminate.’ 
3.4. Data Collection Methods 
3.4.1. Data Sources 
Data relevant to the research questions mentioned in Chapter One and in accordance with the 
above operationalization will be acquired from the following sources: 
Primary Sources 
 Official documents: the 1993 and 1996 constitutions, and the Hansard Records for the 
1993 and 1996 Debates. 
 Published memoirs of major negotiators during the transition,  
 Opinions expressed by negotiators in other publications, e.g. journals. 
 Qualitative research data bases that are in the public domain and contain full-text 
interviews, such as the Patti Waldmeir files at the University of Cape Town; The 
O’Malley Archives (available online) and The Hermann Giliomee files at 
Stellenbosch University 
 Speeches of which the full-text written record could be found1 
 Interviews by the researcher with original negotiators. Snowball selection will be 
used, relying on referrals from interviewees to certain actors who may not otherwise 
be willing to be interviewed for this study. 
 Electronic correspondence with original negotiators by the researcher. 
This study did not focus on biographies (with the exception of the biographies of Thabo 
Mbeki and Cyril Ramaphosa). The study focuses on the original negotiators’ opinions and 
views in their own words. This study did not include other scholarly works on the negotiated 
                                                 
1
 This includes a compilation of selected extracts from speeches made by Thabo Mbeki, compiled by Corrigan 
(1999) 
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democratic transition in South Africa, as each author uses his or her own conceptual 
framework. No author has used this conceptual framework, barring Horowitz (1991) and Sisk 
(1995), which was prior to the written constitution of 1996. Also, the study focuses solely on 
information that can be directly attributed to the original negotiators, and not interpretations 
by others of the views of the original negotiators. Joe Slovo, Benajmin Turok and Ahmed 
Kathrada, among others, who played the role of negotiators, wrote autobiographies that did 
not touch on the subject of this study. 
3.4.2. Data Retrieval Methods 
The data retrieval will consist of an in-depth analysis of published resources as well as 
interviews with selected negotiators and key informants wherever possible. The interview 
forms an important part of case study research. The interviews for this study will come in the 
form of personalised  interviews – which each interviewee’s individual participation in the 
process to be taken into account during the interview. The interviews will be open-ended and 
thematically structured on an individual basis. The theme of each interview is set by the 
conceptual framework – thus, questions pertaining to each of the concepts. No standard 
format of questions was used. Each individual interview was shaped by the unique positions 
which every interviewee held in the negotiations process. Yin (2009:106) refers to these as 
‘guided conversations rather than structured queries.’ This type of interview can change the 
role of the interviewee to ‘informant’, as opposed to a mere respondent. Yin (2009:107) states 
the importance of key informants: ‘Key informants are often critical to the success of a case 
study. Such persons provide the case study investigator with insights into a matter and also 
can initiate access to corroboratory or contrary sources of evidence.’ 
3.4.3 Population 
The interview frame is made up of all available negotiators during the South African 
transition 1990 – 1996, including Codesa I, Codesa II, the MPNP and the Constitutional 
Assembly. Each available negotiator will be contacted for an interview. 
3.5. Chapter Summary 
Negotiations about accords inevitably require constitutional, written outcomes: this chapter 
began by looking at how negotiations lead to outcomes, and how these outcomes can be 
classified into a typology. Some mention was made of what type of outcome is most 
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successful. Three specific types of outcomes were identified: the Social Contract, the 
Constitutional Contract and the Benchmark Agreement. The chapter continued operationalise 
these concepts, which were then clarified within the framework of low- and high-context 
cultures.  
Each concept was operationalised into key indicators which allowed for their empirical 
observation. A comprehensive list of all the sources which will be used during the study was 
given, with an overview of the data retrieval methods and sampling frame.  
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Chapter 4: The South African Transition: Pre-negotiations (1985 – 1991) 
and Substantive Negotiations (1991 – 1996) 
4.1. Introduction 
The chapter provides the context within which the South African transition took place, 
mapping out several factors leading up to the ultimate decision by opposing parties to enter 
into talks, and eventually a negotiated settlement. Parties to the conflict went through several 
channels in order to get to a settlement, some less successful than others, but eventually a 
settlement was achieved, due in part to excellent negotiating skills on both sides, and to the 
willingness of both sides to cooperate. A closer look is taken at the evolving positions of the 
most significant parties, as well as some of the motivating factors. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a phaseological framework within 
which to locate the data reported in Chapter 5, within the parameters outlined in the 
delimitations (Section 1.6.2.). Figure 4.1 (on the following page) represents a timeline of the 
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Figure 4.1: Timeline 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
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During most of the 20th century, South Africa was run by a system of ‘apartheid’. This 
involved a ‘racially defined institutional separation between communities, dictated by the 
white rulers of the country and applied in a discriminatory way’ (Du Toit, 2001:35). Black 
South Africans saw the worst of the apartheid system. Blacks were systemically and 
systematically subjected to a gross rights violations and socioeconomic deprivation, forcibly 
removed from their homes and marginalised (Sarkin, 1999:67). This brought about protest 
and rebellion by the black majority in South Africa in several forms, including petitions, 
protests, strikes and insurgency. Analysing the conflict in South Africa is no simple matter. 
Not only has there been conflict, but also conflict about the nature of that conflict. Du Toit 
(2001), Horowitz (1991) and Lipton (2007), among others, take up the strenuous task of 
describing the conflict about the nature of the South African conflict. 
Steenekamp (2011) provides a summary of the events leading up to and culminating in the 
apartheid state in South Africa, as well as the later disbanding thereof. Apartheid was 
officially imposed in South Africa by means of an enforced policy of segregation 
(Steenekamp, 2011:100).  These policies were aimed at advancing white (no more than 20% 
of the population at the time) economic and political interests while exploiting the black 
majority population as labour. A series of discriminatory acts systemised ‘discrimination and 
strengthened African resistance, laying the foundation for the apartheid era’ (2011:102). The 
notion of ‘separate development’ was later developed and enforced by another series of acts 
confining Blacks to ‘ethnic homelands’ (Steenekamp, 2011:104). According to Steenekamp, 
the ‘defiance, together with the stagnation of the economy, the collapse of labour control, and 
urbanisation that took place during the 1970s and 1980s was the beginning of the end of 
apartheid’ (2011:105). 
In 1983 the incumbent National Party (NP) won the referendum for a tricameral parliament: 
separate houses of parliament for whites, Indians and coloureds (Reynolds, 2005:302; and 
Welsh, 2009:218 - 219). Symbolically, the 1983 parliament ended the supremacy of whites in 
South Africa, but effectively, little change had been made (Giliomee, 2012:175).  
The white-dominated government remained ambiguous about future plans to include blacks, 
but rejected outright the idea of a one-person, one-vote electoral system, as well as a 
parliamentary chamber for blacks (Horowitz, 1991:19). Many whites retained conservative 
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positions regarding change, advocating either a return to ‘pure apartheid’, or continued racial 
partition. This denial of power to blacks spurred the formation of the United Democratic 
Front (UDF) in August 1983, with the purpose of fighting for power for blacks in government 
(Seekings, 2000:1-3). 
In 1982, the government had made a promise to whites that blacks would not be included in 
parliament, and this greatly limited the options that government had in calming black 
tempers. The tricameral parliament had made the message clear: blacks were ‘foreigners in 
their own country’ (Giliomee, 2012:178).  
President P.W. Botha of the NP was faced with the challenge of getting black leaders to 
accept that they had once again been excluded from power, while persuading them to take 
part in a ‘negotiating forum on black political rights’ (Giliomee, 2012:177). Botha realised 
the urgency of dealing with this and proceeded to appoint a special cabinet committee to deal 
with this problem. Botha clearly stated the purpose of the committee as finding an alternative 
for this problem other than a fourth chamber in parliament for blacks. He advocated regional 
development and ‘the creation of a constellation of states’ (Giliomee, 2012:177). 
The Special Cabinet Committee (SCC) faced a great challenge: how to address black political 
demands while keeping promises to whites (De Klerk, 1998:99). The only conclusion that the 
SCC had made reiterated Botha’s demand: there would be no fourth chamber for blacks in 
parliament (Welsh, 2009:232; and Giliomee, 2012:187). 
As the tricameral parliament was being inaugurated in September 1984, political violence 
increased, and did not subside until 1987 (Welsh, 2009:214). Black anger fuelled the mass 
resistance in several forms, including consumer and school boycotts, massive rallies and 
sabotage by the African National Congress (ANC) (Waldmeir, 1997:46). Black residents 
lashed out at being excluded from any effective decision-making by refusing to pay rent, or 
for water and electricity. Township police stations and government offices were attacked, and 
several of those considered to be collaborating with the white regime were murdered. For two 
years, 1985 and 1986, South Africa saw a surge of extreme violence. Attempts were made to 
render townships ‘ungovernable’ (Lawrence, 1994:5; and Wessels, 2010:181). Between 1984 
and 1991, factional violence claimed the lives of almost 11 000 black South Africans (Time, 
1991). 
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After ten months of upheaval, on 20 July 1985, Botha declared a partial state of emergency, 
spanning those areas most affected by the revolts (Esterhuyse, 2012:11). The upheaval caused 
Botha to sanction the detainment of 12 000 black activists and step up the number of 
assassinations (Waldmeir, 1997:48). The ANC played a role in unifying the revolt, but by the 
time the ‘call to ungovernability’ was officially issued by the ANC leader in exile Oliver 
Tambo, the townships were already wracked by chaos (Waldmeir, 1997:46). Patti Waldmeir 
(1997:48) sums up the resistance movement: ‘The aim was to raise up a thousand 
flowerheads of resistance, which could not all be mown down by the apartheid scythe’. 
The 1985 partial state of emergency failed to quash the upheaval. After lifting the partial state 
of emergency in March 1986, Botha declared a national state of emergency on 12 June 1986 
(De Klerk, 1998:119; Wessels, 2010:186; and Esterhuyse, 2012:11).The state of emergency 
destroyed countless lives in its wake, while crushing the rebellion. The use of massive force 
and tyranny became legal, and the police were freed from ‘any remaining psychological 
impediments to oppression’ (Waldmeir, 1997:70; and Giliomee, 2012:263).  
The end of 1987 saw activists retreating and a ‘tense calm’ settling over the townships 
(Waldmeir, 1997:70). Botha now felt that he could take action from a ‘position of strength’, 
clearly, the state was ‘losing its grip’ (Lawrence, 1994:5). The ANC admitted that it had not 
come close to achieving all the objectives of the ‘call to ungovernability’, as the state of 
emergency and detainments had curbed their efforts (Giliomee, 2012:263). But the ANC had 
realised that while the government could contain dissent, it could not completely eradicate it. 
The ANC was acting from a position of strength as well, but that neither was strong enough 
to defeat the other (Kruger, 1998:74; and Waldmeir, 1997:71). Botha Kruger (1998:70) 
argues that ‘both a mutually hurting stalemate and the danger of an impending catastrophe 
were evident in South Africa.’ He goes on to state that the South African situation had so 
changed as to impelled parties to explore alternatives to a military conflict (1998:70).  
As President, Botha sought to prove that the authority of the state had not been hurt in the 
least. However, the revolt had demoralized whites. White prosperity had been sufficiently 
threatened. The revolt had had the wanted effect: weakening white confidence and unity 
(Waldmeir, 1997:49). The state of emergency ruined the country’s international reputation 
and created a rift in its communities (Waldmeir, 1997:70), but at the same time showed the 
strength of the government, and that the ANC did have some clout. In effect, the uprisings 
created favourable circumstances for negotiations. Taylor and Vale (2000:401) mention this 
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‘military stalemate’ as one of several explanations to the commencement of negotiations in 
South Africa. Not only had the South African military failed to modernise technologically, 
but the ‘war’ that was to be fought was in the streets of South Africa itself. 
The biggest crisis of Botha’s presidency came with his ‘Rubicon’ Speech of August 1985 
(Welsh, 2009:231; Heunis, 2007:75). Early in August 1985 Botha announced that he would 
soon be taking steps away from apartheid, alluding that these steps would be major in 
comparison to the cop-outs of the past. He would deliver a speech outlining ‘South Africa’s 
path across the Rubicon of apartheid to the new South Africa’ (Waldmeir, 1997:54). The 
foreign minister, Pik Botha, was sent to Western capitals in order to break the good news, and 
the international hype surrounding the hope of dramatic changes in South Africa grew 
immensely.  
Botha failed to make the speech expected by the international community. A few days before 
the scheduled speech, Botha made a decision to diverge from the original intention of a 
reformist message. It has been claimed that Pik Botha had falsely heightened international 
expectations in order to embarrass P.W. Botha (De Klerk, 1998:103). P.W. Botha appeared 
so clearly irritated, and enraged while making the speech, by the international and local press 
hype, which would make any attempt at a reformist speech anti-climactic (Giliomee, 2012: 
197; and De Klerk, 1998:103). 
Botha’s speech was broadcast live to millions of international viewers (De Klerk, 1998:104). 
What they saw was not a reformist ‘hero’, but rather the epitome of a bullying apartheid 
leader. According to De Klerk (1998:104) the ‘significance of the speech was completely 
lost’: For the first time in forty years, the NP was finally admitting that black people would 
have to be incorporated into the white system. But by rejecting majority rule, a black 
chamber in parliament and a ‘one man one vote’ system, Botha rejected what those watching 
understood as democracy (Giliomee, 2012:199). Esterhuyse (2012:21) refers to this speech as 
wiping away any shred of hope for a negotiated settlement in South Africa. 
Botha did not deliver on the major leap promised by Pik Botha. Nelson Mandela would not 
be unconditionally released: he would have to renounce violence in order for this to happen. 
Publicly, the speech produced great disappointment, and was seen as a ‘major public 
rejection of reform’ (Waldmeir, 1997: 54). Diplomatically, economically, morally and 
financially, South Africa was shunned (Waldmeir, 1997:56). South Africa was clearly in 
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financial trouble (Kruger, 1998:72 - 73; and Giliomee, 2012:202). These pressures should 
have spurred Afrikaners to enter into talks with ‘the enemy’, but Botha made no such move.  
By the end of the 1980s, thousands of people were openly challenging the communist 
regimes in Eastern Europe. By May 1989 East Germany still seemed stable, but the election 
results of that month were so blatantly fabricated that thousands were incited to protest, 
despite it being dangerous to do so. On the 9
th
 of November 1989, it was announced that 
people could now freely cross the border into West Germany, marking the fall of the Berlin 
Wall (Giliomee, 2012:298). Communism started collapsing, one state after the other (De 
Klerk, 1994:5). 
The ANC no longer had its East European support base, and socialism had been widely 
discredited (De Klerk, 1994:5). The Soviet Union’s policy of supporting liberation 
movements in the developing world ‘as a way of weakening the West’ was diminishing 
(Giliomee, 2012:300; and De Klerk, 1998:161). The South African government was 
presented with a golden opportunity to lift the ban on the ANC, marking the fall of the Berlin 
wall as instrumental to the fall of apartheid (Taylor & Vale, 2000:401). 
By this time, the South African government had lost international credibility, submitting the 
country’s economy to trade sanctions and other forms of international political pressures 
(Shapiro, 2012:35). The South African economy could not compete on the international stage 
any longer, forcing the government to re-examine the way it was dealing with the security 
concerns within the country (Taylor & Vale, 2000:402). Taylor & Vale (2000:404) state that 
‘[i]n short, apartheid became bad for business and the elites at both the national and 
international level realised this.’ Wessels (2010:148) states the importance not only of the 
international sanctions in bring the NP to the negotiation table, but also the ‘virility’ of the 
Botha government. 
Another event closely linked to the fall of the apartheid regime was the peaceful Namibian 
transition. The war in Angola ended in a peace settlement (Giliomee, 2012:297). The process 
was backed by the United Nations (UN) and the process of South West Africa (Namibia) 
becoming an independent state was initiated.  In November 1991, South West Africa held 
their first free elections, with whites and black alike going to the polls. Most South Africans 
were affected by this peaceful outcome – serving almost as a ‘dress rehearsal for the South 
African transition to come’ (Welsh, 2009:348). 
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4.3. Prenegotiation: Talks about Talks (from 1985) 
In the late 1980s, South Africa was in the midst of a stalemate in which neither side had the 
power to completely defeat the other (Adam, 1987:287, 302). The NP government was not 
able to maintain apartheid, and the opposition, though strengthened, was not able to seize 
power. Both the government and the opposition were rejecting the reality of the stalemate – 
the government hoped that the situation would correct itself, while the opposition still 
believed that they would reap the rewards of the armed struggle. Substantive negotiations 
could not start before both parties perceived the stalemate (Adam, 1987:302). For substantive 
negotiations to begin, parties need to come to the realisation that negotiation is ‘the only 
viable option’ (Ebrahim, 1998:29).  
There was an ‘absence of basic trust’ between these parties, and without trust, neither side 
could envision any kind of joint solution to the ‘seemingly intractable conflict’ (Shapiro, 
2012:34). Ebrahim (1998:29) notes that ‘years of negative perceptions of one another did not 
make it easier for the parties to negotiate.’ For any type of official meeting to occur, a level of 
trust and confidence would have to be present. As a member of the ANC leadership, Thabo 
Mbeki was set to play a vital role in building this trust during the second half of the 1980s 
(Shapiro, 2012:35). Building trust was also linked to establishing whether common ground, 
or a ‘contract zone’, existed. 
During this time, President Botha had condemned talks with the ANC (Sparks, 1994:80). Any 
talks taking place would have to be in secret. Kruger (1998:95) mentions the importance of 
audiences at this stage: the government ‘could not risk being seen to talk with the enemy by 
their supporters.’ While talks after De Klerk’s seminal speech in 1990 (See section 4.3) have 
been well documented and analysed, what happened leading up to this speech, specifically in 
the form of secret talks, remains more vague (Breytenbach, 2010:14). 
In the early 1980s, some leaders within the NP had begun to realise that apartheid was failing 
(Lieberfeld, 2000:21; and Meer, 1990: 345). Leaders of both the ANC and the NP had started 
to realise that not negotiating would lead to even more ‘oppression, violence and war’ 
(Lieberfeld, 2000:31). From 1987 onwards, several non-official networks of ‘talks about 
talks’ developed in South Africa. Business people, prominent organisations, professional 
institutes and academics met with the ANC in Dakar, London and elsewhere (De Klerk, 
1994:1; and Breytenbach, 2010). 
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In June 1987, the press caught wind of a meeting in Dakar, Senegal, that would take place in 
August between eleven senior members of the ANC led by Thabo Mbeki and about sixty 
people invited by instigator and transformation activist Van Zyl Slabbert (Spaarwater, 
2012:173-174; Giliomee, 2012:273; Waldmeir, 1997:75). This group of dissidents included 
Afrikaans-speaking academics, journalists and professionals, several Afrikaans-speaking 
coloured people, and a few English-speaking businessmen. The violence wracking South 
Africa was the main topic of discussion (Giliomee, 2012:230). While evoking a lot of 
negative press in South Africa, the Dakar conference was an important ‘demonstration of the 
necessity of a negotiated settlement’ (Esterhuyse, 2012:25). At this conference, Mbeki’s 
negotiating style became clear: he ‘understood … charm as a game of strategy’ (Gevisser, 
2009:190). Mbeki realised that negotiation would not happen spontaneously, but that it is 
something that had to be worked at and nurtured. 
4.3.1. Secret Meetings  
Breytenbach (2010:14) mentions the first contact with the ANC abroad as being in 1984, 
when a meeting between the ANC in Lusaka and Dr Piet Muller (then editor of the Beeld 
newspaper) was organised, sparking other interest. By 1987, Dr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert 
and Colin Eglin had met with the ANC in Lusaka; Tony Bloom had met with Oliver Tambo, 
Thabo Mbeki and Chris Hani, amongst others; and Patrick Laurance (editor of the Rand 
Daily Mail) and Willie Breytenbach had met with Mbeki in New York (Breytenbach, 
2010:14). 1987 saw the Dakar meetings, mentioned above. 
The government needed information on the ANC, and so The National Intelligence Service 
(NIS) set out to ‘get to know’ their ‘enemy’. They proceeded to approach delegates of the 
Dakar meetings for information (Waldmeir, 1997:75). Top officials in the NIS had realised 
that ANC members other than Mandela would also have to be approached, as a settlement 
would not depend on Mandela alone. The NIS proceeded to seek a way to meet with the ANC 
in exile. They chose reformist academic Willie Esterhuyse to act as their go-between, as he 
had become involved in other meetings addressing the possibility of negotiations (Gevisser, 
2009:2001). Two NIS officials went to Esterhuyse’s home and made him a proposal: ‘they 
asked him to spy for his country’ (Waldmeir, 1997:75). Esterhuyse was asked to report back 
to the NIS under the leadership of Neil Barnard on the inner workings of the ANC, an 
outrageous request at the time. In 2012, Esterhuyse wrote a tell-all book on the inner 
workings of these meetings, and more specifically his relationship with Thabo Mbeki (2012). 
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One of the first to publish an insider account of the matter, Esterhuyse elaborates on how a 
culture of negotiation and trust was built up in these secret meetings. 
Esterhuyse arranged discussions in Britain between ANC members and NP-aligned 
academics, journalists and business leaders through the course of November 1987 and May 
1990. Esterhuyse also elaborates on the involvement of Consgold in arranging these 
meetings, recalling a conversation between himself and Humphrey Woods of Consgold 
where they both stated their belief that informal and confidential talks between the 
government and ANC leaders abroad could be of help (2012:22). By this time, Esterhuyse 
felt that (2012:26): ‘Die “ding” het alreeds gekom. Hóé geskik gaan word, wát geskik gaan 
word en wié gaan skik, is die eintlike “ding”’ (Translation: “It” had already arrived. How to 
negotiate, what to negotiate and who would negotiate, that was the real question.) 
Twelve of these discussions between at times twenty delegates from both the Afrikaner 
political elite and the ANC were held at a stately home near Bath in England, and later 
became known as the Mells Park House discussions (Gevisser, 2009:201; and Giliomee, 
2012:277). These talks did not mean any concessions on either side: as Patti Waldmeir 
(1997:77) puts it, they were ‘talks… about whether to talk… about talks’.  
The academics proceeded to offer valuable information on the willingness of the ANC to 
enter into more substantive negotiations to the government (Sparks, 1994: 68-90). At the 
Mells Park House meetings, dissidents were not only to talk formally about the future of 
South Africa, but also form personal relationships with each other. The release of political 
prisoners, the role of violence and preconditions for more substantive negotiations were some 
of the subjects on the table (Du Toit, 2001:56). The two sides’ positions on a new constitution 
were also explored. Other secret meetings were also taking part during this time (see Sparks, 
1994).  
At the Mells Park meetings, Esterhuyse and Mbeki held private talks away from their 
respective delegations. Esterhuyse felt compelled to tell Mbeki that he was reporting back to 
the NIS, and was relieved when Mbeki admitted that that was just what he had hoped for, 
knowing that his message, that of the ANC, was now being fed to the government (Waldmeir, 
1997:77). The involvement of the government in the talks was held secret. P.W. Botha did 
not divulge the information to the cabinet, and only he and a few NIS officials were privy to 
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the existence and content of the meetings (Waldmeir, 1997:79). The same went for the ANC 
– only senior leaders in the ANC were in the know, fearing their denouncement as sell-outs. 
The meetings first discussed the issue of starting negotiations, which then turned to a 
discussion on principles and positions (Kruger, 1998:95 – 102). Esterhuyse continued to 
report to Niel Barnard. These talks served as an exploration of each other’s range of possible 
outcomes, from their ideal settlement to fall back positions. This exploration served as a 
means to discover a middle ground, from which plans for formal negotiations could be made. 
4.3.2. Kobie Coetsee and Nelson Mandela Meetings 
In October 1980, Kobie Coetsee became minister of Justice, Police and Prisons (Sparks, 
1994:19).  A close friend of his, Piet de Waal, had been spending some time with Winnie 
Mandela, wife of the renowned political prisoner Nelson Mandela. De Waal started to subtly 
petition Coetsee to release Mandela from prison. This caused Coetsee to consider meeting 
with Mandela, but in those precarious times he was unsure of how to go about the meeting.  
In November 1985, Mandela was admitted to the Volks Hospital in Cape Town as he had 
developed an enlarged prostate gland. Coetsee saw this as an opportunity and proceeded to 
arrange a meeting (Sparks, 1994:21-24). Meeting at the hospital for the first time presented a 
unique opportunity: here, Mandela would not be seen as the ‘prisoner’, but as a patient, and 
Kobie Coetsee could shed his role as Minister responsible for prisons and assume the role of 
a visitor (Du Toit, 2001:54). Though the conversation lacked substance, a connection had 
been made. After the meeting, Coetsee began to prepare for Mandela’s release (Waldmeir, 
1997:92).  
The government realised that meeting with Mandela would be easier if he were moved from 
the Robben Island Prison to Pollsmoor prison – further from other political prisoners and less 
conspicuous (Waldmeir, 1997:93). Botha continued to reiterate his previous condition: 
Mandela would be released if he chose to renounce violence.  
By May of 1988, Botha had found that he should open a channel to Nelson Mandela in prison 
in order to pick Mandela’s brain on changing the violent conflict to political conflict 
(Giliomee, 2012:273). He appointed four officials to meet with Mandela – Niel Barnard and 
Mike Louw from the NIS, General Willie Willemse and Fanie van der Merwe, a senior 
official in the Department of Constitutional Development and Planning (Giliomee, 
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2012:273). These officials were to ‘assess Mandela as a potential negotiator’, in other words, 
to seek the existence of a contract zone (Du Toit, 2001:55). Barnard was tasked with 
reporting back to Botha. By the time Mandela was released in February 1990, they had met 
some 48 times. Mandela relayed Coetsee’s message of tentatively seeking negotiation to his 
ANC comrades. 
Mandela insisted on a meeting with Botha himself, but Botha refused. He would not meet 
with a prisoner who rejected his demands for the renouncement of violence (Giliomee, 
2012:275). Mandela in turn refused to renounce violence unless he was released 
unconditionally. In March 1989, Mandela sent Botha a memorandum seeking the negotiation 
of a peaceful settlement, majority rule and ‘structural guarantees to prevent black domination 
of the white minority’ (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000:12). A week later, on the 5th of July 1989, 
Botha conceded to meet Mandela for the first time (Sparks, 1994:53). Willemse and Barnard 
also attended the meeting.  
Though there was no substantive discussion, Mandela made his demands clear: he would not 
be freed unless Walter Sisulu and others who he had been imprisoned with would also be 
released (Giliomee, 2012:276). The meeting turned out to be inconclusive, but a step had 
been taken in the direction of talks between the ANC and the NP.  
Waldmeir (1997:99) puts the scope of networks into perspective: ‘[n]obody, with the possible 
exception of P.W. Botha, had a full picture of the wide range of contacts already established 
between African and Afrikaner. Chris Heunis was allowed to meet the internal anti-apartheid 
movement, but never Mandela; Coetsee ran with what he called ‘the Mandela initiative’ in 
almost total secrecy; and the NIS was pursuing its own clandestine agenda throughout.’ 
4.4. PW Botha replaced by FW de Klerk (1989): The Speech 2 Feb 1990 
In February 1989, P.W. Botha suffered a stroke. This caused him to retire as leader of the NP. 
He was replaced as leader of the NP by F.W. de Klerk, elected on 2 February 1989 (De 
Klerk, 1998:88). On August 14, 1989, F.W. de Klerk and fifteen other senior politicians 
sought to confront President Botha as they realised that he would not further peaceful talks 
with the opposition. They asked him to resign as President (Giliomee, 2012:277). He was 
replaced as President of South Africa by F.W. de Klerk (Spitz & Chaskalson, 2000:13). At 
this point in time, the main pillars of the Afrikaner establishment, including the press, the 
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church, the Broederbond and the universities had stopped supporting apartheid (Waldmeir, 
1997:132). 
The day after being sworn in as acting president, F.W. de Klerk attended a meeting of the 
State Security Council (SSC). The Council adopted a resolution allowing the NIS to enter 
‘into direct discussion with the still-banned ANC’, specifically aimed at acquiring more 
information regarding the aims and alliances of the ANC (Spaarwater, 2012:175).  
Maritz Spaarwater, an NIS official, proceeded to select a team to meet with the ANC leaders 
in exile (Spaarwater, 2012:175). Spaarwater and Mike Louw met Thabo Mbeki and Jacob 
Zuma in Lucerne, Switzerland on 10 September 1989 (Spaarwater, 2012:177; and 
Esterhuyse, 2012:13). Here, both parties were wary of the other, but also eager to develop 
some kind of relationship. Mbeki set out to change the view that the NP, or the government, 
had of the ANC. He proceeded to cultivate a non-threatening persona, based on his education 
and charm (Shapiro, 2012:37). By showing that he was to be trusted, he was showing that the 
ANC could be trusted. 
At this point, it had become clear that the ANC would not achieve a military victory. 
However, radical ANC leaders rejected the idea of talks because they believed that the 
‘movement’s revolutionary underground had to be much stronger before talks could begin’ 
(Giliomee, 2012:294). The ANC’s ‘people’s war’ had failed to reach its goals of challenging 
the stability of the NP government, and this helped Mbeki’s argument that the ANC should 
enter into talks (Giliomee, 2012:277). It seemed a mutually hurting stalemate was in place 
(Kruger, 1998:70). 
When Louw and Spaarwater reported back to De Klerk, he was at first incensed. When they 
mentioned the sanctioning of their actions by the SSC, he proceeded to listen to what they 
had discovered during their meeting (Giliomee, 2012:277). While de Klerk only realised in 
1988 that secret meetings were going on between the government, in the form of Kobie 
Coetsee and other officials with Nelson Mandela, he quickly realised that he would have to 
steer the NP in the direction of negotiations.  
At this point, these ‘second channel’ negotiations, held informally and in secret, would have 
to begin to hand over the reins to first channel, official negotiations (Esterhuyse, 2012:327). 
De Klerk ordered the softening of strict security measures, including the allowing of mass 
protests in public (Nelan, 1989:2). De Klerk went so far as lifting the 1986 state of 
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emergency and unbanning restricted organisations on certain conditions. De Klerk was 
setting the stage for more substantive steps (Nelan, 1989:2). Eventually the widespread 
violence in the townships, international sanctions, pressure from the white electorate and 
other impending dilemmas, forced the NP to ‘abandon the sinking ship of apartheid’ and seek 
substantive negotiations (Meer, 1990:346). F.W. de Klerk had realised that denying at least 
power-sharing to the majority would only end in extreme violence (Meer, 1990: 345).  
When the cabinet decided to rescind the ban on the ANC and other banned organisations 
early in 1990, Louw, together with other officials from the NIS, met with a team from the 
ANC in Europe. In this meeting, agreement was reached regarding the return of exiled 
members of the ANC and other organisations and the suspension of an armed struggle. The 
ANC and the government each had a set period of time in which to prepare their constituents 
for coming negotiations (Giliomee, 2012:277). 
In his seminal speech on the second of February 1990, President de Klerk ordered the release 
of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, and lifted the ban on other liberation 
movements, including the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Pan-
Africanist Congress (PAC) (Gevisser, 2009:211; Lawrence, 1994:8; and Giliomee, 
2012:309). Emergency restrictions on the radical extra-parliamentary organisations and the 
media were also lifted. During this speech, de Klerk insisted that he would not bow to 
majority rule, but rather usher in a system of power-sharing (Sparks, 1994:107). De Klerk 
also announced the dissolution of apartheid legislation (De Klerk, 1994:6). The content of the 
speech came as a shock to most. De Klerk (1994:6) refers to the speech as ‘the springboard, 
the framework, and the dynamo’. The ANC leadership was shocked at the announcement 
(Gevisser, 2009:211).  
De Klerk hoped to set up a basis of good faith on which to build future negotiations. He 
proposed that peace be achieved by means of a ‘negotiated understanding between leaders 
representative of the entire population’ (Viljoen & Venter, 1995:15). This speech indicated 
that the government had accepted the idea of sharing power with the black majority, and 
brought about a shift in the white community away from apartheid (Viljoen & Venter, 
1995:15). The speech denoted three processes (De Klerk, 1994:6): (1) the democratisation of 
the state (in the form of equality before the law, a free economy, a bill of human rights, 
protection of minority and individual rights and general franchise); (2) the ‘normalisation of 
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political processes’ (including the lifting of the ban on political groups and free political 
activity); and (3) negotiations toward a new constitution. 
4.5. Elite Pacting and the Beginning of Official Negotiations 
4.5.1. Groote Schuur Minute (May 1990) 
The first series of official, preliminary meetings between the leaders of the ANC and the 
South African government took place at Groote Schuur, the official residence of South 
African prime ministers, at the foot of Table Mountain in Cape Town (Sparks, 1994:121). 
This was the first time that leaders from both the Afrikaner and African nationalist movement 
met formally.  
Fourteen people from the government, led by President F.W. de Klerk, met with 15 members 
of the ANC, led by Nelson Mandela, from 2 to 4 May 1990. The NP delegation was made up 
solely of white men, while the ANC delegation was made up of men and women from all 
different races: white, black, Indian and coloured, including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, 
Joe Slovo, Thabo Mbeki and Alfred Nzo (De Klerk, 1998:181; and Giliomee, 2012:323). 
Resolving issues such as the balance of power was not on the agenda at Groote Schuur. 
Delegates at this meeting set out to ‘clear obstacles to constitutional negotiation’ (Waldmeir, 
1997:161). However, vastly divergent views on how to deal with the violence in the country 
emerged. The ANC called for the lifting of the state of emergency, while De Klerk called 
attention to the fact that the emergency measures had seen a significant decrease in violence. 
He noted that, should the emergency measures be relaxed or dropped, violence would surely 
shoot up again (Giliomee, 2012:324). De Klerk and Mandela also disagreed over the lifting of 
sanctions, and the contentious issue of minority rights (Waldmeir, 1997:161). 
The Groote Schuur Minute facilitated the ‘release of political prisoners, the return of exiles 
and the amending of security legislation’ (Sparks, 1994:125). Both parties were to agree on a 
definition of ‘political crimes’ before this could happen, and a ‘Working Group on Political 
Offences’ was set up in order to facilitate this (Spaarwater, 2012:194; and Du Toit, 2001:58). 
While the Groote Schuur Minute imposed certain obligations on the ANC, it did not do so for 
the government. The government committed to lifting the state of emergency, but the army 
and the police could still freely act against opponents, and the government retained resources 
to monitor violations by the ANC (Maphai, 1993:235; and Waldmeir, 1997:161). The ANC 
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pledged to reassess the armed struggle. Only once these things had occurred could 
negotiations begin in earnest. De Klerk (1998:182) left feeling that ‘[i]t was the clearest 
commitment to the ending of the armed struggle that we could get from the ANC at that 
stage. They were extremely sensitive about not being seen by their more radical supporters to 
be making too many concessions too soon – particularly with regard to the armed struggle.’ 
The meeting at Groote Schuur was less about making decisions, and more about building 
trust and establishing connections between the ANC and the NP. The nation and the world 
were watching. While nothing of real substance came from these meetings, both parties did 
agree on continuing talks. De Klerk and Mandela left the meeting believing that a deal was to 
be made, a deal in which ‘there would be no losers’ (Waldmeir, 1997:162). Both leaders had 
found that a middle ground, a contract zone, existed. What is significant about this meeting is 
its ‘conviviality’, but this would also be the last occasion on which the two parties talked 
calmly, and without assigning blame (Giliomee, 2012:326).  
4.5.2. Pretoria Minute (August 1990) 
Violence escalated from May 1990, prompting the two parties to meet again amidst the crisis. 




 of August, this time in Pretoria at the Union Buildings 
(Spaarwater, 2012:194). Mandela announced that the ANC’s armed struggle would be 
suspended, with immediate effect (Sparks, 1994:124). However, this did not mean that the 
ANC was renouncing the armed struggle (Du Toit, 2001:58). This was still a major 
concession by Mandela and ANC radicals grew concerned that Mandela would give away too 
much while de Klerk remained in a position of strength (Sparks, 1994:124). De Klerk 
believed that the ANC was vying for the ‘moral high ground’ (De Klerk, 1998:186). 
The Pretoria Minute sought to regulate the ceasefire between the two sides (Maphai, 
1993:235). The government committed to releasing all remaining political prisoners and to 
allow those in exile to return to South Africa (De Klerk, 1998:186). The government saw the 
suspension of the armed struggle as the last obstacle to substantive negotiations, and now the 
way had been cleared (Waldmeir, 1997:165). However, took sixteen months before official 
multiparty negotiations began in the form of Codesa (the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa). Frustration grew among ANC members, specifically with the government’s lack of 
action regarding its security forces, contrary to agreement (Shapiro, 2012:44). At the ANC 
Consultative Conference in December 1990, both Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma were 
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earmarked as being ‘over-enthusiastic for negotiations’, with frustration aimed specifically at 
Mbeki’s reluctance to step up the confrontation (Shapiro, 2012:44).  
4.5.3. D.F. Malan Accord (February 1991) 
Violence continued to escalate unabatedly. The two sides met once again, this time at the 
D.F. Malan Airport in Cape Town, with the sole purpose of bringing about stability 
(Giliomee, 2012:326). The ANC entered into a secret agreement with the government, the 
D.F. Malan Accord, on 12 February 1991. The Accord allowed for the existence of 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (the ANC’s military wing, also known MK) as the government would 
not regard it as a ‘private army’ during the negotiation period (Sparks, 1994:131). There were 
however some limitations set on MK, including not engaging in threats of armed actions of 
training inside South Africa (Du Toit, 2001:59). The ANC was obliged to give the 
government details of the arms that it had within its arsenal, and these arms would be ‘under 
the joint control of a transitional authority once an interim government was formed’ (Sparks, 
1994: 131). Both parties committed to ending all forms of hostilities, including armed attacks, 
and to participating in a peaceful democratic process (Giliomee, 2012:326). 
The D.F. Malan Accord failed to bring about stability and curb violence. De Klerk had been 
under fire from Mandela since the meeting in Pretoria – Mandela accused de Klerk of ‘being 
unable or unwilling to curb a mysterious ‘Third Force’ that unleashed violence on ANC 
members and tried to disrupt the movement’ (Giliomee, 2012:326). 
In July 1991 it came to light that the government had been secretly funding the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) (Du Toit, 2001:60). While De Klerk denied knowing anything about this 
outright, the ANC accused the government of acting in bad faith (Du Toit, 2001:60). In an 
effort to re-establish good faith, De Klerk proceeded to ‘remove the Ministers of Police and 
Defence from their positions in a major cabinet reshuffle, and to institute administrative 
control procedures to close down these and any other such operations’ (Du Toit, 2001:60). 
4.5.4. National Peace Accord (September 1991) 
Slowly, the two parties came closer to the drafting of a new constitution. The government 
made it clear that they would not oppose some sort of ‘transitional government’, given that it 
did not break ‘constitutional continuity’. On the 14th of September 1991, 32 representatives 
from political parties (including the ANC and the IFP), government and religious and 
business organisations signed the National Peace Accord (Viljoen & Venter, 1995:15).  
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Almost all significant parties were involved, and all, except the Conservative Party (CP) and 
the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), signed a ‘Declaration of Intent’ for substantive 
negotiations in the form of The Convention for a Democratic South African (Codesa) 
(Giliomee, 2012:336). The Accord provided a ‘code of conduct’ for the negotiations to come, 
provided mechanisms for resolving disputes and was designed to moderate tensions (Lee, 
1996:43).  
In October 1991 the ANC made its position clear: it demanded that a government of national 
unity ‘should govern South Africa for no more than eighteen months, after which the election 
for a constituent assembly should take place’ (Giliomee, 2012:336). The ANC agreed to 
Codesa, but not without the caveat that it should not become a constitution-making body. 
Codesa was set for 20 and 21 December in Kempton Park. Common ground had been 
established, but at Codesa, the ‘real haggling would begin’ (Lawrence, 1994:9). 
4.6. Pre-negotiations positioning 
4.6.1. The NP’s earlier proposals 
Prior to the September 1989 election, the NP’s campaign remained much the same as it had 
been before (Welsh, 2009:345). The NP was still talking of the need for reform, but attacked 
the ANC as a terrorist organisation. De Klerk denied that the NP was considering talks with 
the ANC (Welsh, 2009:345). 
The NP appeared to be upholding its ‘group rights’ position; on the basis that ‘only when 
people feel secure in a group context would they be prepared to run the risk of sharing power’ 
(Welsh, 2009:345). De Klerk maintained that each group would have control of its own 
interests, attacking the Democratic Party’s (DP) proposal of federalism as leaving whites a 
powerless minority in every region (Welsh, 2009:345). The NP was strongly against majority 
rule. De Klerk went so far as to equate ‘domination by a majority’ to Nazi Germany, assuring 
NP constituents that whatever constitution was negotiated would not allow any group to 
dominate another (Welsh, 2009:345). 
The NP position had clearly remained much the same as earlier in the late 1980s: power-
sharing; group rights; firmly against majority rule; a minority veto; and minorities to be 
represented in a senate (Welsh, 2009:345; and Giliomee, 2012:347-348). After February 
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1990, the NP government slowly and painfully moved from its steadfast position on group 
rights to power-sharing (Shapiro, 2012:41). 
4.6.2. ANC Proposals 1988/1989 
In 1988, the ANC proposals reflected a unitary position, but very few details (Welsh, 2009): 
i. unitary, democratic and non-racial state; with  
ii. powers (of the government) that might be delegated to subordinate 
administrative units; and  
iii. A Bill of Rights based on the Freedom Charter of 1955. 
The ANC continued to cling to the idea of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). In 
1962, the South African Communist Party (SACP) had adopted a theoretical document: The 
Road to South African Freedom (Giliomee, 2012:294). The NDR was the foundation of this 
document. The NDR wished to ‘overthrow the colonial sate’ (the white government), and ‘to 
introduce popular control over all the institutions, to nationalise the main industries and to 
introduce radical land reform’ (Giliomee, 2012:294). At the SACP congress in 1989, Mbeki 
restated his commitment to the NDR. 
4.7. Positioning 1991 
4.7.1. NP Constitutional Proposals September 1991  
The NP’s constitutional proposals by September 1991 looked as such (Giliomee, 2012:333-
334): 
 The constitution would have authority above all other laws. It would be guarded by an 
independent judiciary; 
 The state would have a Bill of Rights; 
 Democracy would be participatory; 
 Power would be decentralised and trasferred to regional authorities; 
 The National Legislature was to consist of two houses forming a bicameral system. 
The first house would be elected by means of proportional representation, and the 
second house would get the same number of seats to be filled by regional elections. A 
minimum number of votes for parties would equate to an equal number of seats in this 
chamber; 
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 The presidency would rotate between the leaders of the three biggest parties; 
 All decisions would be made by consensus; 
 Minority political parties would be protected by minority rights. 
4.7.2. The ANC proposals of 1991 
The ANC proposals of 1991 showed a shift away from their 1988 proposals (Welsh, 2009): 
 They proposed a unitary state with an entrenched Bill of Rights 
 The homelands should be re-incorporated into South Africa 
 Government would be made up of three tiers: central, regional and local 
 The government would be made up of a National Assembly based on proportional 
representation, and a Senate made up of representatives from the different regions. 
The Senate would be the ‘custodian of the constitution’ 
 The judiciary will be independent and have a constitutional court 







- Equal rights for men and women 
- Affirmative action 
- Abolition of capital punishment 
 Ten official languages were proposed 
 A human rights commission was proposed 
However, Nelson Mandela did try to reassure whites in a speech in Stellenbosch in 1991: 
‘We have to address the fears of whites and we should go beyond the mere rhetorical 
assurance in order to address structural guarantees which would ensure that this principle will 
not lead to the domination of whites by blacks ... It may not be enough to work purely on 
one-person, one-vote, because every national group would like to see that the people of their 
flesh and blood are in the government’ (Uys, 1994:53). From the beginning, the ANC had 
been intent on reassuring whites of their economic interests, stating their commitment to 
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global neo-liberalism (Shapiro, 2012:41). On the issue of nationalisation, the ANC realised 
that it would have to make a change in order to keep on attracting international investment to 
the country. Mandela realised this, and while he could not get the notion of nationalisation 
removed from the ANC’s platform, privatisation as well as nationalisation was accepted 
(Giliomee, 2012:349). 
4.8. Negotiations for Constitution Making 
4.8.1. Codesa I (December 1991) 
On the 13
th
 of November 1991, parties met to discuss and decide the rules for the multiparty 
negotiation process, otherwise known as Codesa. On 21 and 22 December 1991, 228 black, 
white, Indian and coloured delegates from 19 political groups and governments met at the 
World Trade Centre near Johannesburg (Laurence, 1992:48; and Sparks, 1994:130). The 
Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), the Conservative Party (CP), the Azanian People’s 
Organisation (AZAPO) and the PAC were the notably missing parties (De Klerk, 1994:7). 
According to Du Toit (2001:61), the venue was about the only successful aspect of Codesa: 
the building was easily accessible to all, and presented no historical or emotional significance 
to any of the participating parties. 
During the pre-talks of Codesa I, the vague notion of ‘sufficient consensus’ was developed 
(Spaarwater, 2012:201). Parties decided that during substantive negotiations, when consensus 
proved impossible, the negotiations would proceed on the basis of ‘sufficient consensus’. 
Though the notion has never been defined in detail, it did rest on the hope of more than solely 
a majority vote (Laurence, 1992:50). Basically, ‘sufficient consensus’ meant that if ‘the ANC 
and the NP agreed the process could go forward’ (Welsh, 2009:481). While this process was 
hailed internationally, some parties accused the concept as justifying bilateralism in a multi-
party decision-making process. 
Codesa relied on the trust and goodwill of the participants, and did not have any policing 
mechanism ensuring compliance to any decision made. The balance of power between the 
ANC and the NP provided a basis for trust (Maphai, 1993:235). By this time Thabo Mbeki, 
who had been in charge of the ANC negotiating team, had been replaced by Cyril 
Ramaphosa. Mbeki had been labelled ‘moderate’, and the militants within the ANC set about 
to replace him, finding a worthy candidate in trade unionist and lawyer in training 
Ramaphosa (Gevisser, 2009:228). During Codesa I, Mbeki took the lead in the working 
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group for designing the interim government, while Ramaphosa led the working group on 
designing a new constitution (Gevisser, 2009:231). Here, their difference in negotiation styles 
became clear: Mbeki proceeded to achieve compromise with minimal conflict, and with 
minimal concession by the NP, while Ramaphosa’s group failed to compromise on several 
key issues, which eventually led to the collapse of the talks (Gevisser, 2009:231).  
Barry Shapiro (2012:33) notes this change in the leadership of the ANC’s negotiating team as 
a ‘pivotal turning point in the ANC’s drive to secure agreement on a majoritarian 
constitutional settlement’. Mbeki had spent years building trust by building relationships with 
the opposition, seeking to change their perception of the ANC as a terrorist organisation to be 
feared to that of negotiating partner. Shapiro argues that Mbeki’s negotiating style had 
created a steady platform of trust when Ramaphosa took the reins, who proceeded to take a 
notably more adversarial approach and rely on brinkmanship (Shapiro, 2012:33). By the time 
Ramaphosa took over, Mbeki had succeeded in making the government believe they shared 
an ‘ultimately ‘irreversible’ understanding of their mutual interest in making peace’ (Shapiro, 
2012:33). However, once Mbeki had brought about the establishment of this ‘irreversibility’, 
his style of negotiating now longer served the ANC, which led to his replacement by the 
more adversarial Ramaphosa (Shapiro, 2012:36). 
Codesa began with a ‘Declaration of Intent’: a declaration by all the parties (except two) 
vowing to achieve democracy and committing themselves to a peaceful transition and a Bill 
of Rights (Nelan & Hawthorne, 1991:2; and Gross, 2004:58). Codesa’s main objective was 
not to write a new constitution, but rather to reach agreement on how the negotiations and the 
transformation would go forward (Giliomee, 2012:340).  
Five political working groups were set up with specific tasks. Groups were given a timeline – 
discussion in the next two months, and reporting back at the convention in mid-March (Nelan 
& Hawthorn, 1991:2). Each party was to send two delegates and two advisers to each of the 
groups (Giliomee, 2012:337). The five working groups looked at the following issues (De 
Klerk, 1994:7): (1) creating a political climate of free participation and assessing the role of 
the international community in the transition; (2) general constitutional principles and the 
mechanism for writing a new constitution (Cyril Ramaphosa was the chief negotiator for the 
ANC here); (3) how the interim government and the provinces would be arranged (Thabo 
Mbeki was the ANC’s chief negotiator here); (4) how the TBVC (Transkei, Botphutatswana, 
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Venda, Ciskei) states will be dealt with; (5) how decisions made at Codesa would be 
implemented and timetables. 
At Codesa, black and white leaders came together to design a democracy specifically for 
South African needs. While leaders agreed that a new constitution should be set up, they 
disagreed on almost every other aspect. F.W. de Klerk focused on sharing power, while the 
ANC preferred the handing over of power from the NP to an interim government (Nelan & 
Hawthorn, 1991:3). The ANC was in favour of a strong, centralised government, while the 
NP sought a decentralised, federal system and a minority-veto on major legislation. Buthelezi 
of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) fought for a strong federalist state, before withdrawing 
from Codesa. The issue of the ongoing violence continued to be a sore point during Codesa I 
(Giliomee, 2012:340).  
The NP’s pressing for minority rights and a white veto on the constitution was threatening to 
collapse Codesa, or to split the ANC leadership (Giliomee, 2012:345). But the 
misunderstanding between South African political groups went much deeper than one issue. 
Codesa I made one thing clear: there was a fundamental disagreement over who would have 
power in the new South Africa (Waldmeir, 1997:193). The NP held out on its demand of a 
minority/white veto, hoping that it would entrench at least some political power for the white 
minority (making up only 12% of the population at that time) (Waldmeir, 1997:193). 
After September 1991, De Klerk reiterated the NPs proposal of a Bill of Rights to protect 
individual rights, civil and property rights; an independent judiciary; separation of powers 
between the executive and the legislature, and between the provinces and a central 
government (Waldmeir, 2012:193). Initially, the party line had not changed: the NP was set 
against majority rule, knowing that simple majoritarianism would take all political power 
away from whites (Waldmeir, 1997:193). But ultimately, the NP conceded majority rule in a 
constitutional state. 
De Klerk ‘sought to artificially balance power between vastly unequal ethnic groups, with a 
constitution that enforced multi-party coalition government’ (Waldmeir, 1997:193). This 
would mean (Waldmeir, 1997:193): 
…cabinet posts shared out according to each party’s proportion of the vote; extra 
representation for minorities; an upper house of Parliament, coupled with special 
high majorities for passage of some legislation in the lower house; a presidency 
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that would revolve between the leaders of rival parties, rather than residing in one 
man; the requirement that cabinet decisions be taken by consensus, a system that 
would give each party an effective veto over the others. In short, a system in which 
each group had more or less equal power.  
Mandela was dead-set against this proposal, referring to it as ‘loser-takes-all’. Allowing 
minorities to veto the will of the majority was not what the ANC had been fighting for. 
Mandela continued to call for majority rule. De Klerk in turn called this proposal ‘winner-
takes-all’ – exactly what the government was afraid of. The existence of a contract zone 
seemed less and less likely, threatening a deadlock of the talks.  
Ahead of Codesa, the government had made clear its position that it would not accept an 
elected constitution-making body or an interim government. However, a week later De Klerk 
finally conceded to a compromise: Codesa would write an interim constitution, and an elected 
assembly would write a final constitution (Waldmeir, 1997:195). The Codesa negotiators 
reached an agreement on going forward with a two-stage transition. Firstly, an interim 
government would be put into place, and secondly, a parliamentary body would be created 
that would draft a new constitution (Arnold, 1992:3). The procedures for further talks were 
developed. 
While the convention was open to all who wanted to attend, some extremist groups had 
insisted on boycotting the process, including the Afrikaner Resistance Movement led by 
Eugene Terreblanch and the Azanian People’s Organisation (Laurence, 1992:49). These 
groups were in danger of ‘irreversibly marginalising themselves’ (Laurence, 1992:49). 
4.8.1.1. Ramaphosa and Meyer 
The meeting of Roelf Meyer, who had replaced Gerrit Viljoen as the lead negotiator on the 
government’s side in May 1992, and Cyril Ramaphosa, the ANC’s secretary general, was 
pivotal in the South African negotiations (Strauss, 1993:357). As leader of the Mass 
Democratic Movement during the 1980s, Ramaphosa had openly expressed his doubts 
regarding the Nationalist government. While he believed that the government was ready to 
build a New South Africa, he was wary of phrases like ‘group rights’ which were reminiscent 
of apartheid (Nelan, 1989:3). However, he also voiced concerns regarding a one-party-
dominant democracy, knowing that the consequences of allowing one black party to 
dominate the future of South Africa would not be conducive to democracy (Nelan, 1989:3). 
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At a meeting organised by a mutual friend in August 1991, Meyer and Ramaphosa met 
socially for the first time. They were ‘forced’ into a situation that required mutual trust, 
where after a bond was formed between the two men who would become central figures in 
the negotiations (Sparks, 1994:3-4). 
4.8.2. Codesa II (May 1992) 
On the 17
th
 of March, a whites-only referendum voted in favour of change. The question on 
the referendum read: ‘Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State 
President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through 
negotiation? (Strauss,1993:339). Reportedly, 86% of white voters turned up, with 68.7% 
voting ‘Yes’ (Strauss, 1993:350). A record turnout of voters at de Klerk’s referendum gave 
de Klerk a mandate to continue with negotiations, and gave him control of white political 
power (Arnold, 1992:2). Though the ANC and the PAC were initially against the whites-only 
referendum, the referendum changed the course of the negotiations positively. The large vote 
in favour of change strengthened the resolve of parties involved toward a peaceful transition. 
After the referendum, the NP felt confident (De Klerk, 1998:234). It felt secure in at least a 
third of the votes in a national election and as such could manoeuvre their proposals in such a 
way to take this into account (Giliomee, 2012:345). At this point the working groups were 
meeting almost constantly. Nearly every waking hour was spent at the World Trade Centre 
near Johannesburg, struggling to negotiate agreements to be presented a Codesa II on 15 and 
16 May. At this next big meeting, leaders would be called on to approve what the working 
groups had agreed on. 
During this time, the NP’s main constitutional and political adviser, Gerrit Viljoen, started to 
feel the brunt of the long hours of intense negotiation (Giliomee, 2012:346). He resigned as 
Minister of Constitutional Development and decided not to take part in talks any longer. 
Other negotiators, Hernus Kriel and Rina Venter, also decided to pull out of the negotiations. 
De Klerk had to reshuffle his team: deputy minister Tertius Delport was moved to head of 
Working Group 2 in Viljoen’s place, while Roelf Meyer was assigned as Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs, chairman of the cabinet sub-committee on negotiations, and chief 
negotiator (Giliomee, 2012:370). Leon Wessels and Dawie de Villiers were also pulled into  
more senior negotiating positions, assisting Meyer in talks with the ANC (Waldmeir, 
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1997:200). Cyril Ramaphosa and Tertius Delport came head-to-head in Working Group 2, 
with Ramaphosa setting out to break Delport (Waldmeir, 1997:201). 
Heading toward Codesa II, the 19 parties taking part had agreed that (Waldmeir, 1997:201): 
 The parties present at Codesa would draft an interim constitution; 
 Constitutional principles to bind the elected constituent assembly would also be 
written; 
 The constituent assembly would be tasked with rewriting the interim constitution into 
a final constitution. 
Before the start of Codesa II, tensions had been considerably built up, and parties had 
hardened their negotiation positions (De Klerk, 1994:7). Codesa II assembled on the 15
th
 of 
May, 1992. Codesa was originally intended to deal only with broad principles regarding the 
transition, but later evolved into negotiations concerning constitutional issues (Maphai, 
1993:225). Continued conflict at the meeting showed that that process may collapse at any 
moment (De Klerk, 1994:7). 
The balance of power at Codesa seemed relatively equal between the NP and the ANC, with 
each party having an equal amount of allies in the group of assembled parties and delegates. 
The NP had the support of some of the homeland leaders (Giliomee, 2012:345). This 
essentially meant that the NP and the ANC would have equal power in the drafting of the 
interim constitution. A large majority – probably larger than the ANC would have in the 
constituent assembly – would be required to make amendments to the constitution. The NP 
would have power to block ANC decisions (Waldmeir, 1997:201). 
Codesa placed definite constraints on any constitution-making body, with great influence by 
the NP, who would otherwise have been in the minority (Maphai, 1993:225). What had not 
yet been settled, however, was how the constituent assembly would decide on making 
changes: while Working Group 2 had already agreed that more than a simple majority would 
be needed, offers of two-thirds and 70% were still on the table (Waldmeir, 1997:201). 
The NP was adamant that the abuse of power, and more specifically, the domination of one 
party over the other, must not be permitted: there should be a ‘maximum devolution of 
power’ (De Klerk, 1994:7). The NP now advocated a phased approach to the transition, and 
stated that the interim constitution ‘must already entrench the principles of a final 
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constitution’ – another attempt at keeping power (De Klerk, 1994:7). The ANC would not fall 
for the NP’s proposals and accused the NP of having a hidden agenda and attempting to stall 
negotiations to achieve this. From the outside, it seemed that the NP had lost control of the 
process and that the ANC only wanted to win power (De Klerk, 1994:8). 
The NP suggested a two-thirds vote for entrenching general constitutional clauses, but a 75% 
majority for the Bill of Rights, multi-party democracy, the devolution of power and minority 
rights (Waldmeir, 1997: 202). The ANC smelled a rat: such high percentages could stall 
changes to the interim Constitution indefinitely. Ramaphosa agreed to the NP’s proposal, 
with the caveat that if the assembly ‘could not agree within six months, a referendum would 
be held…’ At that point, only 50% of the population would be needed to pass a new 
constitution (Waldmeir, 1997:202-203). With this, Codesa II would become deadlocked. 
The proceedings had stalled as no common ground could be found regarding some crucial 
matters (Viljoen & Venter, 1995:16). The government was in favour of a bicameral 
parliament, one chamber elected proportionally and the other on a disproportionate basis, 
providing ‘special representation’ for minorities (Arnold, 1992:2). The ANC was against this, 
arguing against the institutionalisation of minorities and majorities. Codesa had failed to 
bridge the differences between the two main parties’ interests. No middle ground, no contract 
zone, had been identified. 
4.8.2.1. Failure of Codesa (June 1992) 
Several reasons contributed to the failure of Codesa. No one political group can be blamed 
for its collapse: all made errors in judgement, and there was brinkmanship on all sides (Eloff, 
1994:12). Cyril Ramaphosa is specifically noted as to the use of brinkmanship, and forcing 
the balance of power in the ANC’s direction (Gevisser, 2009:231). Giliomee (2012:367) 
refers to the structure of Codesa as ‘clumsy’. Eloff (1994:12-13) identifies several serious 
flaws in the structure of the negotiations. Firstly, the system of five working groups was 
‘unworkable’: each group had some 80 delegates, making negotiating, and in essence 
compromise, near impossible. 
The way in which there groups were run also facilitated a deadlock: each participating group 
was given the opportunity to not only present its position on each issue on paper, but also 
orally. This meant that large amounts of paper was pushed around, entrenching parties’ 
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positions by putting proposals in writing, making movement very problematic. There were no 
mechanisms for compromise and deadlock-breaking in these structures.  
The impasse in negotiations had started with a lack of agreement on interim arrangements 
(Cohen, 1992). The ANC strongly objected to the NP’s suggestion of white minority veto 
power and an open-ended transition, while the NP continued to demand that have minorities 
some role in South Africa’s future. The ANC ‘reverted to its earlier demand for an elected 
constitution-making body empowered to pass a constitution by a two-thirds majority’ 
(Giliomee, 2012:360). 
A surge of extreme violence in the township of Boipatong in June 1992 (46 people had been 
killed in a ‘four hour orgy of slaughter’ by Zulu nationalists) set off a dispute among political 
parties (Time, 1992; and Waldmeir, 1997:206). Nelson Mandela claimed that this was the 
‘last straw’ in a spiralling surge of violence. This reportedly happened under the ‘watchful 
eye of the security police’ (Gevisser, 2009:231). Codesa II had been threatening to collapse 
for several months, but the Boipatong massacre pressed the ANC to withdraw from talks. On 
the 21
st
 of June 1992, the ANC officially pulled out of negotiations.  
Violence continued to wrack the country and the ANC refused to take part in the negotiations 
until the government actively sought to end the violence (Anonymous, 1992:5). The ANC 
blamed the NP for being complicit in the ongoing violence and accused the government of 
harbouring and encouraging violence. This was met by complete denial by NP-leader F.W. de 
Klerk. 
The ANC had a list of demands, including the suspension of state security personnel believed 
to have been involved in the recent violence at Bisho in the Republic of Ciskei, where 28 
people had been killed (Spaarwater, 2012:210). The ANC went so far as to accuse de Klerk 
of bypassing ‘real issues’, such as how state security forces were running rampant throughout 
the country (Anonymous, 1992:5). From June to September 1992, South Africa was marred 
by further strikes and protests. 
Former labour unionist Cyril Ramaphosa reportedly initiated, or had been involved in, the so-
called ‘rolling mass action’ of 1992 (Spaarwater, 2012:210; and Kasrils, 2004:267). 
Ramaphosa had succeeded in engineering a crisis to tip the scales in the direction of the 
ANC, playing on the balance of power within the working relationship (Shapiro, 2012:47). 
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Ramaphosa had sought to show that they ‘were dealing with an enemy that would not give in 
easily’, and succeeded (De Klerk, 1998:238). 
By refusing to re-enter negotiations before certain demands were met, the ANC forced the 
NP to make certain concessions, taking some action against the ongoing violence.  Security 
units were disbanded, and the bearing of weapons was limited, while promises were made 
regarding international intervention in the regulation of the violence (Cohen, 1992). De Klerk 
dismissed 19 police generals thought to be involved in violent actions in order to aid 
negotiations (Lee, 1996: 43). It was essential to the resumption of negotiations that the 
violence be controlled. Parties remained committed to negotiations, and the government had 
accepted that it is impossible to return to the previous regime. The only viable option for all 
parties was to return to the negotiating table. 
The ANC held that it was ready to join renewed talks, under certain demands made to de 
Klerk, remaining convinced that de Klerk should hand over power to a government of 
national unity (Time, 1992). During this time, the first mention of the ‘Sunset Clauses’ was 
made. These clauses came forth as a means to protect the jobs of white civil servants and 
security force members (Waldmeir, 1997:213). These included ‘pension protection; amnesty 
for apartheid crimes; and most of all, compulsory power-sharing for a fixed number of years 
after the adoption of the interim constitution, including a coalition cabinet enforced by law’, 
which would eventually result in the formation of the Government of National Unity. 
4.8.3. Record of Understanding (September 1992) 
By the middle of 1992, there was no clarity on the way forward, or how an elected assembly 
would work (Giliomee, 2012:361). The NP and the ANC had divergent views: the NP saw a 
mutually beneficial settlement, one that could only be changed if the main parties agreed; the 
ANC were fighting a ‘war of position’, using each concession from the NP as a step toward 
the next battle, true to the form of the National Democratic Revolution (Gevisser, 2009:231; 
and Giliomee, 2012:361). 
When the balance of power shifted in favour of the ANC, it changed its position. Later, 
Thabo Mbeki would admit that ‘the negotiations for an interim constitution were “contrived 
elements of a transition” necessary to end white domination. At no time did the ANC 
consider them “as elements of permanence” ‘(Giliomee, 2012:361). 
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The deadlock at Codesa had caused parties to rethink their positions. De Klerk announced 
that the NP was walking away from a Second House of parliament which would be over-
representative of minority parties. De Klerk also made concessions regarding the majority 
needed to change the interim constitution, lowering the percentage form 75 to 70 (Giliomee, 
2012:361). The ANC continually rejected all forms of power sharing, calling for non-racial 
majority rule. 
In June/July 1992, Mandela and De Klerk communicated by means of written memoranda. 
They ‘exchanged formal memoranda that were, at least in part, substantial papers on 
constitutional matter’, exchanging views on the current situation and what would happen in 
the near future (Viljoen en Venter, 1995:15-16; and Giliomee, 2012:373). Cyril Ramaphosa 
and Roelf Meyer were meeting in secret, attempting to find a deal among the remnants of the 
failed negotiations. They met more than forty times, creating a network which was later 
dubbed ‘the channel’ (Strauss, 1993:357). This formalised the ‘sufficient consensus’ rule. 
Fanie van der Merwe and Niel Barnard from the NIS supported Meyer at these meetings, 
while Ramaphosa had Joe Slovo and Mac Maharaj at his side (Giliomee, 2012: 372-373). 
Meyer and Ramaphosa had both come to the realisation that the country would be 
economically ruined should talks continue to fall apart. Both Ramaphosa and Meyer realised 
that the only future lay in both parties’ cooperation (Waldmeir, 1997:208 – 209).  
Each party retreated to give compromise another look: the ANC to find a way to ‘soften’ 
majority rule; the NP to realise that majority rule may not be so bad in a constitutional state, 
provided that property rights and press freedom prevailed (Waldmeir, 1997:212). Both 
shifted focus to a system, at least an interim system, of power sharing.  These meetings led to 
the production of the ‘Record of Understanding’ on September 26, a paper focused on 
curbing violence and building democracy, which opened the way for negotiations to resume 
(Strauss, 1993:357). The following figure shows the clear build-up of political violence 
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Figure 4.2: Political Fatalities in South Africa 1985 – 1996 
 
Source: South African Institute for Race Relations South Africa Survey 1996/1997: 600 
The ANC set three conditions to be met before they would return to talks: the release of the 
remainder of political prisoners, the fencing in of Inkatha hostels, and the banning of Zulu 
traditional weapons (De Klerk, 1998:248). The Record of Understanding marked a turning 
point in the on-again-off-again negotiations and would ‘turn everything upside down’ 
(Giliomee, 2012:360). The three major parties involved all reacted differently: the ANC was 
happy, the government was embarrassed, and Inkatha was enraged and withdrew from ormal 
negotiations
2
 (Waldmeir, 1997:216).  
At this point in time it became clear that the NP would most probably not get more than 25% 
of the vote in a national election and lose its dominant position, essentially handing over 
power to the ANC (Giliomee, 2012:360). The ANC would agree to some constitutional 
principles before the election, but would not accept any procedures or rules that would bind 
them too tightly. Winning the first election convincingly would allow them some freedom in 
changing the interim Constitution (Giliomee, 2012:360-361). 
The Record of Understanding set up measures to fence off Inkatha hostels and ban the 
carrying of traditional Zulu weapons, infuriating Buthelezi of Inkatha. The NP had ostensibly 
                                                 
2
 This withdrawal had implications for the study, as the IFP did not take part in formal negotiations of 1993. No 
significant memoirs relevant to the study emerged referring to later formal involvement. 
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gained nothing: no concessions to the government were made. While it made no mention of 
constitutional matters, the Record of Understanding facilitated the resumption of talks, which 
was what the NP had been hoping for (Heunis, 2007:190-191; Waldmeir, 1997:216). 
Waldmeir (1997:218) calls the Record of understanding ‘not just a triumph for the ANC; it 
was a triumph of negotiation over conflict’.  
In the Record of Understanding, the ANC abandoned its original position put forth in the 
Harare Declaration of 1989, where it had demanded an ‘“unstructured and immediate” 
transfer of power before a constitution was even negotiated’ (Giliomee, 2012:375). Such a 
total takeover usually only occurs after a revolution, or if the regime had suffered a military 
defeat. The Record of Understanding set forth the idea of a ‘government of national unity’, 
which to F.W. de Klerk meant an interim government built on the premise of power sharing, 
at least in part what the NP had been fighting for. However, the Record did not mention the 
interim constitution nor the majority needed to change these decisions, only that the ‘elected 
body would “draft and adopt the new constitution” and “arrive at its decisions democratically 
with certain agreed majorities”’ (Giliomee, 2012:375). 
The ANC won several major battles with the signing of the Record of Understanding (Welsh, 
2009:466-467): the fencing off of the Inkatha hostels; the ban on the carrying of traditional 
weapons; the release of political prisoners; and the ‘use of mass action as an instrument of 
political pressures’ (De Klerk had proposed a ban in this). 
Kobie Coetsee described the Record of Understanding as ‘short of disastrous’: the NP had 
been reduced to a junior partner in the transition and had lost its alliance with Inkatha 
(Giliomee, 2012:379). Similarly, Meyer made his discontent with the agreement clear, 
claiming that all concessions had come from the NP side (Welsh, 2009:466). The NP and the 
ANC finally agreed to a five-year government of national unity after two ‘bosberade’ (bush 
summits), while De Klerk insisted on a ‘revolving presidency’ (Waldmeir, 1997:222 – 223). 
At the end of November 1992, De Klerk proposed a time scale for the transition (De Klerk, 
1998:257): 
We would try to launch a new, inclusive, multilateral negotiating forum before the 
end of March 1993. We hoped that agreement could be reached on a transitional 
constitution before the end of May, with a view to it being enacted before the end of 
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September. The first elections under the transitional constitution would then be held 
no later than March/April 1994. 
4.8.4. MPNP (May 1993) 
In February 1993, a conference was held in order to prepare for the resumption of multi-party 
talks in April (Laurence, 1993: 26). It was decided that the talks would resume under a new 
name, but start were Codesa had left off (Viljoen & Venter, 1995:16). The new talks, known 
as the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) were by far the most inclusive of talks so far 
– the Conservative Party, the Afrikaner Volksunie and the PAC had decided to join 
negotiations after loudly protesting the first set of negotiations (Laurence, 1993:26). The 
previously vague notion of ‘sufficient consensus’ was clarified by Ramaphosa and agreed to 
by the NP (Atkinson, 1994:22): ‘consensus was sufficient if the process could move on with 
the backing of only those who supported a proposal. Disagreement would be recorded; 
dissenters could remain in the process, await its outcome, and the decide whether to support 
it.’ 
These talks were also held in Kempton Park, and are sometimes referred to the ‘Kempton 
Park Negotiations’ (Gross, 2004:58). Traditional leaders like the Zulu monarch King 
Goodwill Zwelethini had also found their way into the negotiations. The only notable groups 
not in attendance were the extremist AWB and AZAPO (Laurence, 1993:26). All in all, 26 
parties and organisations took part in the MPNP (Strauss, 1993:360). From the 1
st
 of April, 
formal negotiations resumed. 
During these negotiations, the ANC continued to call for a ‘government of national unity’ to 
govern for a five-year period after the first one-person one-vote elections. They believed that 
this was the best way to curb violence as well as ease the transition. Ronnie Kasrils 
(2004:260) refers to this ‘concession’ by the ANC as a move displaying ‘magnanimity and 
statesmanship’. 
 The MPNP lasted for seven months, and included several non-political committees in order 
to draft a new constitution and build structures and procedures. Meyer’s team included Leon 
Wessels, Fanie van der Merwe, Dawie de Villiers, Francois Venter, Johan Kruger, Niel 
Barnard, Jan Heunis, Theuns Eloff and Maritz Spaartwater. Ramaphosa’s team consisted of 
Mac Maharaj, Joe Slovo, Mohammed Valli Moosa, Thabo Mbeki, Mathews Phosa, Arthur 
Chaskalson and Dullah Omar (Spaarwater, 2012:223). 
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On 10 April 1993, the leader of the SACP, Chris Hani, was assassinated by a white man 
(Kasrils, 2004:261; and Atkinson, 1994:26). This put pressure on the negotiations to proceed 
as quickly as possible. Niel Barnard and Fanie van der Merwe, assisted by Jan Heunis, set up 
a timetable marking an election date. Both ANC and the NP agreed to the setting of the 
election date of 27 April 1994, which put a time constraint on the proceedings. Given the 
amount of preparation time needed for elections, the MPNP would only have several weeks 
to produce agreement on a new, interim constitution (Waldmeir, 1997:226). 
4.8.4.1. Structure 
The MPNP talks consisted of several committees: technical committees to look at specific 
issues; a management committee, and a negotiating council (Waldmeir, 1997:226). The 
plenary session of the MPNP was granted the power of confirming agreements reached by the 
sub-committees (Eloff, 1994:14). The Negotiating Council was made up of two delegates and 
two advisers per participating party/group, and was set to finalise all agreements. The 
Negotiating Council was open to the media, as opposed to Codesa which had been closed off 
to the media (Eloff, 1994:14; and Atkinson, 1994:24). It received reports from the other 
committees, debated on these issues, and reached agreement. These agreements were then 
turned into the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. On urgent matters, the Council sometimes 
took ad hoc decisions (Eloff, 1994:14). 
The ‘Planning Committee’, made up of individual negotiators across the political field, 
directly reported to the Negotiating Council (Atkinson, 1994:24). Those serving on this 
committee accepted the important role as ‘guardians’ of the process (Eloff, 1994:14). Seven 
different ‘Technical Committees’ also reported to the Negotiating Council. These committees 
were made up of ‘experts’ not affiliated with specific political groupings but acceptable to all 
the participants (Eloff, 1994:14). Most of these ‘experts’ came from a legal background, 
making them the most suitable drafters of agreements made by the participating parties. 
Parties’ proposals were presented to the Technical Committees, avoiding ‘grandstanding’ and 
emotive language. These committees were effective as a ‘compromise-seeking and deadlock-
breaking mechanism’ within the MPNP (Eloff, 1994:15). Eloff (1994) further describes the 
detail of the MPNP structure. 
The MPNP had been structured in such a way as to promote constant movement within the 
process itself, and allowed for a flexibility and informality which enhanced the effectiveness 
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of the talks (Eloff, 1994:17). The chairmanship was alternated between a panel of eight, 
ensuring trust in the chair’s neutrality (Eloff, 1994:17). 
This seemingly complicated structure proved crucial to the success of the negotiations. The 
technical committees allowed for the most fundamental arguments to be treated as technical 
problems with technical solutions designed by experts not clouded by emotion (Waldmeir, 
1997:226). Using technical expertise had allowed the transfer of power to be dealt with as a 
‘mutually agreeable trade-off’ instead of the emotive conflict it had become (Waldmeir, 
1997:226). At the same time, delegates at the MPNP were subject to pressure from their 
constituencies: some constituencies had very high expectations of the talks, while others 
openly criticised their leaders as ‘selling out’ whenever a compromise was reached (Eloff, 
1994:19). 
4.8.4.2. Trust 
Eloff (1994:18) attributes the success of the MPNP, at least in part, to the ‘building of 
personal relationships and trust between various negotiators’. Roelf Meyer and Cyril 
Ramaphosa continued to run the talks, showing great compromise and expert negotiating. 
However, they did not always agree, and when this happened they had Fanie van der Merwe 
and Mac Maharaj to turn to (Waldmeir, 1997:226). Not only had these personalities played a 
formative role in the compromise-seeking atmosphere, but also the process itself. Waldmeir 
(1997:227) shows the effectiveness of the process: 
All the parties to the talks accepted that reason was their best weapon. Each learned to 
present an argument for sectional interests in the language of universal, and overwhelmingly 
liberal, values. They learned that they must appeal to the overall public good, if they wished 
to win concessions for their own party. 
4.8.4.3. Agreement 
By November 1993, most of the contentious issues remained unanswered. On the night of 17 
– 18 November, the resolving of these issues was undertaken. The ANC conceded the 
protection of civil servants in order to mollify the NP. However, it would later become clear 
that this did not mean they could hold their posts (Giliomee, 2012:404). De Klerk made 
another big concession at this time: the NP would not have veto power in government 
(Waldmeir, 1997:227). At Codesa II it had been agreed that an interim government (or 
Transitional Executive Council) would need an 80% majority to make decisions, which 
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would have resulted in an effective veto for the NP/government. De Klerk ended up 
compromising on a lower majority, obliterating the chance of a NP veto (Waldmeir, 
1997:227-228). Should the constituent assembly be unable to reach agreement, a 60% 
majority in a referendum would be sufficient for the adoption of a new constitution 
(Giliomee, 2012:404). 
During this period, the idea of third party mediation was mooted. The internal agreement was 
finalised in late 1993. One issue did remain unresolved – the issue of power-sharing in the 
executive. No definitive decisions had been made on De Klerk’s position in the interim 
cabinet, nor how the cabinet would make decisions (Waldmeir, 1997:228). De Klerk 
demanded a two-thirds majority on ‘crucial issues’ (Giliomee, 2012:405). Mandela held 
ground at a 50% majority. Eventually, it was agreed that the cabinet would ‘seek consensus’ 
when making decisions, effectively ushering in majority rule (Waldmeir, 1997:231 – 232).  
Near the end of 1993, an agreement had been reached: De Klerk finally agreed to a multi-
party interim government until the elections. On the 18
th
 of November 1993, a peace deal was 
signed (Waldmeir, 1997:237). ‘They had compromised on a new South Africa which none of 
them really likes – and then decided they were stuck with it’ (Waldmeir, 1997:250).  
The agreement called for the formation of a ‘Government of National Unity’ which would be 
formed by all parties receiving more than 5% of the vote in one-person, one-vote elections to 
be held in April 1994 (Sparks, 1994:14). Parties would then be awarded seats in cabinet in 
proportion to the number of votes it had received (Gross, 2004:59). The majority party’s 
leader would become president, and two deputy presidents would be chosen from ‘the party 
coming second and the other from any other party gaining more than 20% of the vote, or, if 
no party achieved this … from the majority party’ (Sparks, 1994:14). De Klerk had been 
fighting for power sharing and a strong form of federalism, until this, final, round of talks 
(Giliomee, 2012:398). The ANC had argued that permanent power sharing would not be 
supported by their supporters. They agreed that the Government of National Unity would rule 
for five years. 
Four draft Bills had also been agreed upon to build the structure for the coming months: the 
Transitional Executive Council (TEC); the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC); the 
Independent Media Commission; and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (Eloff, 
1994:12). 
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The MPNP drafted an interim constitution, which emerged as a classic liberal constitution. 
Power would be separated between the three branches of government (judiciary, executive 
and legislative) in an attempt to inhibit the abuse of power (Waldmeir, 1997: 228). A Bill of 
Rights was included, protecting human rights and individual property. The provinces were 
granted some power, and a constitutional court would ‘resolve disputes and ensure that the 
constitution reigned supreme in the new state’ (Waldmeir, 1997:228). However, the strong 
federalism and entrenched power sharing that the NP had been spouting was nowhere to be 
found (Giliomee, 2012:399).  
The ANC had compromised on property rights: the ANC had realised that it would have to 
attract investors, preserve the efficacy of the private sector and keep business happy, even 
though this upset ANC supporters on the left (Giliomee, 2012:400). It was also accepted that 
the guardian of the constitution would be the judiciary, which in reality meant the 
constitutional court. On the issue of appointing judges however, it was agreed that the 
president would have the power to appoint six judges from a list nominated by the Judicial 
Service Commission, effectively placing the appointment of judges in the hands of the ANC 
(Giliomee, 2012:401). 
Amnesty was another issue that had remained unresolved until this last round of talks. 
Eventually, the ANC had granted the NP a line of defence: ‘there shall be amnesty’, but no 
official ground was taken. This would later lead to the formation of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which was heavily partial to the ANC’s favour (Giliomee, 
2012:406). 
While some (De Klerk, 1994:10) believed that there were no winners or losers in the deal, 
and that a good compromise had been reached, others believed that they had lost a great deal. 
Tertius Delport of the NP was devastated. To him, the NP had given in on all the issues it had 
fought for (Giliomee, 2012:406). From an NP point of view, the ‘deal’ that had been made 
had major weaknesses (Giliomee, 2012:407-408): 
Language rights and the right to instruction in Afrikaans in schools and universities could 
have been more tightly formulated. The majority in parliament was allowed to make 
appointments to institutions guarding rights and combating corruption, thus weakening these 
institutions. Affirmative action was not limited in time and scope. In the eyes of the security 
forces there was no proper vision for amnesty. With a majority on the Judicial Service 
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Commission, the ruling party could pack the bench in the name of representivity and 
transformation. The issue of land redistribution was left hanging. 
4.8.4.4. Constitutional Principles 
During this time the MPNP also agreed on a set of principles which would govern the 
drafting of a more permanent constitution by the constituent assembly elected in April 1994. 
These principles would be incorporated and entrenched into the new constitution (Giliomee, 
2012:393). In July the Negotiating Council accepted 27 Constitutional Principles, which was 
later expanded to 34 principles (De Villiers, 1994:37). The Constitutional Court would have 
to verify that these principles were incorporated into the new constitution or any amendments 
thereof (De Villiers, 1994:37). 
The first set of principles was made up of ten principles safeguarding classic democratic 
rights, including the holding of regular elections and the freedom of speech and information. 
The independence of institutions like the Reserve Bank and the judiciary was protected by 
these principles (Giliomee, 2012:393). 
The second set of principles attempted to incorporate the protection of minorities that the NP 
had been insisting on. However, the vague wording of ‘collective rights of self-
determination’ did not live up to what the NP had hoped for (Giliomee, 2012:394). Minorities 
were guaranteed participation in the legislative process. A ‘quasi-federal’ system was set out 
by a third set of principles, including the allocation of powers, specifically the power of the 
national government over the provincial governments (Giliomee, 2012:394). 
De Villiers (1994:37-38) sums up the compromise of the Constitutional Principles: 
The Constitutional Principles… on the one hand, offered security concerning the 
nature of future constitutions and, on the other, recognised the inherent competence 
of the Constitutional Assembly to write a Constitution within the framework of the 
principles.  
The ANC had advocated a looser, more general set of principles, while the NP had called for 
the principles to be as detailed as possible, so that the assembly would eventually be bound 
by rules that the NP had backed (De Villiers, 1994:38). De Villiers (1994: 48-49) argues that 
the Constitutional Principles have the inherent problem of becoming obsolete: the problems 
faced during the drafting of the principles may be vastly different to future difficulties; and 
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matters that had been relevant may become outdated or impractical with time. He argues that 
the constitutional principles could have been less detailed and more flexible to allow for 
development. 
Herewith a timeline on the decisions reached at the MPNP: 
Table 4.1: MPNP Timeline 
April/May 
1993  
- Establish Technical Committees 
1 June  - 27 April set as Election Date 
- Technical Committee on Constitutional Development tasked with drafting 
Interim Constitution 
15 June  - IFP calls for proposals for a federal Constitution, which is then rejected in a 
vote 
22 June  - Calls for establishment of Independent Electoral Commission and Independent 
Media Commission 
2 July Agreement on: 
- The adoption of constitutional principles aimed at establishing strong regional 
and national government; 
- That the constitutional principles are binding on the constituent assembly, and 
‘justiciable by a Constitutional Court’; 
- ‘A Commission will make recommendations on regional boundaries’; 
- Legislation to level the playing field and promote free and fair elections; and 
- To agree on a transitional (or interim) constitution 
31 July - Agreement on establishment of nine regions 
25 – 28 
October 
- Agreement on Interim Constitution 
- Agreement on Government of National Unity 
- NP abandons minority veto demands 
16 November - Mandela and De Klerk reach final agreement 
18 November - MPNP approves interim Constitution 
Source: Compilation by the author, adapted from Welsh (2009:487) 
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 of November 1993, the interim Constitution was accepted by sufficient consensus 
(De Klerk, 1994:9).The Freedom Alliance continued to reject the legitimacy of the interim 
Constitution. Joe Slovo of the ANC notes the negotiations as a triumph for the ANC: 
‘Looking at the result as a whole, I can say without hesitation that we got pretty much what 
we wanted’ (Uys, 1994:54). On the 22nd of December 1993, the still NP-led parliament 
formally adopted the new, preliminary constitution, adopting the fourth constitution of the 
20
th
 Century for South Africa (Olivier, 1993:50). Maritz Spaarwater was ‘thrilled’ when the 
interim constitution was adopted, being witness to hard work and dedication from all sides 
(Spaarwater, 2012:225). 
The Constitution included eleven official languages and strong safeguards for culture and 
religion by means of fundamental rights entrenched in the Constitution (Viljoen & Venter, 
1995:17). Constitutional provisions also included a prescription ‘that executive government 
at national and provincial levels should be characterized by "the consensus-seeking spirit 
underlying the concept of a government of national unity," and the recognition - albeit rather 
vague - of the principle of self-determination for all groups within South Africa (Section 235) 
are also included in the constitutional provisions’ (Viljoen & Venter, 1995:17). 
The processes which produced the 1993 interim Constitution were not completely democratic 
(Olivier, 1994:51). Many of the parties and groups present at the MPNP talks did not have 
any proven support from the public yet still provided insight and eventually consent to the 
new, albeit interim, Constitution, as well as the constitutional principles. On contentious 
issues, the rule of sufficient consensus rather than inclusivity prevailed. The Constitution was 
passed into law by a tricameral parliament made up of mostly minorities and completely 
unrepresentative of the black majority (Olivier, 1994:51). Neither the ‘collective will of the 
people’, nor a referendum, were ever canvassed (Olivier, 1994:51). 
Accordingly, the final constitution would have to be drafted and eventually accepted in such 
a way as to legitimate its existence (Olivier, 1994:51). Although the final constitution was set 
to be drafted by the democratically elected Constitutional Assembly (CA), it was strongly 
bound by 34 principles set out in the interim Constitution (Gross, 2004:59). These principles 
form the foundation of the new constitution and are to remained unchanged (Olivier, 
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1994:51). The Constitutional Assembly, to be elected in April 1994, would vote on the 
passing of a new constitution, needing at least a two-thirds majority to take decisions. The 
provisions of the constitution relating to the ‘boundaries, powers, and functions of the 
provinces also require the approval of a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the 
Senate’ (Olivier, 1994: 51). The constitution would require 60% for other amendments. In the 
interim Constitution it is stated that the National Assembly and the Senate will jointly draft 
the final constitution within a timeframe of two years (De Villiers, 1994:41).  
4.9. Implementation and Settlement 
4.9.1. Transitional Executive Council (TEC) 1993 
In 1992, Working Group 3 at Codesa II had proposed the setting up of the TEC, supported by 
a number of sub-councils (Heunis, 1994:20). The MPNP had taken up the matter in April 
1993, unanimously accepting its implementation. On the 7
th
 of December 1993, the 
Transitional Executive Council (TEC) met for the first time (Heunis, 1994:20). Heunis (1994) 
provides technical detail on the inner workings of the TEC.  
4.9.2. Election 1994 
In November 1992 de Klerk proposed a firm schedule toward universal elections (Maphai, 
1993:223). An executive committee was set up in order to help de Klerk toward South 
Africa’s first democratic elections, and depending on the level of violence, the election could 
be held in the first few months of 1994 (Maphai, 1993:223). The adoption of the 1993 interim 
constitution included the implementation of electoral arrangements, set for April 1994 (Faure, 
1997:70). This represented a turning point in the transition process.   
At different stages during the MPNP, various parties withdrew, but the main actors continued 
to canvas their opinions during the negotiations.  In February 1994, the ANC and the NP 
‘agreed to last minute changes to the interim constitution and the Electoral Act in hopes of 
getting members of the right wing Freedom Alliance in the election process’ (Lee,1996:47). 
These amendments were made in order to attract all parties to take part in the upcoming 
elections (Viljoen & Venter, 1995:17). Three days before the election almost all significant 
political parties had agreed to take part, including the ANC, the NP, the Freedom Front, the 
PAC and Inkatha. Only the AWB and the Conservative Party, on the ultra-radical right, did 
not take part (Waldmeir, 1997:250). 
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27 April 1994 went by peacefully as thousands of South Africans voted for the first time. The 
ANC won the elections on 27 April 1994 with 62.65% of the vote, just missing the two-thirds 
majority it needed dominate all decisions. The NP came in second with just over 20% while 
the IFP garnered 10.54% (Waldmeir, 1997:261). As a whole, the elections were deemed a 
success. The interim Constitution came into operation. With the election in 1994, a new 
parliament and nine new provincial legislatures were elected, set to be in office for the next 
five years (Faure, 1997:70).  
The NP was greatly disappointed in the results: it had hoped for at least 35% of the vote 
(Waldmeir, 1997:261). The outcome made De Klerk dispensable to Mandela – he did not 
have enough support to make him so. The deal that De Klerk had made was made on the 
basis of a much different outcome, and after the election, the deal looked ‘even worse’ 
(Waldmeir, 1997:261). 20% was just barely enough to avoid humiliation. The NP had 
garnered just over 60% of the white, Indian and coloured vote (Giliomee, 2012:409). The IFP 
was reasonably satisfied with the outcome as it had won the KwaZulu Natal Province: its 
home base. 
The ANC was relatively satisfied as it could now exercise real power, with a mandate from 
the people. The ANC was dependent on the black vote, gaining 94% of the black vote 
(Giliomee, 2012:409). The Freedom Front won at least a third of the white vote in the 
provincial election (680000 votes out of 1.8 million voters), which advanced its mandate for 
self-determination (Waldmeir, 1997:261). The radicalised PAC won an insignificant 1.25%. 
4.9.3. Government of National Unity 1994-1996 
The Government of National Unity (GNU) was set to rule for five years after the 1994 
election. The cabinet was made up of 30 members, including De Klerk as second deputy 
president, and six other NP ministers, IFP leader Buthelezi as minister of home affairs, and 
two other Inkatha ministers (Waldmeir, 1997:273). While Mandela genuinely tried to make 
decisions in a ‘consensus-seeking spirit’, this proved more difficult than anticipated. While 
De Klerk held some influence in the cabinet, he certainly did not have the degree of power he 
had hoped for. Within weeks it was clear that power sharing between Mandela and De Klerk 
was not a reality (Waldmeir, 1997:272).  
The following table shows party representation in the Constitutional Assembly: 
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Table 4.2: Party Representation in the Constitutional Assembly (1994) 
Party Seats % 
African National Congress 312 63.7 
National Party 99 20.2 
Inkatha Freedom Party 48 9.8 
Freedom Front 14 2.8 
Democratic Party 10 2.0 
Pan Africanist Congress 5 1.0 
African Christian Democratic Party 2 0.4 
Source: Strand, 2001:48 
De Klerk pulled the NP out of the GNU in June 1996, realising his powerlessness in the 
cabinet. De Klerk was aware that his withdrawal would make little difference in the cabinet’s 
decision-making, and that ‘President Mandela clearly had no intention of allowing me and the 
National Party to play a constructive role’ (De Klerk, 1998:356). 
4.10. Final Constitution of 1996 
4.10.1. Elected Parliament and Constituent Assembly 
Literature on the constitutional negotiations tends to focus on the negotiations between 1990 
and 1994, placing little importance on the negotiations of the Constitutional Assembly 
(Strand, 2001:47). Once the interim Constitution was in place, the elected constitutional 
assembly served as drafters of the final constitution (Gross, 2004:61). The drafting process 
was to be based on inclusivity, accessibility, transparency, and consensus (Gross, 2004: 60-
61).  
The drafters of the interim constitution had significant influence on the drafting of the 1996 
constitution (Sarkin, 1999:69). The interim constitution set several constraints on the process 
of drafting a final constitution, and imposed a set of 34 constitutional principles as 
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substantive requirements (Sarkin, 1999:69). Strand (2001:48) sets out the process of drafting 
and adopting the final constitution as delimited by the interim constitution:   
There would be a two-year constitution-making process with a deadline on 8 May 
1996, at which time a two-thirds majority could adopt the constitution. If no such 
majority existed, a ‘Panel of Constitutional Experts’ would propose a compromise. 
If this failed too, the proposal favoured by a simple majority in the CA would be 
adopted if it won 60 per cent popular support in a referendum and was certified by 
the Constitutional Court. If this also failed, subsequent deadlock-breaking 
mechanisms placed even more power in even smaller majorities.  
At first, the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitution as not adhering to the principles 
set by the 1993 constitution. After amendments were introduced, the final constitution was 
certified by the Court. The drafting of the final constitution by the elected, broadly 
representative constitutional assembly proved significant in fostering feelings of participation 
(Gross, 2004:62). Before pulling out of the GNU, De Klerk had given the constitution his 
endorsement (Waldmeir, 1997:276). 
The final constitution was drafted in three time periods (Sarkin, 1999:69 - 70): 
a) negotiations from May 1994 leading up to the May 1996 deadline for finalizing 
the constitution, culminating in the adoption ceremony on May 8, 1996; b) the first 
Constitutional Court certification process, starting in May 1996 with public 
submissions, and ending on September 6, 1996, when the court delivered judgment 
refusing to certify the text; and c) the second round of negotiations in late 
September 1996 and early October 1996, leading to certification of the text by the 
Constitutional Court on December 4, 1996. 
a) May 1994 to May 1996: Constitutional Assembly Negotiations 
Two particular issues were not addressed by the interim Constitution: (1) the structure of 
executive power; and (2) the content of the Bill of Fundamental Rights (Strand, 2001:49-50). 
For the structure of the National Assembly, parties more or less wanted the same thing. 
Parties were also in agreement regarding a senate with an equal number of representatives 
from each of the nine regions, or provinces (Strand, 2001:50). The ANC fashioned its 
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proposal on the German federation, opting for a system of ‘co-operative governance’ where 
the senate would be involved (Strand, 2001:50).  
For the most part parties agreed on what the executive branch of the government should look 
like, with notable exception of the NP.  Other parties agreed that parliament should elect a 
president, who would then appoint the cabinet. The NP sought a continuation of a grand 
coalition government, with a deputy president chosen by the minority parties. They chose this 
model on the basis that it would ‘put checks on undue majority dominance and help stabilise 
and foster reconciliation in the South African plural society’ (Strand, 2001:50). The ANC 
rejected this proposal, indicating that it would like to have the functions of the president 
without consulting to be expanded, citing the smooth running of the government as 
reasoning. The NP later withdrew from the GNU, mentioning this attitude of the ANC as its 
reason (Strand, 2001:50). 
On the fundamental issue of the Bill of Rights, parties’ proposals were widely divergent. The 
IFP called for extensive socio-economic rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. The ANC 
reiterated this even more strongly, claiming that strong socio-economic rights were a 
necessity should past injustices be sufficiently addressed (Strand, 2001:51). The ANC aimed 
for a Bill of Rights that would make all rights equally fundamental, making them applicable 
not only between citizens and the state, but also between people (Strand, 2001:51). In certain 
aspects, the final Constitution improved on the interim Bill of rights, especially by setting a 
high bar for socio-economic rights (Sarkin, 1999:77). However, the language used to 
circumscribe these rights makes them subject to the ability and willingness of the state 
(Sarkin, 1999:80). 
All parties, with the notable exception of the ANC, cited the limiting nature of the interim 
constitution and the constitutional principles in their proposals. While claiming loyalty to 
decisions made in previous negotiations, the ANC argued that the provisions in the interim 
Constitution ‘were too detailed, and purported to deal with issues which should be left to 
Parliament to legislate on’ (Strand, 2001:53).  
By the second year of negotiations, time constraints started to hurry along a process that had 
struggled to gain momentum. The Constitutional Assembly sought an open, inclusive and 
democratic process, and as such advocated public participation (Sarkin, 1999:70). 
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By November 1995, at least 32 contentious issues remained unresolved. Negotiations 
continued with specific focus on these issues. Unlike deliberations in the Constitutional 
Assembly before, these negotiations were closed to the media and the public, allowing parties 
to ‘reach compromises without losing credibility’ (Sarkin, 1999:71). 
By March 1996, the parties were deadlocked on several issues. The time constraints made by 
the interim constitution were amended in order to maximise the time left (Strand, 2001:53). 
On 15 April, the fifth working draft of the constitution was published. By this time, the 
structures of government had been altered in such a way as to resemble the ANC proposal 
closely: a ‘Council of Provinces’ to complement the National Assembly, a president elected 
by that Assembly, and a cabinet appointed by that president (Strand, 2001:53). This put 
executive power in the hands of the majority. At this point (April 1996), three major issues 
remained unresolved: ‘provisions of a lockout clause, property rights, and the conditions for 
single-medium education in the proposed Bill of Rights’ (Strand, 2001:54). 
On the 3
rd
 of May, the ANC made clear its position on accommodating minority parties: it 
had reached its limit. Several multi- and bilateral meetings followed this announcement, but 
no progress was made. The issue of single-medium schooling was resolved to the point of the 
ANC’s recognition thereof as legitimate, and adding the caveat (on demand from the DP) that 
the provision ‘did not preclude state subsidies for independent educational institutions’ 
(Strand, 2001:57).  
The contentious issues of entrenching rights relating to labour relations remained so: the 
ANC’s ‘proposal on the lockout clause had demoted employers’ right to such action in 
industrial disputes to ordinary legislation in the Labour Relations Act (LRA)’ (Strand, 
2001:57). Both the NP and the DP recorded their opposition to this clause. 
The property clause was next on the agenda. The ANC proposed that a condition be set on the 
state’s acquisition of property: that it be done by ‘reasonable and justifiable’ measures, 
among several other rigid conditions (Strand, 2001:57). The ANC conceded to put the 
property holder in a stronger position concerning rights in the Bill of Rights. The DP and the 
NP accepted this clause. 
On the sixth of May 1996, NP advisor Rassie Malherbe was tasked, on the instructions of 
Roelf Meyer, with setting up a ‘balance sheet’ regarding the constitution as it stood, listing 
the NP’s gains and losses at that point. This document lists numerous gains, among others: 
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‘one sovereign state with one citizenship’; the ‘separation of powers as principle’; and a ‘Bill 
of fundamental Rights.’ The document lists the death penalty, a multi-party executive and 
two national anthems as losses, among several others. This document was to serve as the 
decisive impetus for NP members to vote in favour of the constitution, noting very clearly 
that failure to do so would result in the NP effectively losing its influence on the text (See 
Appendix A). The document warned that should the NP choose to publicly go against the 
constitution, the ANC would effectively be able to unilaterally write the constitution and 
would not be bound by any decisions made thus far (Wessels, 2010:281). 
The May 1996 deadline was looming, putting pressure on the Constitutional Assembly to 
reach an agreement. The ANC made clear their fall-back position by refusing to further 
concede to minority parties, which left few options for minority parties but to vote for or 
against the constitution on the 8
th
 of May. The constitution was adopted by a majority 
(Strand, 2001:58). On the 8
th
 of May 1996, 85 per cent of the Constitutional Assembly voted 
in favour of the Constitution (Ebrahim, 1998:3). The ANC, the PAC, the NP and the DP 
voted in favour of this text, while the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) was the 
only party to vote against it. The Freedom Front chose to abstain from the vote, and the IFP 
failed to attend the voting (Sarkin, 1999:72; and Ebrahim, 1998:232). The Constitution was 
referred to the Constitutional Court which would now start the task of assessing the new 
Constitution in terms of the 34 constitutional principles noted in the interim Constitution.  
b) Constitutional Court Assessment September to October 1996 
The Constitution was submitted to the Constitutional Court, which encouraged parties and 
organisations to ‘submit any objections arguing the non-compliance of the constitutional 
proposal with the Constitutional Principles’ (Strand, 2001:58). The NP, the DP, the IFP and 
the ACDP and 84 other organisations and individuals made submissions to the Court. On the 
6
th
 of September 1996, the Court announced that the draft constitution complied with a 
majority of the Constitutional Principles, with the exception of nine aspects (Strand, 2001:58; 
and Sarkin, 1999:73).  
c) Second Round of Negotiations and Constitutional Court Assessment October to 
December 1996 
In October the Constitutional Assembly met once more, agreeing on 15 amendments to the 
text in line with the Constitutional Court’s ruling (Strand, 2001:60). The Constitutional 
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Assembly limited itself to only discussing the issues identified by the Constitutional Court, 
and these issues would be agreed on by 11 October 1996 (Sarkin, 1999:74). Sarkin (1999:75) 
sets out some of the final changes: 
The clause entrenching the right to bargain collectively was extended to grant this right to 
employers as well as employees. More rights were included in the list of non-derogable rights 
under a state of emergency, including the right of children under the age of 15 to be protected 
from armed conflict, some fair-trial rights and more extensive protection of the right to 
equality. Procedures for amending the Constitution were made more stringent… The clauses 
immunizing the Truth Commission and Labour Relations Acts from constitutional scrutiny 
were removed.  
The vote on the 11
th
 of October had the same outcome as the previous vote at 85% approval: 
only the ACDP voted against the text while the Freedom Front continued to refuse the vote 
(Sarkin, 1999:76). The DP, the IFP, the government of KwaZulu Natal, along with 18 other 
organisations and individuals called on the Constitutional Court to reject the text again 
(Sarkin. 1999:76). The Court unanimously certified the adoption of the final Constitution on 
the 4
th
 of December 1996, and Nelson Mandela signed it on the 10
th
. The constitutional 
assembly adopted the new constitution. The constitution abolishes all ‘lingering vestiges of 
enforced power sharing’, and is based on majority rule and liberal democracy (Waldmeir, 
1997:276). Ebrahim (1998:251) refers to the final Constitution:  
The negotiations also went on to produce a constitutional framework within which 
previously warring parties could co-exist to form a vibrant democracy. From the 
smouldering ashes of a divided society, the basis for a new nation and a new South 
Africa was produced, which is why this Constitution is referred to as the birth 
certificate of a nation. The success of the negotiations lay in both the agreed 
constitutional provisions as well as the process adopted. It was an experience that 
offers many lessons for other negotiations. 
4.10.2. The Outcome: A puzzle? 
De Klerk, ostensibly the stronger opponent entering into negotiations, held the backing of the 
powerful South Africa military, which had proved loyal to the civilian leadership (Giliomee, 
2012:314). De Klerk fought for power sharing throughout the entire process, yet did not 
secure any effective form thereof. The ANC had entered into the negotiations with 
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considerably less coercive power than the government, strongly advocating majority rule. It 
seemed that Mandela would accept nothing less than this (Giliomee, 2012:314). 
Giliomee (2012:314) presents two explanations for this puzzling outcome: the first 
explanation is that the NP failed to meet its objectives because it lacked negotiation expertise; 
the second is that the NP entered into negotiations much weaker than it appeared to 
onlookers, while the ANC with Mandela as its spearhead, in reality, held a much stronger 
negotiating position.  
By 1990, the white population was very low, and by 1996 had reached a low of 4 million 
whites in comparison to 31 million blacks, reinforcing whites as a minority, and adding to the 
ANC’s negotiating power (Giliomee, 2012:314). The NP gained almost no significant black 
allies or supporters. Buthelezi of the IFP proved an unstable alliance partner (Giliomee, 
2012:315). While the fall of the Berlin wall and effectively the fall of communism would 
have adversely affected the strength of the ANC in exile, the ANC started to gain support 
from the United States and Europe. Nelson Mandela became an international symbol of 
peace-making. The ANC lacked formal power, but ‘held several strong cards’:  ‘It soon 
became clear that the lifting of international sanctions depended on its consent’ (Giliomee, 
2012:316).  
4.11. Chapter Summary 
This chapter set out to describe the process of the South African transition chronologically. A 
brief look was taken at the context in which the two main parties involved found themselves 
in the 1980s, which lead to the realisation on both parts that negotiations may be better than 
continued violent confrontation. Several factors contributed to the formation of a mutually 
hurting stalemate, including international pressures and internal violence. 
The prenegotiation phase started in the late 1980s, including several concerned parties. The 
NP government was late to the game, but started taking part via spies and secret meetings. 
This enabled both the ANC and the NP to explore the existence of a contract zone, which 
would allow them to enter into more substantive negotiations. While the NP government was 
not set against negotiations, no definitive movements were made until P.W. Botha was 
replaced by F.W. de Klerk as president. F.W. de Klerk realised that the timing for 
negotiations was perfect and set about organising, with help from several key participants, the 
first negotiations. 
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Preliminary negotiations revealed deep cleavages between the parties involved. After several 
failed attempts at curbing the still escalating violence, including several signed Accords and 
concessions, parties grew wary of entering into more substantive negotiations. The signing of 
the National Peace Accord in September 1991 allowed parties to go forward with talks. 
Entering into substantive negotiations, the two main participating parties continued to have 
divergent proposals concerning the way forward. Exhaustive negotiations reached agreement 
on only some issues, leaving some of the most contentious issues on the table. The failure of 
the first and second attempts (Codesa I and II) at negotiations took its toll on the parties. The 
ANC pulled out of Codesa II citing the ongoing violence and the NP’s perceived 
complacency as reason. Several demands had to be met before the ANC would sit at the 
negotiating table again. The government sought to meet these demands in hopes that 
negotiations would resume. 
In May 1993, talks resumed in the form of the MPNP. The structure of these talks were more 
conducive to agreement and compromise-seeking, allowing parties to have their say, but 
allowing room for movement should they seek compromise. The talks were based on an 
atmosphere of trust and good faith, spearheaded by chief negotiators Cyril Ramaphosa and 
Roelf Meyer of the ANC and NP respectively. Several issues were resolved at these talks, but 
more specifically a way forward for the transition was calculated. 
The transition took place in phases. First, the MPNP would draft an interim constitution 
which would govern the government and country for two years after an election in 1994. The 
elected parliament would also serve as the constitutional assembly. In conjunction with the 
senate, the constitutional assembly would draft a final Constitution. The interim Constitution 
did place some limitations on the drafters of the final Constitution, in the form of 34 
constitutional principles which would have to be adhered to in the final constitution. The 
Constitutional Court was tasked with certifying whether the new Constitution complied with 
the constitutional principles.  
A relatively peaceful election on 27 April 1994 produced an unsurprising outcome: the ANC 
won with over 60%, while the NP lagged behind with only slightly over 20%. A few other 
parties gained seats in the constituent assembly, which set forth to draft the new constitution. 
This process sought to be open and democratic, accepting proposals from the public as well 
as from the Assembly. After two years of negotiations, it seemed the ANC’s proposals were 
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at the forefront. The constitutional assembly voted to adopt a new constitution, subject to 
certification by the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court found only nine issues that 
were not in accordance with the constitutional principles. The Assembly renegotiated these 
issues and by December 1996 the final Constitution was adopted. 
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Chapter 5: Negotiated Outcomes – The Written Constitutions 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks first to identify the elements identified in Chapter 3 as indicators within 
the 1993 and 1996 South African Constitutions. Not all elements typical of a Constitutional 
Contract, Social Contract or a Benchmark Agreement can be found in the written text of the 
negotiated settlement. Some elements are identifiable only in the opinions of the negotiators 
of that agreement, who will be analysed in the next Chapter. 
The conceptual framework seeks to identify a frame of thought. The written aspects of the 
1993 and 1996 Constitutions which will be identified in this chapter are open to interpretation 
by the individual negotiators. This chapter focuses on the original 1993 and 1996 
Constitutional Texts, and not on the interpretation of these texts.  
5.2. The Constitutional Outcomes (1993 Constitution; 34 Constitutional 
Principles; 1996 Constitution) 
5.2.1. Elements typical of a Constitutional Contract 
Only certain elements typical of a Constitutional Contract are identifiable within the written 
text of the negotiated settlement. Quota’s, fixed targets, amendment procedures and the 
element of permanence can be identified in the written text, while the perceptions of trades 
and bargains, core and non-core issues and what constitutes breach of contract can mainly be 
found in the opinions of the original negotiators. Also, the extensive information gathered in 
Chapter 4 allows for an informed examination of these constitutions. 
5.2.1.1. Quotas 
Quotas are often used in Constitutional Contracts as they are specific numerical criteria for 
the allocation of goods, and may show immediate gains for some stakeholders, and ensure an 
ongoing representation of stakeholders in certain decision-making procedures. Examples of 
quotas can be found in both the 1993 and 1996 constitutions. While these quotas are not 
numerically defined, they do represent an approach congruent with the Constitutional 
Contract. 
1993 Constitution and Constitutional Principles [emphasis added] 
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 Section 115 Establishment and appointments [of the Human Rights Commission] 
(1) There shall be a Human Rights Commission, which shall consist of a chairperson and 10 
members who are fit and proper persons, South African citizens and broadly representative of 
the South African community.  
 Section 119 Establishment [of the Commission on Gender Equality] 
 (2) The Commission shall consist of persons who are fit and proper for appointment, South 
African citizens and broadly representative of the South African community.  
 Section 212 The Public Service  
(b) …promote an efficient public administration broadly representative of the South African 
community. 
 Constitutional Principle XXX  
1. There shall be an efficient, non-partisan, career-orientated public service broadly 
representative of the South African community… 
1996 Constitution [emphasis added] 
 Section 174: Appointment of judicial officers 
 (2) The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South 
Africa must be considered when judicial officers are appointed. 
 Section 186: Composition of Commission [for the Promotion and Protection of 
the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities] 
(2) The composition of the Commission must- 
(a) be broadly representative of the main cultural, religious and linguistic communities in 
South Africa; 
 Section 193: Appointments [to every commission established in terms of Chapter 9] 
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(2) The need for a Commission established by this Chapter to reflect broadly the race and 
gender composition of South Africa must be considered when members are appointed. 
 Section 195: Basic values and principles governing public administration 
(1) (i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with 
employment… 
5.2.1.2. Fixed Targets 
Elements typical of a Constitutional Contract include ‘fixed targets’, which leave 
stakeholders and implementers with rigid time frames, as set out in calendar dates or number 
of years, within which to implement the agreement. Examples of this can be found in both the 
1993 and 1996 Constitutions. 
1993 Constitution and 34 Constitutional Principles [emphasis added] 
The 1993 Constitution is in its entirety a fixed target – the intention of the original negotiators 
was for the Constitution to serve a temporary – interim – goal. Within the constraint of the 
1993 Constitution and the 34 Constitutional Principles, and within a strict timeframe, the 
final Constitution was to be agreed upon, after which the 1993 Constitution would lapse. 
Certain extracts from the 1993 Constitution show its temporary nature: 
 Section 38: Duration of Parliament  
(1) Parliament as constituted in terms of the first election under this Constitution shall, 
subject to subsection (2), continue for five years as from the date of the first sitting of the 
National Assembly under this Constitution.  
 Section 73: Adoption of new constitutional text 
(1) The Constitutional Assembly shall pass the new constitutional text within two years as 
from the date of the first sitting of the National Assembly under this Constitution.  
 Section 121: Claims (In Restitution of Land Rights) 
(This section comes in the form of a reverse target) 
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(3) The date fixed by virtue of subsection (2) (a) shall not be a date earlier than 19 June 
1913.  
 Constitutional Principle XXXII 
The Constitution shall provide that until 30 April 1999 the national executive shall be 
composed and shall function substantially in the manner provided for in Chapter 6 of this 
Constitution.  
 Constitutional Principle XXXIII  
The Constitution shall provide that, unless Parliament is dissolved on account of its passing a 
vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet, no national election shall be held before 30 April 1999.  
1996 Constitution [emphasis added] 
The 1996 Constitution shows one definitive example of a fixed target in the form of a reverse 
target: 
 Section 25: Property 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
Another instance of a fixed target is found in Annexure B: 
 Section 4  
(6) An Executive Deputy President holds office: 
(a) Until 30 April 1999 unless replaced or recalled by the party entitled to make the 
designation in terms of subsections (2) and (3); or 
(b) Until the person elected President after any election of the National Assembly held before 
30 April 1999, assumes office. 
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5.2.1.3. Constraints on Amendments 
Inflexibility and complicated or difficult amendment procedures can be interpreted as being 
indicative of a Constitutional Contract, and evidence of this is found in both the 1993 and the 
1996 Constitutions. Special majorities are an example of strict amendment procedures, and 
give a good indication as to which issues the original drafters viewed as core to the 
agreement. Elkins et al (2009: 141) list the South African Constitution as ‘at one extreme of 
detail’. 
1993 Constitution and 34 Principles [emphasis added] 
 Section 62 Bills amending Constitution  
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and section 74, a Bill amending this Constitution shall… be 
required to be adopted at a joint sitting of the National Assembly and the Senate by a 
majority of at least two-thirds of the total number of members of both Houses.  
(2) No amendment of sections 126 and 144 shall be of any force and effect unless passed 
separately by both Houses by a majority of at least two-thirds of all the members in each 
House: Provided that the boundaries and legislative and executive competences of a province 
shall not be amended without the consent of a relevant provincial legislature.  
 Section 73 Adoption of new constitutional text  
(1) The Constitutional Assembly shall pass the new constitutional text within two years as 
from the date of the first sitting of the National Assembly under this Constitution.  
(2) For the passing of the new constitutional text by the Constitutional Assembly, a majority 
of at least two-thirds of all the members of the Constitutional Assembly shall be required: 
Provided that provisions of such text relating to the boundaries, powers and functions of 
provinces shall not be considered passed by the Constitutional Assembly unless approved 
also by a majority of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.  
(3) If the Constitutional Assembly fails to pass a proposed draft of the new constitutional text 
in accordance with subsection (2), but such draft is supported by a majority of all its 
members, such proposed draft shall be referred by the Chairperson to the panel of 
constitutional experts referred to in section 72 (2) for its advice, to be given within 30 days of 
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such referral, on amendments to the proposed draft, within the framework of the 
Constitutional Principles, which might secure the support required in terms of subsection (2).  
(4) An amended draft text unanimously recommended by the panel of constitutional experts 
and submitted to the Constitutional Assembly within the said period of 30 days… it shall 
become the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
(5) Should the panel of constitutional experts fail to submit within the said period of 30 days 
to the Constitutional Assembly an amended draft text which is unanimously recommended by 
the panel, or should such an amended draft text not be passed by the Constitutional Assembly 
in accordance with subsection (2), any proposed draft text before the Constitutional 
Assembly may be approved by it by resolution of a majority of its members for the purposes 
of subsection (6).  
(6) A text approved under subsection (5) shall, after it has been certified by the Constitutional 
Court in terms of section 71 (2), be referred by the President for a decision by the electorate 
by way of a national referendum.  
(7) The question put before the electorate in the referendum shall be the acceptance or 
rejection of the text approved under subsection (5).  
(8) The text presented to the electorate in the referendum shall, if approved by a majority of 
at least 60 per cent of the votes cast in the referendum and subject to subsection (13), become 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.  
(9) If the relevant text is not approved in the referendum in accordance with subsection (8), 
or if a new constitutional text is not passed in terms of this Chapter within the period of two 
years referred to in subsection (1), the President shall dissolve Parliament by proclamation in 
the Gazette within 14 days after the referendum or the expiry of the said period, whereupon 
an election contemplated in section 39 (1) (a) shall be held.  
(10) The Constitutional Assembly as constituted after such an election, shall pass the new 
constitutional text within a period of one year as from the date of its first sitting after such 
election.  
 (11) For the passing of the new constitutional text referred to in subsection (10) by the 
Constitutional Assembly, a majority of at least 60 per cent of all the members of the 
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Constitutional Assembly shall be required: Provided that provisions of such text relating to 
the boundaries, powers and functions of provinces shall not be considered passed by the 
Constitutional Assembly unless approved also by a majority of at least 60 per cent of all the 
members of the Senate.  
 Section 74 Amendments relating to this Chapter and Schedule 4  
(1) No amendment or repeal of-  
(a) this section or the Constitutional Principles set out in Schedule 4; or  
(b) any other provision of this Chapter in so far as it relates to-  
(i) the Constitutional Principles; or  
(ii) the requirement that the new constitutional text shall comply with the Constitutional 
Principles, or that such text shall be certified by the Constitutional Court as being in 
compliance therewith, shall be permissible.  
(2) The other provisions of this Chapter may be amended by the Constitutional Assembly by 
resolution of a majority of at least two-thirds of all its members.  
 Section 115 Establishment and appointments [Human Rights Commission] 
(3) (b) …approved by the National Assembly and the Senate by a resolution adopted by a 
majority of at least 75 per cent of the members present and voting at a joint meeting 
 Section 124 
(i) paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection, a majority of votes cast shall be required to 
sanction the inclusion of the areas in question in the provincial territories of KwaZulu/Natal 
or the Eastern Transvaal, as the case may be; [Sub-para. (i) amended by s. 1 of Act 2 of 
1994.]  
(ii) paragraph (c) of this subsection, a majority of at least 60 per cent of the votes cast in 
either of the two blocks mentioned in paragraph (g) of Part 2 of Schedule 1 shall be required 
to sanction the division of the said area into two separate provinces; and  
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(iii) paragraph (d) of this subsection, a majority of at least 60 per cent of the votes cast shall 
be required to sanction the discontinuance of the Northern Cape as a separate province.  
 Section 250 
(c) no amendment by a Parliament established on the basis of a declaration in terms of 
subsection (1) (a), of this Constitution…  shall be permissible until the election contemplated 
in paragraph (a) has been certified as substantially free and fair in terms of the Independent 
Electoral Commission Act, 1993;  
 Constitutional Principle XV  
Amendments to the Constitution shall require special procedures involving special 
majorities.  
 Constitutional Principle XVIII  
The powers, boundaries and functions of the national government and provincial 
governments shall be defined in the Constitution. Amendments to the Constitution which 
alter the powers, boundaries, functions or institutions of provinces shall in addition to any 
other procedures specified in the Constitution for constitutional amendments, require the 
approval of a special majority of the legislatures of the provinces, alternatively, if there is 
such a chamber, a two-thirds majority of a chamber of Parliament composed of provincial 
representatives, and if the amendment concerns specific provinces only, the approval of the 
legislatures of such provinces will also be needed. Provision shall be made for obtaining the 
views of a provincial legislature concerning all constitutional amendments regarding its 
powers, boundaries and functions.  
1996 Constitution [emphasis added] 
 Section 74 Bills Amending the Constitution 
(1) Section 1 and this subsection may be amended by a Bill passed by - 
(a) the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least 75 per cent of its members; and 
(b) the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces. 
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(2) Chapter 2 may be amended by a Bill passed by - 
(a) the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members; and 
(b) the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces. 
(3) Any other provision of the Constitution may be amended by a Bill passed - 
(a) by the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members; 
and 
(b) also by the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces, 
if the amendment - 
(i) relates to a matter that affects the Council; 
(ii) alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions; or 
(iii) amends a provision that deals specifically with a provincial matter. 
(4) A Bill amending the Constitution may not include provisions other than constitutional 
amendments and matters connected with the amendments. 
(5) At least 30 days before a Bill amending the Constitution is introduced in terms of section 
73(2), the person or committee intending to introduce the Bill must - 
(a) publish in the national Government Gazette, and in accordance with the rules and orders 
of the National Assembly, particulars of the proposed amendment for public comment; 
(b) submit, in accordance with the rules and orders of the Assembly, those particulars to the 
provincial legislatures for their views; and 
(c) submit, in accordance with the rules and orders of the National Council of Provinces, 
those particulars to the Council for a public debate, if the proposed amendment is not an 
amendment that is required to be passed by the Council. 
(6) When a Bill amending the Constitution is introduced, the person or committee introducing 
the Bill must submit any written comments received from the public and the provincial 
legislatures - 
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(a) to the Speaker for tabling in the National Assembly; and 
(b) in respect of amendments referred to in subsection (1), (2) or (3)(b), to the Chairperson of 
the National Council of Provinces for tabling in the Council. 
(7) A Bill amending the Constitution may not be put to the vote in the National Assembly 
within 30 days of - 
(a) its introduction, if the Assembly is sitting when the Bill is introduced; or 
(b) its tabling in the Assembly, if the Assembly is in recess when the Bill is introduced. 
(8) If a Bill referred to in subsection (3)(b), or any part of the Bill, concerns only a specific 
province or provinces, the National Council of Provinces may not pass the Bill or the relevant 
part unless it has been approved by the legislature or legislatures of the province or 
provinces concerned. 
(9) A Bill amending the Constitution that has been passed by the National Assembly and, 
where applicable, by the National Council of Provinces, must be referred to the President for 
assent. 
5.2.1.4. Permanence and Status 
Constitutional Contracts do not have ‘expiration dates’ and as such tend to have stipulations 
entrenched in the written texts pertaining to an element of permanence. Evidence of this can 
be found within the South African constitutional texts, regarding the overarching nature of 
the constitution as the ‘supreme law of the Republic’, with no end-date of expiry in mind. 
While in itself the 1993 Constitution was not permanent, it did provide stipulations for the 
final Constitution. 
1993 Constitution and Constitutional Principles 
 Chapter 1 Section 4 
(1) This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law or act inconsistent 
with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication in 
this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency. 
1996 Constitution 




We therefore, through our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the 
supreme law of the Republic… 
 Section 2: Supremacy of Constitution 
This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid… the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. 
5.2.2. Elements typical of a Social Contract 
5.2.2.1. National Consensus 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the term ‘national consensus’ forms an essential part of the 
formation of a Social Contract. The idea of a national consensus is based on the principle that 
stakeholders act according to a shared understanding of the fundamental nature of the 
negotiated text. The multiple references (listed below) to a ‘consensus-seeking spirit’ within 
the South African Constitution of 1993 reflect an attempt at a national consensus to govern 
all decision-making. However, there is a striking difference between the two Constitutions. In 
the 1993 Constitution, the ‘spirit’ is mentioned explicitly three times. Only two references are 
made to this ‘consensus-seeking spirit’ in the 1996 constitution – the sole direct reference is 
made in the Annexure, while in Section 39 the reference to ‘spirit’ is vague and undefined. 
1993 Constitution and Constitutional Principles [emphasis added] 
 Section 88 Cabinet 
(5) Subsection (4) shall be implemented in the spirit underlying the concept of a government 
of national unity, and the President and the other functionaries concerned shall in the 
implementation of that subsection endeavour to achieve consensus at all times 
 Section 89 Cabinet Procedure  
(1) Meetings of the Cabinet shall be presided over by the President, or, if the President so 
instructs, by an Executive Deputy President: Provided that the Executive Deputy Presidents 
shall preside over meetings of the Cabinet in turn unless the exigencies of government and 
the spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity otherwise dictate.  
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(2) The Cabinet shall function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus-
seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as the need for 
effective government.  
 Section 150 Executive Council Procedure 
 (2) The Executive Council shall function in a manner which gives consideration to the 
consensus-seeking spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity as well as 
the need for effective government.  
1996 Constitution [emphasis added] 
 Section 39  
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. (Emphasis added) 
 Annex B Section 4 [as pertains to section 91 of the new Constitution]  
(15) The Cabinet must function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus-
seeking spirit embodied in the concept of a government of national unity as well as the need 
for effective government. (Emphasis added) 
5.2.2.2. Core/Non-core 
The phrasing of certain key issues gives some insight into which parts of the constitution may 
form part of the core of the agreement. The following extracts represent what may be 
considered as core to the agreement, and could be corroborated, modified, adapted or 
discarded by the evidence collected in the memoirs and biographies of the original 
negotiators. 
1996 Constitution [determined by special amendment procedures] 
 Section 1: Republic of South Africa 
The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following 
values: 
(a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 




(b) Non-racialism and non-sexism. 
(c) Supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law. 
(d) Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, regular elections and a multi-
party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness. 
 Sections 7 -39: Bill of Rights 
 Section 74: Bills amending the constitution 
5.2.2.3. Institutions 
Sisk (1995:250) lists a Bill of Rigts, institutions that reconcile majority rule with minority 
rights, institutions that provide for equality before the law, and for equal economic 
opportunity as potential ‘building blocks’ for a Social Contract (Other institutions that are 
favourable to the process that rewards accommodative politics also promote the 
establishment of a Social Contract).  
1996 Constitution 
The 1996 Constitution allows for the creation of several institutions: 
 Section 181 Establishment and governing principles [Chapter 9 Institutions] 
(1) The following state institutions strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic: 
a. The Public Protector. 
b. The Human Rights Commission. 
c. The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities. 
d. The Commission for Gender Equality. 
e. The Auditor-General. 
f. The Electoral Commission. 
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The Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities listed in this subsection relates directly to Sisk’s building block. The 
1996 Constitution also includes a comprehensive Bill of Rights (Chapter 2: Sections 7 to 39), 
which is congruent with the kinds of institutions conducive to nurturing a Social Contract. 
5.2.2.4. Process 
In determining whether the 1996 constitution contains elements favourable to initiating a 
process that rewards accommodative politics and relies on a system of incentives rather than 
restraints, or ‘process over institutions’, a closer look at the electoral system is warranted.  
While Lijphart (1977; 1985) argues in favour of the proportional list system for divided 
societies which tend to have ethnic voting blocks, Horowitz (2003) argues strongly against 
this system (2003:118) and argues in favour of an electoral system that is conducive to the 
process of vote pooling and produces compromises between opposing groups.  As noted in 
Chapter 3, Horowitz (1991) uses the Malaysian electoral system as an effective example. The 
South African National Electoral System is based on a proportional list system, which, 
according to Horowitz (2003) is the least likely of electoral systems to produce a process 
conducive to moderate politics and compromises between groups. This means that the South 
African electoral system does not encourage the kind of political process definitive of a 
Social Contract. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a potential for vote pooling in a mixed 
system (proportional list and ward-based electoral districts), which is used for local 
government elections.  
The South African electoral system is however not entrenched in the Constitution – the 
Constitution provides merely for a system that ‘results, in general, in proportional 
representation’ (see below). This means that this system may become subject to 
renegotiation: in other words, that it is possible for the proportional list system to be changed 
in order to include constituencies and become a mixed system more conducive to continuing 
compromise, should those in power wish to do so. 
1996 Constitution [emphasis added] 
 Section 46: National Electoral System – Composition and Election 
 (1) The National Assembly consists of no fewer than 350 and no more than 400 women and 
men elected as members in terms of an electoral system that - 
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(a) is prescribed by national legislation; 
(b) is based on the national common voters roll; 
(c) provides for a minimum voting age of 18 years; and 
(d) results, in general, in proportional representation. 
(2) An Act of Parliament must provide a formula for determining the number of members of 
the National Assembly. 
 
 Section 157: Composition and election of Municipal Councils 
(1) A Municipal Council consists of - 
(a) members elected in accordance with subsections (2), (3), (4) and (5); or 
(b) if provided for by national legislation - 
(i) members appointed by other Municipal Councils to represent those other 
Councils; or 
(ii) both members elected in accordance with paragraph (a) and members 
appointed in accordance with subparagraph (i) of this paragraph. 
(2) The election of members to a Municipal Council as anticipated in subsection (1)(a) must 
be in accordance with national legislation, which must prescribe a system - 
(a) of proportional representation based on that municipality’s segment of the 
national common voters roll, and which provides for the election of members from 
lists of party candidates drawn up in a party’s order of preference; or 
(b) of proportional representation as described in paragraph (a) combined with a 
system of ward representation based on that municipality’s segment of the national 
common voters roll. 
(3) An electoral system in terms of subsection (2) must ensure that the total number of 
members elected from each party reflects the total proportion of the votes recorded for those 
parties. 
(4) If the electoral system includes ward representation, the delimitation of wards must be 
done by an independent authority appointed in terms of, and operating according to, 
procedures and criteria prescribed by national legislation. 
(5) A person may vote in a municipality only if that person is registered on that 
municipality’s segment of the national common voters roll. 
(6) The national legislation referred to in subsection (1)(b) must establish a system that 
allows for parties and interests reflected within the Municipal Council making the 
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appointment, to be fairly represented in the Municipal Council to which the appointment is 
made. 
5.2.3. Elements/Components typical of a Benchmark Agreement 
While in itself a Benchmark Agreement does not necessarily take the form of written 
agreement, certain elements contained within a written agreement may allude to the existence 
of such an agreement. Phrasing used within the written constitution may indicate the intention 
to address past injustices, the superiority of a larger goal in the minds of some authors, as 
well as the overall status of the document, being of a permanent or transitory nature. 
5.2.3.1. Historical Context: Past Injustices 
The need to address past injustices is characteristic of the high-context culture of negotiation. 
High-context negotiators are focused on historical context and do not view the negotiating 
forum as an equaliser for the parties involved, as past injustices imply past victims and past 
perpetrators. Instead, these type of negotiators set out to right historical wrongs by means of 
the negotiations. There is clear evidence in both the 1993 and 1996 constitutions that righting 
past injustices was high on the agenda, as well as ensuring that these types of injustices do 
not happen again. 
1993 Constitution and Constitutional Principles [emphasis added] 
(After Section 251) National Unity and Reconciliation  
This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the 
recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence and development 
opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. The 
pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require 
reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society.  
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to 
transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human 
rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, 
fear, guilt and revenge.  
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These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for 
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for 
victimisation.  
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be granted in 
respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and committed in 
the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall 
adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and 
before 6 December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, 
including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after 
the law has been passed.  
 Constitutional Principle V  
The legal system shall ensure the equality of all before the law and an equitable legal process. 
Equality before the law includes laws, programmes or activities that have as their object the 
amelioration of the conditions of the disadvantaged, including those disadvantaged on the 
grounds of race, colour or gender.  
 Section 121: Claims (Restitution of Land Rights) 
 (2) A person or a community shall be entitled to claim restitution of a right in land from the 
state if-  
(a) such person or community was dispossessed of such right at any time after a date to be 
fixed by the Act referred to in subsection (1); and  
(b) such dispossession was effected under or for the purpose of furthering the object of a law 
which would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of racial discrimination contained in 
section 8(2), had that section been in operation at the time of such dispossession.  
(3) The date fixed by virtue of subsection (2) (a) shall not be a date earlier than 19 June 1913.  
1996 Constitution [emphasis added] 
 Preamble 
We, the people of South Africa, 
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Recognise the injustices of our past… 
… Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights…’ 
 Section 25: Property 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
 Section 195: Basic values and principles governing public administration 
(1) (i) Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with 
employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and 
the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation. 
5.2.3.2. Larger/superior objective 
In a joint statement made by F.W. de Klerk, Nelson Mandela and Chief M. Buthelezi on 19 
April 1994, a caveat was added to the 1993 Constitution, amending section 160 of the 1993 
Constitution [emphasis added]: 
The parties expressed their satisfaction that the Agreement will substantially contribute to 
their common goal of creating circumstances which will be conducive to the holding of a 
free, fair and peaceful election. 
5.2.3.3. Agreement as Temporary 
The nature of the 1993 Constitution is interim, and as such, temporary. It was intended to be 
operative for two years until it would be replaced by a new constitution drafted by a 
constitutional assembly. 
1993 Constitution and Constitutional Principles 
 Section 73 Adoption of new constitutional text  
(1) The Constitutional Assembly shall pass the new constitutional text within two years 
as from the date of the first sitting of the National Assembly under this Constitution.  
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5.2.4 Chapter Summary 
In terms of the Constitutional Contract, some differences exist between the 1993 and the 
1996 Constitutions. While both Constitutions are equally reliant on quotas in the form of the 
terms ‘broadly representative’, only the 1993 Constitution has very rigid fixed target, which 
is the nature of the 1993 Constitution. The 1996 Constitution has one definitive instance of a 
fixed target in the form of a reverse target, more specifically, the Property Clause. The 1996 
Constitution’s constraints on amendments are basically a reflection of what was proposed in 
the 1993 Constitution, with the added exception of special procedures for amendments 
regarding provinces. 
There is a striking difference between the two Constitutions regarding the issue of National 
Consensus within a Social Contract. The 1993 Constitution places a lot of focus on the 
continuation of the ‘spirit underlying the concept of a government of national unity’, while 
the 1996 Constitution mentions this ‘spirit’ only twice.  
Both Constitutions address the issue of historical context by addressing past injustices, with 
specific focus on the restitution of land rights. In its nature, the 1993 Constitution is a 
temporary agreement, while the 1996 Constitution does not have a fixed end-date or 
expiration date.  
This Chapter set out to place elements within the 1993 and the 1996 Constitution within the 
conceptual framework set out on Chapter 3. It was found that both Constitutions have 
indicators open to interpretation as being either those of a Constitutional Contract, a Social 
Contract and a Benchmark Agreement.  
Both of the Constitutions place significant emphasis on the Property Clause with regard to 
‘addressing past injustices’, which is congruent with the Benchmark Agreement. However, 
placing the addressing of past injustices in such strict terms is also reconcilable with a rigid 
Constitutional Contract.  
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Chapter 6: Analysis of Data 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to establish whether negotiators interpreted certain sections of the both the 
1993 and 1996 Constitutions to be indicators of either Constitutional Contracts, Social 
Contracts and/or Benchmark Agreements. These views will be found in published material as 
well as interviews available in the public domain, and personal interviews. Each negotiator 
will be analysed as an individual in order to determine whether their views are congruent 
with the Constitutional Contract, the Social Contract or the Benchmark Agreement, or as 
reconcilable with one or more of these concepts. The negotiators have been placed in 
alphabetical order by surname. 
6.2. Findings 
6.2.1. Kader Asmal 
Kader Asmal represented the ANC during Codesa I and Codesa II, where he served on 
Working Group 5 which dealt with creating procedures for dealing with possible problems 
during the transition (Asmal, 2011:119). Asmal also formed part of the ANC’s negotiating 
team at the MPNP. After 1994, he was a minister in Nelson Mandela’s cabinet.  
In his memoirs, Politics in my Blood, co-written with Adrian Hadland with input from Moira 
Levy, Asmal writes about the importance of the ANC getting involved in the debate in South 
Africa in the 1980s regarding what a future constitution would look like. By getting involved 
in this debate, the ANC would ‘rebut the enemy’s claims that the ANC … was nothing more 
than an organisation of communists and terrorists’ (Asmal, 2011:104). By attempting to 
change others’ perception of them, the ANC was laying the groundwork for their opponent to 
fundamentally redefine the ANC as a viable negotiating partner, which is conducive to 
creating a political culture favourable to the formation of a Social Contract. 
In 1986, the ANC’s most basic aims for a constitution included majority rule and ‘national 
unity in the sense of one people corresponding to one country’ (Asmal, 2011:105). However, 
Asmal knew that the constitution would have to make room for diversity and 
multiculturalism. The ANC would continue to advocate an accommodative unitary state 
(Asmal, 2011:105). Asmal was strongly against a federal state, as he believed it would ‘open 
the door to white minority rule and would preserve whites’ economic power base’ 
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(2011:107). He, along with the ANC, advocated a strong central government (2011:107). A 
point of contention that came up during the argument on whether or not to have a strong 
federal system, was what to name the provinces: the ANC was in favour of the loose term 
‘regions’, while the NP called for the use of ‘states’ (Asmal, 2011:124). Eventually, the 
parties compromised on the term ‘provinces’ (Asmal, 2011:124).  
Asmal dismisses the NP’s proposal of minority rights. While Asmal recognises the success of 
minority rights in other societies, he finds that minority rights in South Africa would be ‘an 
inversion and perversion of this legal-philosophical tradition’ (2011:101). 
Asmal was against the ‘conventional liberal democratic constitutional model’ as it would 
limit the state’s power, which it would need to eradicate the racial and social inequalities 
caused by apartheid (2011:113). Asmal stressed the importance of a Bill of Rights and its role 
in eradicating social and economic inequalities (2011:112). Asmal describes the functions of 
the Bill of Rights as reflecting ‘the need of the majority’, while providing ‘protection … to 
the anxieties of different groups of people’ (Hansard, 1996:123). This type of process is 
strongly in line with the formation of a Social Contract.  
Asmal refers to the ANC’s suspension of the armed struggle in 1990 as a ‘major concession 
for which we did not receive much in return’ (2011:119). This type of argument in terms of 
quid pro quo is congruent with Constitutional Contractarian thinking. 
Asmal spends some time debating the electoral system that would be best suited to South 
Africa, a country where most of the population was illiterate and had never voted before. 
According to the KwaZulu Training Trust, at that time, 78% of blacks, 55% of coloured 
people, 23% of Indians and 2% of whites were illiterate (Race Relations Survey, 1991/2:213). 
Asmal notes how this issue was constantly debated within the ANC (2011:121). Asmal was 
in favour of the proportional list system and expressed his concerns over a constituency-
based system (2011:122). He believed that the possibility existed that the ANC would win 
most if not all the constituencies, removing the chance of all parties being represented in 
parliament (2011:122).  He believed that the National Assembly should be as representative 
as possible, and that by not setting a threshold within the party list proportional representation 
system, any party could secure seats in the Assembly. 
Asmal also expresses the importance of setting up a ‘relatively simple’ system, not only 
because of the administration it would require, but also because fighting over constituency 
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delimitation would take up too much time during the negotiations, as it would surely bring 
about disagreements. He found that a constituency based system would cause administrative 
problems and that it would ‘be much too large in South Africa’ (2011:123). Asmal ‘could see 
no other way for the duration of the first few elections than proportional representation’ 
(2011:123). As mentioned in Chapter 3, this type of system is recommended by Lijphart 
(1977; 1985). However, both Sisk (1996) and Horowitz (2003) argue against this model as 
more favourable to the emergence of a Social Contract, instead advocating systems of 
incentives and rewards. 
Asmal also very specifically notes that this system should not necessarily ‘stay as it is 
forever’ (2011:123). His personal preference would be that in time, the system be changed to 
one resembling the German system, in which Parliament is made up of sixty per cent 
constituency-based voting, and forty per cent by proportional representation. He 
acknowledges that in a constituency-based system, ‘members have a more direct connection 
to their representatives’ (2011:123). This type of system would be more conducive to the 
formation of a Social Contract, as elaborated in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2.7. 
Asmal was greatly in favour of a constitution that would hold the interest of the people ‘in the 
highest regard’, and for this to happen, the constitution would have to be drafted by ‘the 
people’s democratically elected representatives’ (2011:130). After much debate, the ANC 
decided that a multi-party conference, which came in the form of the MPNP, would draft an 
interim constitution (Asmal, 2011:129). Asmal states that the ANC ‘conceded that the regime 
would not give way to an interim government, as De Klerk would not waver from his 
attachment to the legitimacy of his government’ (2011:129). 
In 1994, Asmal admitted that certain provisions in the Interim Constitution were very 
‘cumbersome’ (Asmal, 1994). He continued by saying that the Bill of Rights had ‘serious 
flaws’, and that the section on national territory was overly detailed. Asmal did however say 
that the provision regarding amnesty was very well-formulated and allowed for amnesty to be 
dealt with ‘without threatening anyone, without scapegoating anyone’ (Asmal, 1994).  
Asmal feels particularly proud of his part in the drafting of the constitution, specifically his 
hand in the creation of a Constitutional Court and his preference for an electoral system based 
on proportional representation (2011:131). Asmal specifically mentions the 1993 Preamble 
and Chapter 16 as standing out to him (2011:130 – 131). When referring to the ‘constitutional 
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settlement’ made in South Africa, Asmal states that the idea of dignity ‘resides at the very 
heart’ of the settlement (2011:3).  
Asmal notes the constant compromise during the negotiations: ‘The balancing of the needs of 
the oppressed with the fears of the oppressors permeated the negotiating process from 
beginning to end’ (Asmal, 2011:132). However, while noting the ANC’s concession of the 
Sunset Clauses, Asmal states that ‘in the end it was the regime that capitulated’ (2011:132). 
According to Asmal (2011:126), the ANC used the Sunset Clauses, in part, to secure ‘whites’ 
commitment to the process and their loyalty to a peaceful post-apartheid state’. Speaking in 
terms of wins and losses is congruent with one of the characteristics of the concept of a 
Constitutional Contract. Asmal finds, in his view, a more fitting description for the negotiated 
settlement as a ‘peace treaty between warring parties’ (2011: 132 – 133). Asmal, on 
negotiations (2011:133): 
…it is axiomatic of negotiations that they involve give-and-take and compromise; that is 
the substance of bargaining. However, to find a middle road, to negotiate through 
seemingly irreconcilable differences, you have to know your objectives. You have to be 
acutely sensitive to the reasoning behind your particular position on an issue so that 
you can modify it as need be without compromising your vision or end goal. The sunset 
clauses are a good example of this. We learnt that trust is the outcome of, not a 
precondition for, negotiations. 
In a vague statement, Asmal mentions the election of the GNU in April 1994 and says that ‘at 
last we were moving towards our goal’ (2011:131). He however fails to note what the ‘goal’ 
that he is referring to entails. It may be inferred that he was referring to the ANC’s goal of 
working toward ‘national, non-racial, democratic elections for a constituent assembly that 
would draft the final constitution’ in order to establish their goal of a ‘non-racial, multi-party 
democracy’ (2011:133). 
Asmal praises the importance of the bilateral trust between the ANC and the NP during the 
negotiations. While noting that this was ‘downplayed’ during Codesa in order to uphold the 
inclusive nature of the discussions, direct talks between the two parties by means of 
Ramaphosa and Meyer were invaluable in finding the middle ground (2011:134). Asmal 
again speaks to this aspect of inclusion when mentioning the accommodation of the IFP a few 
days before the 1994 election, stating that this was done in the ‘pursuit of full inclusivity’ 
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(2011:131). Inclusion serves as an indicator of a Social Contract, but does not necessarily 
mean that a Social Contract will form. 
In an interview with Padraig O’Malley in 1994, Asmal stated the importance of the ANC 
getting a large majority in the national elections set for April of that year as it would 
‘establish clarity in terms of support, clarity in terms of the kind of reconstruction policy that 
we have’ (Asmal, 1994). He continued by mentioning the importance of consensus in the 
adoption of the final constitution. 
In the first sitting of the new parliament in 1994, Asmal ‘felt the exhilaration of a victor and 
the vindication of the just’ (2011:1). He states that during the negotiations he ‘was courteous 
towards our opponents… for political power because it was correct and productive to do so. 
But I never forgot with whom I was dealing’ (2011:1). This shows that negotiations did not 
cause Asmal to change his opinion of his opponents, which in turn would have allowed the 
formation of a Social Contract. Also, the win/lose argument is one of the indicators 
associated with the Constitutional Contract. 
Asmal refers to the 1996 Constitution as a ‘social compact … it’s not different from the 1993 
Constitution. The fundamental assumptions are not different’ (Asmal, 1996). He is clear that 
the 1996 Constitution was written by consensus, which is a characteristic associated with 
Social Contractarian thinking. In parliament at the adoption of the final constitution, Asmal 
said that no party should ‘claim victory’ in the drafting of the constitution, that ‘[t]he victory 
is our country’s’ (Hansard, 1996:401).  
According to Asmal, a system of checks and balances was established in order to ‘ensure that 
the principle of social transformation is sustained and that the rights and duties are 
accordingly enshrined in such distinctive detail in our Constitution are respected by all’ 
(Asmal, 2011:134). Asmal is very optimistic on the Bill of Rights, referring specifically to 
the inclusion of affirmative action providing ‘redress for the past’ and economic and social 
rights (Asmal, 1996). This referral to past injustices is congruent with the Benchmark 
Agreement. 
After the adoption of the final Constitution in 1996, Asmal said that ‘a constitution has to 
have a high degree of flexibility… What has happened here is that the parties have seen this 
as a contract with all the details to be included in it and there is extraordinary detail in it and 
it’s possible but we might regret the details because details give rise to litigation’ (Asmal, 
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1996). A detailed, unchangeable contract is a sign of a Constitutional Contract. However, 
Asmal mentions the flexible nature of the constitution as an ‘in-built flexibility’ (Hansard, 
1996:402). 
Asmal describes the final Constitution as ‘a dynamic, creative document, particularly on 
notions such as cooperative governance, with the capacity to move with changing times and 
encompass new realities, while holding firm to fundamentals’ (Hansard, 1996: 400). This 
type of assessment is congruent with the political culture of a Social Contract. 
In his memoirs, several indicators of both the Social Contract and the Constitutional Contract 
can be found. However, it becomes evident in Asmal’s win/lose assessment as well as his 
insistence on a party-list proportional representation system that, at the time, his thinking was 
more in line with the Constitutional Contractarian perspective. 
6.2.2. F.W. de Klerk 
In 1989 F.W. de Klerk became leader of the then incumbent ruling party, the National Party, 
and later the same year he became president of South Africa. He remained president and 
leader of the NP during Codesa I and II and the MPNP, until April 1994. He played a crucial 
role during the constitutional negotiations, and remained the leader of the NP as well as 
deputy president in the GNU from 1994 to June 1996, when he withdrew from government 
(De Klerk, 1998A:362). In his autobiography The Last Trek – A New Beginning: The 
Autobiography (1998A), certain indicators consistent with the conceptual framework used in 
this study can be identified. 
At their December 1989 ‘Bosberaad’, the NP started to devise ways to promote negotiations 
as the only course of action, to which De Klerk notes that they sought to occupy the ‘moral 
high ground’ (1998A:161). This reference to the moral high ground leans toward the 
Benchmark view, which is generally concerned with outward appearances and using this 
outward appearance of strength or magnanimity as bargaining power. However, upon closer 
inspection of De Klerk’s intentions, his intentions lean more towards the formation of a 
Social Contract in which his party’s interests are considered as opposed to an ongoing and 
changeable agreement. 
At this strategy session, the NP considered the risks involved in entering into negotiations 
and devised possible fall-back positions. They sought to ‘ensure justice for all South Africans 
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within the framework of universally accepted democratic values’ (De Klerk, 1998A:161). De 
Klerk lists the NP’s core visions for South Africa: ‘everybody would have equal rights and 
opportunities and… minorities would not be threatened or suppressed’ (1998A:161). The 
matter of ‘reasonable protection for minority rights’ formed an essential part of the 
acceptance of this major step toward negotiations with the ANC by the cabinet (De Klerk, 
1998A:162). In a meeting between De Klerk and Nelson Mandela in December 1989, 
Mandela voiced his concern over the NP’s commitment to group rights, to which De Klerk 
replied that group rights would merely provide a structural guarantee that majority rule would 
not mean domination of the white minority by blacks (De Klerk, 1998A:157, 158). 
De Klerk divides the negotiation process into three phases, firstly, the ‘tentative negotiations’ 
that had taken place between Nelson Mandela, the ANC and certain members of the 
government, described as Secret Meetings in Chapter 4. De Klerk notes these meetings, 
specifically those held in the United Kingdom, as being instrumental to his understanding of 
the ANC and its intentions (1998A:173). The second phase, according to De Klerk, involved 
the preparations for the substantive negotiations, listed as preliminary negotiations. De Klerk 
notes this phase as integral to establishing a level political playing field (1998A:175). The 
first and second phases were instrumental in helping both parties redefine their assessment of 
each other fundamentally, which is essential to the process of constructing the political 
culture of a Social Contract. 
In March 1990, De Klerk made clear his commitment to ‘making the political playing fields 
even’ (De Klerk, 1998A:153). This is reconcilable with both the Constitutional Contract view 
and the Social Contract View, as low-context negotiators tend towards a perception of equal 
standing when entering into negotiations. 
The third phase, substantive negotiations, came in the form of Codesa. De Klerk writes of his 
continued determination that the negotiations should be inclusive (1998A:176). In an 
interview with Patti Waldmeir in 1994, De Klerk makes clear his belief that the ‘final 
agreement’ should be reached at a multi-party conference where all the parties in the country 
would be represented (De Klerk, 1993A:2). For a Social Contract to be successfully 
established, the main parties to the conflict should be included in the process. De Klerk’s 
commitment to inclusion is compatible with the shaping of a new political culture conducive 
to a Social Contract. 
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Just before the Pretoria Minute of August 1990, the ANC announced that it would suspend its 
armed struggle, something which the NP had been pushing for. Even though De Klerk 
expressed his delight at this revelation, the unilateral nature of the decision made De Klerk 
realise that it was ‘aimed at seizing the moral high ground’ (1998A:186). The Pretoria Minute 
was portrayed as the ‘selling out of the white man’, making the NP seem less powerful and 
strengthening the ANC’s bargaining position (De Klerk, 1998A:187). This referral to moral 
high ground by De Klerk may be reconcilable with the Benchmark Agreement, as he was 
concerned with losing the NP/government’s position. The use of a morally stronger 
bargaining position is a key indicator of this view.  
The divergent views of the ANC and of the NP government were clear from the outset: the 
ANC called for the handing over of power to a non-elected interim multiparty government, 
while the NP called for a multiparty constitutional convention to draft a new constitution 
which would govern the first democratic elections (De Klerk, 1998A:218). According to De 
Klerk, he proposed two phases to the drafting of the constitution: Codesa would produce an 
interim constitution which would allow for the election of a representative Parliament, which 
would then draft a final constitution (De Klerk, 1998A:222). 
De Klerk found that the ‘real challenge’ that lay ahead for Codesa was determining a ‘win-
win outcome’ (1998A:223). Seeking a positive sum (win-win) outcome instead of a zero-sum 
outcome is consistent with Social Contractarian values. For De Klerk, Codesa was a success. 
The NP had positioned themselves to be able to achieve their basic goals (De Klerk, 
1998A:225). Upon noting that the ANC’s ‘rolling mass action’ had not been as successful as 
they had hoped, De Klerk continued to work toward what he perceived as a win-win outcome 
(1998A:248). 
The continuing violence in South Africa hampered the negotiating process, and caused 
‘distrust and recriminations’ between the two main parties (De Klerk, 1998A:192). De Klerk 
specifically notes how difference in culture affected negotiations when talking about his 
experience with Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi of the IFP, stating that in Zulu tradition one 
always concedes to a president or a king, never openly challenging him face-to-face. This 
acute difference in culture changed the way that De Klerk dealt with Buthelezi, and shows the 
direct effect of culture on negotiations (1998A:196). De Klerk was searching for equal 
standing for the participants in the negotiations, once again congruent with the political 
culture from which a Social Contract can evolve. 
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At Codesa II, certain issues continued to provide a great source of contention. One of these 
was how the final constitution would be adopted: the NP called for a 75% majority, and the 
ANC called for a two-thirds majority (De Klerk, 1998A:236). The NP sought power-sharing 
by means of the devolution of power; increased majorities for important decisions and the 
‘limitation of powers of the president’ (De Klerk, 1998A:236). Strict amendment procedures 
are associated with the Constitutional Contractarian view, but the NP sought to produce a 
system in which all the major parties would form an ongoing part of the new government, 
and as such, an approach closer to the values associated with the Social Contractarian 
perspective (De Klerk, 1998A:237). De Klerk continued to defend this position, noting that 
power-sharing had become the norm in divided societies seeking stability, while the ANC 
framed this proposal as an attempt to hold power indefinitely (1998A:237). In February 1993, 
De Klerk said that ‘great progress’ had been made in ‘an emerging broad consensus with 
regard to the framework of a new constitution’ (De Klerk, 1993A:2). He also made it clear 
that the bilateral talks taking place at that time between the NP and the ANC had not 
produced ‘fixed agreements’.  In Parliament in 1993, De Klerk said (Hansard, 1993:14360): 
As a lawyer, I know that a healthy contract does not necessarily guarantee a 
successful transaction. Other factors to consider are the intentions of the parties, 
their reputations and their ability to comply with their contractual obligations… 
We are confident that the ANC in general genuinely want to make a success of our 
joint constitutional effort, and that they are committed to the honourable 
implementation of our agreements. 
In his assessment of the 1993 Constitutional Principles, De Klerk lifts out one principle in 
particular which he finds to be the most important: ‘the final constitution would have to be 
adopted by a special majority and it would be bound by agreed constitutional principles’ (De 
Klerk, 1998A:254). Upon mentioning the idea of a sunset clause, Joe Slovo tried to address 
the government’s core interests, which he identified as a period of five years for a 
Government of National Unity and ‘guarantees for civil service pensions and jobs’, among 
others (De Klerk, 1998A:257). This indicates that Slovo and De Klerk had divergent ideas on 
what constituted the core of the NP government’s interests. 
By September 1993 the issue of the level of federalism was still on the table. The NP, the 
ANC and the IFP held a ‘fundamental difference of philosophy… on the basic relationship 
between SPRs [states/provinces/regions] and the federal government’ (De Klerk, 
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1998A:283). The ANC called for a strong central government and weak states, the IFP for 
strong states and a weak government, while the NP advocated a strong central government, 
and ‘strong states in matters which fell within their jurisdiction’ (De Klerk, 1998A:283). De 
Klerk wanted the devolution of power to be one of the agreed upon constitutional principles, 
calling for ‘entrenched powers for regional governments’ as a ‘basis for the future 
constitutional dispensation’ (De Klerk, 1993A:3). 
The continuing negotiations in October 1993 were marked by ‘sufficient give and take and 
reasonable compromises to encompass the bottom lines of all the main parties on all but a 
few outstanding issues’ (De Klerk, 1998A:287). De Klerk refers specifically to the protection 
of property rights as a ‘titanic struggle’, which, according to him, the NP won (1998A:287). 
The inclusion of market value in law expropriation was something that they had insisted on, 
and eventually won. Arguing in terms of wins and losses is congruent with Constitutional 
Contractarian thinking, and shows De Klerk diverging from his previous approach. The 
property clause emerged as a core issue for De Klerk. 
A key, long unresolved, issue was the question of amnesty. At the Groote Schuur Minute of 
1990, a working group was set up to deal with some pressing issues. Within this working 
group the first concerns regarding the matter of amnesty came up – the group could not find 
agreement on this matter (De Klerk, 1998A:182). The issue of amnesty would continue to be 
a sore point for De Klerk. The government continually advocated a ‘comprehensive process 
of amnesty for all those, on all sides, who had been involved in the conflict of the past’ (De 
Klerk, 1998A:288). Eventually, De Klerk found that (1998A:288): 
…the best that our negotiating team could do was to reach agreement on the inclusion of 
a paragraph at the end of the interim constitution that stipulated that ‘amnesty shall be 
granted in respect of all acts and omissions associated with political objectives and 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past.’ Amnesty was to be dealt with ‘in a 
spirit of reconciliation, on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for 
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu (traditional 
African humanism) but not for victimisation. 
Despite stating that he found that the ANC was ‘not in a position to dictate terms to [the 
South African government]’ (1998A:288), De Klerk was resoundingly unhappy with this 
wording on amnesty. It provided no indication of the practicability of the process, and thus no 
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guarantees as to how the ANC would handle the issue. While he states that the NP had 
brokered the ‘best deal that was then possible’, he concedes that ‘[t]he manner in which we 
dealt with the question of amnesty was probably our greatest failure during the negotiating 
process.’ (1998A:289). This retrospective view of wins and losses is consistent with the 
Constitutional Contractarian thinking. 
De Klerk (1998A:291) terms the Interim Constitution as ‘one of the major milestones on the 
road to the new South Africa’. While De Klerk was not completely satisfied with the 
agreement, he found that it was concurrent with their ‘bottom line’ spelled out in the 1992 
referendum (De Klerk, 1998A:291). He identified concessions from both sides, but in an 
interview in 1993, he said that he would ‘not describe it as victories’, but rather as ‘common 
sense’ (1993B). De Klerk mentions that both the ANC and the NP made major concessions 
on a ‘give-and-take basis’ (1994B:5). He (1995) refers to the writing of an interim 
constitution with fixed principles for the final constitution as a ‘good compromise’, which in 
its nature did not satisfy any of the parties completely, but rather, sufficiently. De Klerk finds 
that by addressing each of the party’s concerns ‘sufficiently’, the agreement ‘provided the 
basis for a new national consensus’, which is an indication of the political culture associated 
with the Social Contract (1998A:291).  
In November 1993, certain issues remained unresolved. De Klerk (1998A:289) notes the 
most important of these as the issue of the ‘functioning of the GNU and the process by which 
the multiparty cabinet would take its decisions – would it be by consensus or by a two-thirds 
majority? The latter option would conceivably give the minority parties a veto.’ The minority 
veto was what the NP had been seeking all along. De Klerk denies that they were seeking a 
veto, arguing instead that the country ‘be governed on the basis of consensus between the 
main role players’ (1993B:3). Eventually, Mandela and De Klerk agreed that the cabinet in 
the GNU would make decisions based on the ‘spirit of consensus underlying the concept of a 
government of national unity’ (De Klerk, 1998A:290). This type of continual bargaining was 
what De Klerk had been advocating and is consistent with Social Contractarian thinking. 
On the working of the Government of National Unity, De Klerk was confident (1994A:1). He 
defined the ANC within the confines of the GNU: ‘we should call ourselves co-operators but 
also competitors’ (De Klerk, 1995).  He said that ‘the GNU will not implement ANC policy, 
will not implement NP policy, will not implement IFP policy, but will, with regard to those 
matters where there are fundamental differences, negotiate compromises’ (1994A:1). De 
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Klerk was confident that a ‘very good team spirit’ was developing among those taking part in 
the GNU, reiterating his commitment to the GNU in an interview with Patti Waldmeir in June 
1994 (1994A). This type of continuing compromise is reconcilable with the political culture 
associated with the emerging of a Social Contract. De Klerk conceded that five years may not 
be enough time for the GNU, and that the concept of power sharing will not disappear in the 
final constitution, though it might take a different form (De Klerk, 1994A). 
De Klerk begun to feel that the ANC was deviating from the ‘spirit of reconciliation’ when 
the ANC sought to press murder charges against the former minister of defence and two 
former chiefs of the South African Defence Force (SADF) (1998A:348). After a clash with 
Mandela in a cabinet meeting, De Klerk and Mandela reiterated their mutual good faith in a 
joint statement (De Klerk, 1998A:351). This gives some insight into which issues were 
considered core by De Klerk, and specifically the issue of amnesty comes to the fore. This 
particular action by the ANC seemed to De Klerk to break the spirit of consensus. 
De Klerk is optimistic about some compromises made during the negotiations for the final 
constitution, but certain issues that remained unresolved toward the end produced significant 
deadlocks. The NP had continually pushed for some form of power-sharing at the executive 
level, but the ANC refused (De Klerk, 1998A:358). De Klerk argued that ‘we need to 
continue to have a bond of trust and a spirit of co-operation, between that which I represent in 
public life and that which President Mandela represents in public life (1994B: 12). In an 
interview with Patti Waldmeir in November 1994, De Klerk said that should the current 
‘partnership situation’ (the GNU) not continue, ‘we will have to look at strengthening the 
checks and balances against the misuse of power, at strengthening the constitutional 
protection for cultural minorities, not based on race or colour, religious minorities, language 
minorities’ (1994B:12). The NP eventually compromised on almost all important issues: 
which to De Klerk was ‘not entirely satisfactory’ (1998A:359).  
Three days before the adoption of the new constitution the NP was still unsure of its support 
thereof (1998A:359). Before voting for the 1996 Constitution, De Klerk notes that the NP did 
a thorough evaluation of what they had achieved: ‘in some instances we got 100% of what we 
wanted, in some even 110%, in some only 75%, we had to make fairly far reaching 
compromises but we believed, and I am convinced as I sit here, that we substantially 
delivered on what we envisaged there and we never advocated that it will be a minority veto 
or that type of thing’ (De Klerk, 1997). In an interview with Padraig O’Malley in 1999, De 
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Klerk mentions a ‘balance sheet’ on ‘what was achieved and what wasn’t achieved’ that was 
drawn up by Rassie Malherbe. This allowed the NP to conclude that they had achieved most 
of their goals (De Klerk, 1999). This type of ‘balance sheet’ is reconcilable with a 
Constitutional Contract. 
In 1996, De Klerk mentioned that the constitution ‘contains the most fundamental things that 
I would like to see there’, but continued to argue that the Constitution lacks a ‘consensus-
seeking model at the executive level’ (1996B). The NP did eventually vote in favour of the 
new constitution, but De Klerk expressed his concerns in a speech after its adoption: he was 
particularly concerned with the lack of a long-lasting power-sharing agreement as well as the 
absence of consensus-seeking within the executive (1998A:360). De Klerk’s hopes of what 
the constitution should embody are recognisably those of a Social Contract, though it is clear 
here that he did not believe that the outcome guarantees this type of ongoing bargaining.  
After leaving the GNU in 1996, De Klerk reasoned that the Constitution did not include ‘a 
whiff, even the faintest basis for the concept of multi-party consensus seeking in a structured 
manner on issues of national importance’ (De Klerk, 1996A). He argued for a system where 
the main political role-players are continually included in decision-making on issues of 
national importance ‘in an effort to find consensus’. Regarding voting yes on the new 
constitution and leaving the GNU in retrospect, De Klerk says that he would ‘have done [it] 
again’ (1998B). He does not believe that putting more pressure on the ANC regarding a 
consensus-seeking mechanism would have made a difference to the final outcome (De Klerk, 
1998B). 
De Klerk shows his ongoing commitment to the agreement in this statement (1998A:364): 
I would like to think that, in our retirement, in some way or other we [he and 
Mandela] will be able to work together as elder statesmen to nurture and protect 
the young democracy which both of us had the privilege of helping to create.  
At the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, De Klerk made the statement that the new 
South Africa was ‘just as much our creation as it was the creation of any other party’ (De 
Klerk, 1998A:379). He continued to say that he and his party were neither morally inferior 
nor superior to any other party to the conflict, and that the solution to the historic divisions in 
the country had been a joint one. This reveals once again a cognitive mindset that can be 
located within the framework of Social Contractarian values, as fundamental redefinitions of 
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opponents as well as an equal share in the outcome relate directly to this type of agreement. 
De Klerk also touches on the equality of the status of the contributors, which is in line with 
the Social Contract. 
Looking back at the negotiation process, De Klerk specifically mentions the absence of 
effective power-sharing mechanism as one of his deepest regrets (1998A:387; 389). He said 
that, should the NP win the next election by a two-thirds majority, they would entrench a 
consensus-seeking mechanism in the constitution (1996B). He finds simple majoritarianism 
lacking when dealing with the inclusion of minorities in any effective decision-making, as 
this system completely excludes minorities from participating effectively in the way in which 
they are governed (De Klerk, 1998A:396). He seeks a majority not based on race, but rather 
on ‘common values and a shared vision of how the country should be governed’ 
(1998A:397). De Klerk calls for ways to continue the type of negotiation and search for 
consensus which marked the negotiation process in a search for consensus on dealing with 
present and future problems (De Klerk, 1998A:398).  
De Klerk notes specifically the dissensus among South Africans on the past. He wishes for all 
parties to come together to reach consensus on the ‘past and present realities of our country’ 
(1998A:383). Here it becomes clear that De Klerk wished to create an outcome more 
compatible with that of a Social Contract than was produced. However, upon reflection, De 
Klerk finds that the agreement was ‘much closer to our opening positions than to those of the 
ANC’ (De Klerk, 1998A:388). Asked whether the country ‘turned out the way you thought it 
would when you made those changes in 1990’,  De Klerk answered that he thought that ‘we 
have basically achieved what we set out to achieve’ (De Klerk, 2004:2).  De Klerk listed 
some of the positives in South Africa in 2004: ‘the constitutional certainty, the adherence to 
the constitution, but most important of all, what is in place is the underlying goodwill 
between all the people of South Africa, a sort of commitment to make the new South Africa 
work’ (De Klerk, 2004:2). 
De Klerk’s views on the constitutional negotiations, the Interim Constitution of 1993 and the 
1996 Constitution reveal several indicators consistent with each of the concepts listed in 
Chapter 3. However, De Klerk’s opinions and beliefs seem to generally reflect the values and 
beliefs that define a Social Contractarian political culture, even though it seems that he 
believes that while this was what he had aimed for during negotiations, the Social Contract 
was not successfully formed. 
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6.2.3. Dawie de Villiers 
As a minister in FW de Klerk’s cabinet, Dawie de Villiers played the role of negotiator at 
Codesa II, and served on Roelf Meyer’s negotiating team at the MPNP. De Villiers continued 
his role a negotiator serving in the Constitutional Assembly until 1996. 
In 1992, De Villiers clarified what the NP meant by power-sharing. He stated that it would 
mean that minorities or smaller parties’ opinions would ‘not be totally ignored’, and the 
implementation of mechanisms that ‘protect minorities from abuse of power’ (De Villiers, 
1992). To De Villiers, this meant that the constitution could only be changed with the assent 
of a very high percentage of voters, suggesting a seventy-five per cent majority. This type of 
mechanism is associated with the Constitutional Contract. 
By August 1993, the interim constitution was almost fully drafted. De Villiers believed that 
the ANC had conceded on several matters, including the Government of National Unity and a 
more extensive Bill of Rights. He noted his belief that ‘the transitional constitution must 
actually be the next constitution, it must be a full constitution and I think what is developing 
here is a full constitution’ (De Villiers, 1993).  
In Parliament in November 1993, De Villiers noted the level of compromise during the 
negotiations (Hansard, 1993:14246). He continued by saying that ultimately, no party was 
‘completely satisfied’ with the agreement, but that the agreement was acceptable to all in 
providing a balance between parties’ interests (Hansard, 1993: 14246). He also noted that 
‘despite the shortcomings, we are proud of what we achieved’ (Hansard, 1993: 14247).  
De Villiers mentions accusations that the NP had not succeeded in entrenching power-sharing 
in the constitution. He however refutes this by mentioning the different forms of power-
sharing in the Interim Constitution, specifically noting that ‘power… in the constitution is 
divided in such a way that the exercising of power does not lead to the domination of power’ 
(Hansard, 1993:14248). He mentions the importance of the proportional list electoral system 
which ‘ensures representation … for smaller parties’ (Hansard, 1993:14248). 
De Villiers strongly believed that the Government of National Unity should not be a 
temporary arrangement (1994). He noted that a first-past-the-post, winner-takes-all system 
would not work in South Africa, but rather a more accommodative system in which all parties 
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are required to cooperate (De Villiers, 1994). This type of system is conducive to the 
formation of a Social Contract. 
In October 1996, De Villiers said that ‘We've got a non-racial democracy with a constitution 
that is better than most constitutions that I know of with a Bill of Rights protecting not only 
black rights but white rights, particularly white rights when it comes to things like 
possessions, etc., and now after a period of renegotiation there is very little in the new 
constitution that we can cry out and say that this is totally foul, this is unacceptable. Looked 
at as a whole, it's a very good constitution’ (De Villiers, 1996). This approach to the 
constitution is reconcilable with one of the indicators of Social Contractarian thinking. 
6.2.4. Tertius Delport 
Tertius Delport was a minister in F.W. de Klerk’s government, and played a significant role 
as negotiator during the multi-party negotiations. At Codesa II Delport represented the 
government along with Gerrit Viljoen. He was involved in Codesa Working Group 2. Delport 
has not written memoirs and as such this section relies on interviews conducted by Patti 
Waldmeir and Padraig O’Malley. 
According to Delport in 1990, the NP sought a multi-party democracy and minority 
protection in the settlement agreement (1990). He proposed a Bill of Rights as well as 
political structures to entrench ‘some form of group rights’ (1990). He suggested a bicameral 
approach, ensuring minority involvement in the second chamber, adding that groups would 
not necessarily be based on race, rather interest groups (Delport, 1990). 
In 1992, Delport expressed his personal belief that the NP was ‘dealing with people who are 
not committed to negotiations, who are not committed to a peaceful settlement. They are only 
committed to grabbing all of the state power in this country’ (Delport, 1992). He added that 
he did not trust the ANC and that he saw ‘no sense in negotiating with them’ (1992). 
Delport defines negotiating as ‘give and take’ (1993), but was not confident in Roelf Meyer 
as a negotiator. He believed that Meyer should not have been lauded for the Peace Accord, 
and that the Accord ‘set the pattern’ for negotiations to come: ‘you take what they give you 
and you are happy with what you get’ (Delport, 1994). Delport advocated one solution: ‘to 
have a mix, have one of the councillors being elected by all the citizens and the other half by 
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the taxpayers. Because we are not going to end up with proper representation of those who 
have got to pay the bills’ (Delport, 1994). 
In November 1994 Delport said in an interview with Patti Waldmeir that ‘it will become 
obvious that we [the NP] have no power because we have what one would call majority party 
rule’ (Delport, 1994:2). He argues that the concept of consensus holds no ‘real legal value’. 
He continues to say that there ‘is no power-sharing’. In 1998, Delport said that ‘I was the first 
one to say we have co-option, not power sharing, we're co-opted into government and sit 
there like puppets with no real influence whatsoever. Well … influence but not power. It was 
protection of influence and influential position… power as a contribution, you're in a position 
to where power lies to make an input, input protection but not power sharing’ (Delport, 
1998). 
Delport speaks of the failure of the Government of National Unity, saying that the NP ‘had 
no real power, nothing, and Mr Mandela was increasingly isolating, ignoring F.W. de Klerk’. 
He continued by saying that NP was ‘in fact, and I don't think my colleagues will really admit 
it, but in the last round of negotiations now for the final constitution there was no 
compromise and there was a total unwillingness from the ANC's side to make compromises 
on the delicate issues’ (Delport, 1996). On the Property Clause, Delport says that the NP was 
‘sold out once again’. He said that the clause held no guarantee on keeping property (1996). 
Delport believed that there was ‘no way we [the NP] [were] going to change this constitution 
in my lifetime and we’ve got to work within these parameters now’ (1996). 
Delport’s strong opposition if the concept of consensus as well as his advocating of a mixed, 
numerically-based electoral system shows a way of thinking compatible with the 
Constitutional Contractarian thought. Delport is clearly unhappy with the resulting 
agreement, which in turn hampers the formation of a Social Contract. 
6.2.5. Colin Eglin 
Colin Eglin was a member of the Democratic Party (DP) (which would later form part of the 
Democratic Alliance) during the period of negotiations in South Africa, and played the role 
of negotiator during Codesa I, Codesa II, the role of chief negotiator of the DP at the MPNP, 
and he was a member of the Constitutional Assembly. His published memoirs Crossing the 
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Borders of Power: The Memoirs of Colin Eglin (2007) provide significant insight into his 
opinion regarding the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions.  
Colin Eglin became involved in talks seeking to find common ground with the ANC in 
October 1985. The purpose of these talks was not only to gain insight into each other’s 
positions, but also to ‘develop an understanding of each other’s point of view’ (Eglin, 
2007:211). After these exploratory talks, members of the then-PFP (Progressive Federal 
Party) noted the ANC’s apparent ‘passion for South Africa’ and that they ‘were certainly not 
agents of Moscow engaged in the “total onslaught”’ which had been the general view adopted 
by the then NP government (Eglin, 2007:211).  The willingness of Eglin, as part of the PFP at 
that point, to fundamentally redefine his opponents is a clear indicator of the starting point of 
an approach by Eglin consistent with those of someone who pursues the ideal of creating a 
Social Contract.  
However, in 1986, after the leader of the PFP Van Zyl Slabbert abruptly left politics, Eglin 
commented that the incumbent government was ‘stubborn and short-sighted’ (Eglin, 
2007:218). This shows that while Eglin was taking steps towards changing his perception of 
the ANC, he was still sure of the confrontational nature of the NP government, who would 
also act as an opponent during the coming negotiations. 
Eglin announced the DP’s belief that the barriers of apartheid should be broken down in order 
to build a new, non-racial democracy. He believed that this could only be done through 
mutual trust and cooperation (Eglin, 2007:263-264). He specifically notes that ‘it is not good 
enough for those who have [disseminated] apartheid to repeal their discriminatory laws. In 
the interest of peace and constructive politics they must undo the damage they have done to 
the fabric of our society’ (2007:264) Eglin knew that in order to achieve this, mechanisms 
would need to be created which would ‘redress undesirable imbalances in the ownership and 
occupation of land’ (Eglin, 2007: 264). At first glance, this reference to righting historical 
wrongs can be placed within the Benchmark Agreement framework, as Benchmark 
negotiators are particularly concerned with redressing past injustices.  However, as later 
indicators will show, Eglin was not seeking a Benchmark Agreement. 
In preparation for the multiparty negotiations the DP placed specific importance on getting to 
know the ANC – this allowed them to once more change their perceptions of the ‘enemy’ to 
that of a negotiating partner, going so far as to refer to the members of the ANC as 
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‘concerned fellow South Africans’ (Eglin, 2007:267). After a conference in Bermuda in April 
1990, Eglin had changed his perceptions of other groups favourably as well – specifically, 
Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development in the NP government, and Oscar 
Dhlomo, secretary-general of the IFP (Eglin, 2007:268). 
At Codesa Eglin was one of six people in a sub-committee which was tasked with drafting a 
Declaration of Intent. Taking part in this process caused Eglin to note that he ‘felt part of 
history in the making’ (2007:269). A shared ownership of the negotiations and its outcome is 
integral to the formation of a Social Contract. This Declaration of Intent would eventually 
play a role in changing the power relationship between the NP and the ANC as it stipulated 
regular elections, causing the NP to take note of the temporary nature of its dominance. 
According to Eglin, this changed the way in which the NP approached the negotiations: the 
NP grasped the fact that they may be a minority in the new dispensation (2007:270). 
Eglin mentions the concept of ‘sufficient consensus’ on which decision-making during 
Codesa and the MPNP was based. Eglin finds this as an ‘invaluable procedural tool’ during 
the negotiations as it allowed for the negotiations to go forward even when there was some 
element of disagreement (Eglin, 2007:269).  
On the interim constitution, Eglin said that had it been the final constitution, the DP would 
have rejected it as inadequate (Hansard, 1993: 14254). He said that the DP had accepted the 
interim constitution on the grounds that it paved the way toward democracy, but that they 
would fight for several changes in the final constitution (Hansard, 1993:14256). In an 
interview in 1993, Eglin said that the ‘concept of the government of national unity is clearly 
not going to be a permanent feature’ (Eglin, 1993).  Eglin also found the ‘shape of the regions 
in relation to the centre’ written in the interim constitution to be changeable, but that ‘for the 
rest the essential structures are there and will probably persist’ (1993). 
The DP put special focus on the Constitutional Principles as they knew that this would be an 
important feature when the final Constitution was drafted. Eglin finds that ‘the issue was 
resolved neither by firm debate nor by sloppy compromise, but by what I have termed “the 
chemistry of negotiation”. By the time the elected CA was required to comply with the 
constitutional principles drawn up by Codesa, the basic principles were to a large extent 
‘owned’ by all the political parties’ (2007:284). This feeling of collective ownership is 
congruent with Social Contractarian thinking, as for the Social Contract to form, all parties 
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need to feel some sense of ownership in the agreement. Upon reflection of the negotiations in 
Kempton Park, Eglin finds that a ‘mutual understanding’ was formed during the talks 
(2007:303). This is indicative of a Social Contract. 
The DP argued strongly against the definition of minorities as racial groups, but rather a 
group with which one could voluntarily associate. However, the DP was also against the 
simple majority rule that the ANC was advocating (Eglin, 2007:284). In an interview with 
Patti Waldmeir in 1994,  Eglin noted that while minorities weren’t mentioned numerically in 
the Interim Constitution, the ANC’s commitment to the GNU would force it to ‘dilute its kind 
of majority hegemony and so will the minorities also… be accommodated’ (Eglin, 
1994A:16). The DP proposed a mechanism built into the final constitution that would grant 
political minorities ‘access to power’ – this would come in the form of a Bill of Rights 
‘guaranteeing all citizens equality before the law, freedom from discrimination and freedom 
of association, speech and political mobilisation’ (Eglin, 2007:285). The proposal falls in line 
with the Social Contractarian thinking: institutions that reconcile majority rule with minority 
rights generally promote a Social Contract.  
Eglin takes specific note of an element of mistrust between F.W. de Klerk and Mandela 
(2007:271). Without a strong element of good faith, the formation of a Social Contract is 
unlikely. The collapse of Codesa prompted Eglin to tell De Klerk that the NP government had 
‘won’ on a number of issues thus far, noting that they had been ‘too keen on winning, too 
greedy for its own good’ (2007:289). This argument can be reconciled with the kind of 
approach that negotiators who favour a Constitutional Contract would have: the NP was 
seeking a win-lose Constitutional Contract while it should have been seeking a positive-sum 
Social Contract. Eglin maintained that working toward a win-win situation would be more 
constructive.  
The DP pushed for the Constitutional Assembly to make decisions on the grounds of 
consensus – a measure which is associated with the concept of a Social Contract – but that 
should this not be possible, a 70% majority would be required (Eglin, 2007:265). In 
Parliament in 1996, Eglin urged the Chairperson (at that time Cyril Ramaphosa) to ‘look at 
the spirit of trying to achieve consensus’ when adopting the final Constitution (Hansard, 
1996:17). Eglin notes that the ‘real’ negotiations were between the NP government and the 
ANC, labelling himself and the DP as a ‘small player’, and mentioning that in order for a 
proposal by such a small player as themselves to be successful, it would have to be in 
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conjunction with either the ANC or the NP government (2007:272). After the Record of 
Understanding was signed in September 1992, Eglin was very much aware of a series of 
bilateral meetings taking place between the ANC and the NP (2007:295). Although the ANC 
and the NP were the most notable and important players during the negotiations, Eglin felt 
that the process to draft the new constitution would have to be inclusive for it to be accepted 
by all South Africans (2007:296). The notion of an inclusive process is congruent with the 
concept of the Social Contract. 
An issue that Eglin was specifically concerned with, was a clause in the constitution that 
removed members of parliament from their seats should they leave the party in which they 
were originally elected to the position (2007:302). Eglin contended that this would place too 
much power in the hands of party leaders and leave no room for party member to express 
personal views on issues as this could potentially result in a loss of their livelihood. Eglin 
declared this to be ‘contrary to the spirit of the transitional constitution’ (2007:302).  
On the electoral system planned for the 1994 election, Eglin declared it to be an interim 
system: ‘the electoral system in its very simplistic single list is not going to survive, 
proportionality will survive but not in the particular form’ (Eglin, 1993). In 1994, Eglin 
continued by saying that ‘there's a common view that while you want proportionality to give 
you the overall fairness, you also need constituencies in order to make people directly 
accountable’ (Eglin, 1994). In 1996, Eglin spoke again of the adding of constituencies to the 
electoral system, as this would make members of parliament ‘directly accountable’ to their 
constituents (Hansard, 1996:251). Eglin continually expressed his concerns regarding the 
electoral system based on party lists as opposed to on the basis of constituencies. He found 
that this would not ensure effective proportional representation within government and make 
members ‘agents of their political parties rather than representatives of the people’ 
(2007:302). Eglin’s continued support of a more accommodative electoral system, 
specifically in favour of a constituency based system, is consistent with the arguments that 
buttress the case for a Social Contract. 
Eglin experienced the Constitutional Assembly to be an ‘agreed, structured process’ 
(2007:131). He uses the symbol of an, if not quite round, but oval table when referring to the 
talks during this phase, and notes the importance of the decision-making rule of a two-thirds 
majority (2007:313). Eglin found that there was ‘a great desire to reach consensus all along 
and that’s why smaller parties like the DP were able to play a part’ (1996). However, in the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
166 
 
last few weeks before the final date for the submission of the final constitution to the 
Constitutional Court, Eglin was of the opinion that the ‘reality of what was in truth a two-
sided negotiating table revealed itself when… Mandela and De Klerk met and decided how 
the issues would be dealt with’ (2007:302). Eglin voiced his concern that several issues that 
should have been discussed within the Constitutional Assembly had been decided bilaterally 
(2007:315). 
Nevertheless, when it came to voting for or against the new constitution, Eglin said that ‘for 
us to vote against a constitution that is the product of negotiation between all leaders of all 
sections of the South African people would be for us to turn our backs on the very thing the 
DP and its predecessors fought for.. [R]ather than concentrating on the negative features we 
should see the bigger picture and claim to have been part-owners of the historic constitution-
making process’ (2007:315). Eglin saw himself as a custodian of the constitution, tasked with 
making sure that the values written in the constitution be ‘entrenched and not eroded’ 
(2007:335). This is an indication that the meaning Eglin invested in the Constitution was that 
of a Social Contract. 
Upon adoption of the final Constitution, Eglin highlighted the significance and the 
importance of ‘a special committee of Parliament to keep the constitution under constant 
review… to ensure that it is adjusted in terms of the needs and requirements of the time’ 
(Hansard, 1996:251). Eglin also places specific importance on the first section of the 
constitution, saying that when in doubt, ‘we… can go right back to section 1 for the founding 
provisions of our constitution’ (Hansard, 1996:250). To argue for this type of ongoing 
revision is reconcilable with Social Contractarian thinking. 
On the issue of capitulation of either of the major parties (the ANC and the NP), Eglin is of 
the opinion that ‘history will show that the only real capitulation was the NP from apartheid. 
In historical terms that was the real capitulation, the rest is all a mechanistic kind of 
adjustment, there's no capitulation in that sense’ (1993).  
Congruent with the formation of the political culture essential to a Social Contract, Eglin 
notes the DP’s commitment to ‘enduring values are entrenched not only in the constitution, 
but also in the hearts and souls of the people of this country’ (Hansard, 1993:14257). Eglin is 
of the opinion that the 1996 Constitution guarantees a continuing multi-party democracy by 
ensuring regular elections and a place for minority parties in the legislature (1996). However, 
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Eglin believes that there is an ‘inadequate guarantee for property rights’ in the 1996 
Constitution (1996).  Eglin mentions another specific issue on which he feels that the 
‘intention of the Constitution has not been fulfilled’ (2007:360). He finds that the current 
electoral system (that of a party list system) does not promote the representative democracy 
originally envisioned, and calls for a revision of this system. He takes specific note that the 
party-list system is not entrenched in the constitution and that it should be revised in order to 
reflect the original intention of a representative government (Eglin, 2007:361). This means 
that the electoral system does not facilitate a process of mutual compromise and 
accommodation, which is definitive of a Social Contract. It is clear that Eglin was in favour 
of such a system. 
6.2.6. Tienie Groenewald 
As the former head of the Department of Military Intelligence, Tienie Groenewald formed 
part of the ‘Committee of Generals’ that took part at the Codesa and MPNP negotiations. For 
this purpose of this study, interviews with Groenewald by The Executive Intelligence Review 
(1993) and by Patti Waldmeir (1994) will be closely analysed. 
Groenewald believed that by 1989 the ANC had been defeated militarily. However, ‘the UDF 
was still operating strongly, the trade union movement was operating strongly, the youth in 
the schools were still very active’ (Groenewald, 1994:6). Militarily, the government could 
declare a victory against the ANC, but not politically, ‘because no political alternative was 
forthcoming, that was the big problem’ (Groenewald, 1994:6). 
In an interview with Patti Waldmeir in 1994, Groenewald stated the importance of a political 
solution as opposed to a military solution to the continuing South African conflict 
(Groenewald, 1994:3). Groenewald also mentions the problem that negotiators approach the 
negotiations with different backgrounds and with divergent constitutional thinking (1994:3). 
On the one side, American liberal thinking was influencing the negotiators. On the other side, 
the side of the ANC, the thinking was based on the socialist, centralist view, with a strong 
focus on centralised government, emanating from the Soviet Union (1994:4). He argues that 
the idea of European federalism was not put on the table at the Codesa negotiations. 
According to Groenewald, the negotiating platform consisted of three main political 
groupings: the NP and its supporters; the ANC/SACP/COSATU alliance and its supporters; 
and the COSAG (Concerned South Africans Group). Fourteen of the parties at the MPNP are 
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‘controlled’ by the NP and the ANC (Groenewald, 1993:29). Groenewald is of the opinion 
that the COSAG group is ‘more representative of the people of South Africa than either the 
ANC or the Nationalist Party’ (Groenewald, 1993:29). 
Groenewald was very concerned that the ANC would get joint control of South Africa, which 
would mean that it had joint control over the Defence Force. He argued that other parties did 
not have control of armies and as such the ‘the playing field becomes very, very uneven. It 
becomes such that the whole weight shifts toward the ANC. This is not what negotiations are 
all about’ (Groenwald, 1993:30). He continued by saying that the attitude of the ANC up 
until that point (April 1993), had been ‘either you do as we say or else we stop negotiating 
and we tum to violence, which is a classic communist technique (1993:31). 
Groenewald was adamant that before a ‘transitional executive council’ could be established, 
the form that the state was going to take should be discussed (1993:30). Groenewald was 
advocating a ‘constitution which will last us for scores of years, a constitution which will 
really be a final solution and not a temporary solution’, arguing that both the ANC and the 
NP were seeking a temporary solution (Groenewald, 1993:31). Groenewald reasoned that the 
interim constitution created problems for the ANC – arguing that what held the ANC together 
was apartheid, and as soon as apartheid went away, the ANC will start to fall apart (1994:15). 
Groenewald strongly believed that PW Botha had been the harbinger of change, as opposed 
to FW de Klerk. Groenewald said that ‘all FW did was he climbed on the back of PW and 
made a complete balls-up of it’ (Groenewald, 1994:5). Groenewald also speaks of his 
disappointment in Roelf Meyer and his negotiating team: ‘the first thing that shocked us was 
the fact that the Roelf team never kept one of their agreements with us, they sided with the 
ANC on every single issue’ (1994:22). 
Groenewald’s argument that the main decision-makers at the negotiations were not fully 
representative of South Africa is interpreted here as being hostile to the formation of a Social 
Contract. His reference to an ‘uneven playing field’ not being ‘what negotiations are all 
about’ is congruent with low-context negotiation. Groenewald voices his concern about the 
badgering nature of the ANC’s bargaining technique. Groenewald is in favour of a long-
lasting, permanent constitution, which is reconcilable with a Constitutional Contract. He does 
however state that FW de Klerk made a complete ‘balls-up’ of the negotiations, suggesting 
that he was not satisfied with the solution at that point. This means that a Social Contract 
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could not be formed, as one of the participants is not supportive of the solution or the 
negotiations leading up to the agreement. 
6.2.7. Tony Leon 
As a member of the Democratic Party (DP), Tony Leon became involved in the constitutional 
negotiations in 1991 at the start of Codesa I. At Codesa, Leon played the part of advisor in 
Working Group 2, which dealt with how South Africa would be governed in the new 
dispensation (Leon, 2008:203). In 1994, Tony Leon became leader of the DP. He continued 
to participate in negotiations until the adoption of the final Constitution in 1996 (Leon, 
1998:41). Tony Leon’s memoirs On the Contrary (2008) as well as a compilation of his 
speeches Hope & Fear: Reflections of a Democrat (1998) provide a significant base for the 
understanding of his views and beliefs. 
In August 1989, Leon made clear his own as well as the DP’s commitment to negotiations, to 
be commenced without delay. He sought a South Africa ‘at peace with itself and the world’ 
(1998:14). His party called for ‘equal rights, simple justice, economic growth, minority 
protections, [and] care for the elderly’ (1998:16). The DP sought a system which would be 
inclusive and democratic, with an entrenched Bill of Rights to protect basic rights (1998:16). 
This type of system, inclusive with a Bill of Rights, is in line with Social Contractarian 
thinking, if it promotes accommodative behaviour. 
After F.W. de Klerk’s 2 February 1990 speech, Leon reiterated the importance of accepting a 
Bill of Rights, which would be adjudicated by an independent court (Leon, 1998:9). He found 
that the implementation of such a Bill would ‘be a bridge over the troubled waters raging in 
our country – a bridge over the conflicting ambitions of absolute power’ (Leon, 1998: 9). To 
Leon, a Bill of Rights would represent the common ground between the parties in conflict. In 
this same statement in Parliament, Leon implored the government as well as other politicians 
to create a ‘culture of rights in a climate of liberty’ (1998:10). The idea of a ‘culture of rights’ 
is associated with the political culture favourable to the formation of a Social Contract. Leon 
saw liberalism as the common ground between the different schools of thought entering into 
negotiations (1998:71). He also advocated the ‘protection of minorities and accommodation 
of electoral losers’ within a democratic system, though he did not propose a workable model 
for achieving this (1998:72). 
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Leon refers to De Klerk’s decision to allow Codesa to draft an interim constitution and an 
elected Constitutional Assembly to write the final constitution as a ‘key concession’ 
(2008:202). On the issue of how the constitution would be ratified, the NP proposed a two-
thirds majority on all clauses, and a 75% majority for the Bill of Rights. They later conceded 
dramatically on this, settling on two-thirds majority on all clauses (Leon, 2008:207). After the 
signing of the Record of Understanding, De Klerk was a ‘much-reduced negotiator’, having 
conceded almost all of the NP’s ‘non-negotiable bottom lines’ (Leon, 2008:213). However, 
Leon also notes that towards the end of 1992, the ANC would also make ‘vital concessions’ 
(2008:214). Leon found that the fixing of an election date had a negative impact on 
negotiations (2008:232). However, Leon mentions that being ‘in the public gaze’ forced 
negotiators at Codesa to make progress (2008:216).  
In parliament in November 1993, Leon made clear his thoughts on the incumbent NP: 
according to him, the NP had ‘served its historic mission’, implying that the NP should be 
disbanded. (1998:25). The NP was set to be one of the biggest contributors to the final 
Constitution, which would mean that the DP would be negotiating with a party that they (the 
DP) did not believe should have a strong position in these deliberations. 
In 1993, Leon noted the importance of flexibility in a constitution: ‘constitutions which do 
not bend will in time surely break’ (1998:26). He also noted the importance of the Bill of 
Rights in the Interim Constitution, noting that it would ‘move South Africa to that culture of 
persuasion’ (1998:26). As argued in Chapter 3, more flexible agreements within a democratic 
culture promote the formation of a Social Contract. Leon did, however, find some fault in the 
Interim Constitution. Leon is not optimistic about the Property clause, claiming that it ‘does 
not provide a coherent right to property at all’ (Hansard, 1996:175). He specifically noted the 
Property Clause as being overly detailed, noting that case law would have provided for all the 
clauses added by the ANC and the NP (Leon, 1998:26 -27). Constitutional Contracts have the 
tendency to be very detailed, and Leon shows a clear aversion to this type of agreement. 
However, Leon refers to the 34 Constitutional Principles as ‘immutable’, which would make 
these Principles impossible to deviate from, which would be consistent with a Constitutional 
Contract (2008:305). 
In November 1993, the DP fought strongly against proposals by the ANC and the NP that 
‘will enable a new state president to effectively veto the nomination of any person proposed 
for a seat on the new Constitutional Court’ (Leon, 1998:43). The DP was deeply concerned 
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with this agreement between the ANC and the NP, referring to it as a ‘bilateral agreement’ 
(Leon, 1998:43). Leon continued to criticise the Technical Committee on only receiving 
proposals from the NP and the ANC, saying that should this truly be the case, the ‘multiparty’ 
negotiations were a ruse for bilateral negotiations between the two main parties (1998:46). 
Negotiations that are not inclusive generally do not produce the political culture associated 
with the formation of a Social Contract. 
Leon quotes Cyril Ramaphosa’s terse remark on the concept of ‘sufficient consensus which 
was implemented during the negotiations: ‘it means that if we, the NP and the ANC agree, 
everyone else can get stuffed’ (Ramaphosa, in Leon, 2008:203).Leon is sceptical of the 
continuing bilateralism during the negotiations for the final constitution. 
However, in December 1993, Leon backtracked to say that while it was ‘far from perfect’, the 
Interim Constitution (1998:47): 
…is the product of a process that which by its nature was imprecise, untidy and 
fractious. If one party, including my own, had been able to say ‘This is a 100% 
victory for us’ then the Constitution would have not been the product of 
compromise, but a treaty of a surrender by one or another party. In truth, the 
constitutional package which will govern our lives and country for, possibly, the 
next five years is an amalgam of several crucial factors: firstly, it is an accurate 
reflection of the balance of power and the constellation of political forces as they 
stand in November/December 1993 … therefore, this draft interim Constitution at 
least holds the promise that it will span the great divide between the old and the 
new South Africa. 
Leon clearly states that he believes that the Interim Constitution was a product of mutual 
compromise, which would be favourable to the eventual formation of a Social Contract. 
When referring to the Interim Constitution, Leon calls it a ‘triumph of freedom’ (1998:76). 
In April 1994, Leon was very critical of the NP’s performance during the preceding 
negotiations, referring to it as ‘dismal’ and ‘flaccid’ (1998:29). He specifically mentions 
some of the ‘bilateral deals’ made between the NP and the ANC as being overly favourable 
toward the ANC and falling far short of the NP’s goals (1998:29).  Leon felt it was very 
important for not only the NP and the ANC’s opinions to be reflected ‘n the new constitution, 
but also the opinions of the opposition (1998:31). 
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According to Leon (2008:305), the ANC’s dominance (at 62% of the vote) would be 
reflected in the final constitution. The final constitution would reflect the will of the ANC far 
more than in the Interim Constitution. However, the ANC had not achieved the required two-
thirds majority that would have allowed them to completely dominate the drafting of the final 
constitution, and the small margin left would be filled by the opposition (Leon, 2008:305). 
In his book, On the Contrary, Leon takes a quote from Time magazine (2008:235): 
In one of his typically nonconformist essays, Bertrand Russell once dissected the 
fallacy of regarding oppressed peoples as morally superior. The fact that they are 
tyrannised, the British philosopher observed, does not mean that they will perform 
wonders of nobility and high-mindedness once given their freedom. 
Leon also felt it was very important that the parties in the negotiations ‘shed our past 
identities as victims or vanquished, as blacks and as whites, and seek a common South 
Africanism’ (1998:220). Thinking in terms of victims and perpetrators is an indication of the 
approach related to the Benchmark Agreement, while attempting to search for common 
ground and a ‘common South Africanism’ suggests a Social Contractarian approach. 
Leon is specifically negative toward the use of race or gender quotas. He notes that South 
Africa should be built on ‘merit, not quotas’ (1998:78; 80). In 1995, Leon continued to 
openly reject any form of quotas. When Parliament announced that 80% of its posts ‘may 
only be filled by blacks’, Leon called it ‘reverse discrimination’ and added that while past 
imbalances needed to be addressed, a ‘crude system of racial quotas’ would not achieve this 
(1998:225; 231). Quotas are usually an indication of a Constitutional Contract, and Leon’s 
open criticism of this shows a rejection of the rigidity of a Constitutional Contract. 
In 1995, Leon stated that ‘we need rather to promote it [the Bill of Rights] as a central 
concept so that all sides – minorities and majorities – will relinquish their claims to absolute 
power and use the Bill of Rights as an instrument for achieving true reconciliation and 
justice’ (Leon, 1998:32). Leon stated the DP’s belief that the Constitution is supreme and ‘not 
just an instrument for party-political manipulation’ (1998:37). Leon sought ‘common visions 
for the future and a shared agenda as to how to achieve this’, which is an attitude that can be 
associated with the formation of a longer-lasting Social Contract (1998:82). 
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On the night before the vote on the final constitution was to take place, Ramaphosa conceded 
on an issue regarding state subsidies for independent/private schools, according to Leon, ‘in 
exchange’ for the DP’s vote in favour of the final constitution (2008:311). Leon however was 
not ‘enchanted’ with the final draft, as some of his colleagues in the DP were (2008:312). 
Leon mentions some concessions by the ANC, including ‘considerable protections for 
minorities at local government level, and… (strictly limited) independent powers for the 
newly created provinces’ (2008:220). While Leon was not completely satisfied with the final 
constitution, he notes that his party was ‘so fixated on signing a deal that a flawed inclusive 
new order was preferable to the discredited and exclusionary old one; even the negation of a 
key principle would not cancel our assent’ (2008: 224). 
In 1996, Leon spoke in Parliament on the adoption of the final Constitution. His findings 
were that it would institutionalise the rule of law, and that the DP’s contribution to the 
Constitution would aid in building a Democratic South Africa (1998:53). Leon believed that 
his party had made a significant contribution to the federalist elements within the constitution 
(1998:55). He found some aspects of the Constitution lacking, and was set to deliver these 
objections, with specific regard to the Bill of Rights, to the Constitutional Court when it was 
revising the final draft of the Constitution. The DP found that the Constitution as it stood 
would not meet the demands of a divided society (Leon, 1998:54).  
The DP was specifically displeased with the clause preventing members of parliament from 
crossing the floor ‘on matters of conscience and principle’, referring to it as ‘undemocratic’ 
(Leon, 1998:54). They argued against proportional representation and rather advocated direct 
constituencies; were in favour of ‘instruments for promoting democracy and accountability’ 
(including the Public Protector and the Human Rights Commission), but concerned that the 
mechanisms for appointment of these positions would ‘allow the majority party to appoint its 
own watchdogs’ (Leon, 1998:55). Leon advocated a constituency-based participative system 
of local government election instead of the simple party-list system used for national 
elections. He argued that democracy only works effectively when representatives are held 
personally accountable (Leon, 1998:259 and Hansard, 1996:438). This type of constituency-
based system would be conducive to a Social Contract. 
In line with a Social Contractarian view, Leon stated that ‘We [the DP] want South Africans 
to walk the road ahead with a common purpose, a common road map under a common flag’ 
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(1998:56). According to Leon, the ‘transformation to democracy’ would be ‘over’ once the 
final Constitution had been ratified (1998:231). He did however note that the final 
constitution was ‘not the end of the journey towards the new South Africa. It is an important 
milestone on a never-ending road’ (1998:56). Leon believed that building a unified country 
would entail an ongoing process of nation-building, but within the rule of law, where 
‘everyone is equal under that law’ (1998:210). 
Commonly associated with the strict amendment procedures of the Constitutional Contract 
framework, Leon speaks out on the amendment procedures of the constitution (1996): 
If you think that the constitution, and I do, provides a reasonable framework for 
multi-party democracy and for the advancement of fundamental human rights then 
you mustn't make that document capable of easy amendment. Now in the first draft 
it was ridiculously easy to amend the constitution, a simple two thirds majority in 
one chamber. That's now changed to the extent now you've got to have both 
chambers, on the Bill of Rights you've got to have a certain fixed percentage of the 
total number, there's got to be a whole process gone through. That is better than it 
was but if they were really serious about empowering not just minority parties but 
empowering individual dissent and minority viewpoints and protecting them, then 
they would have made that Bill of Rights almost impossible to amend or extremely 
difficult to amend. 
Leon refers to 1994 as ‘a new, bold and necessary chapter in the 350-year-old book of our 
nation and we have to account for the pages and the chapters – many of them soaked in 
blood, suffering and suspicion – which preceded them’ (1998:264). While this may be 
interpreted as in line with a Benchmark Agreement, Leon’s previous allusions to the Social 
Contract view are significant. Leon’s belief in ongoing participatory democracy as well as his 
criticism of quotas and bilateral negotiation indicates a preference for a Social Contract. 
Looking back at the period of transition, Leon declares that he is ‘humbled and privileged… 
to be part of a process rectifying that historical wrong [apartheid]’ (2008:4).  
6.2.8. Mac Maharaj 
Mac Maharaj played an important role on the side of the ANC during the negotiations 
process. He formed part of Ramaphosa’s team at the deliberations leading up to the Record of 
Understanding, and negotiated directly with Fanie van der Merwe of the NP during the 
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MPNP. Maharaj notes that while ‘they’ (the NP government) were ‘very very concerned 
when I came into the negotiations process’, they concluded that he was a man of integrity 
(Maharaj, 1994A). a series of interviews by Patti Waldmeir and Padraig O’Malley provide 
the basis for the assessment of Maharaj’s beliefs and opinions, with a follow up, in-depth 
interview by the author. 
Maharaj explains the act of negotiating as such: ‘Compromises and concessions are very 
interesting for selling a package… Good line, good persuasion, useful negotiating tactic.’ 
(1993). Maharaj states that negotiations between conflicting parties by nature ‘mean a give 
and take and a compromise’ (Maharaj, 2000A). Conversely, when O’Malley questions 
Maharaj on Patti Waldmeir’s approach to her book on the negotiations, Maharaj responds that 
‘Patti's concept is a winner/loser concept and it's a wrong way of approaching negotiations’ 
(Maharaj, 2000B). In 2014, Maharaj stated that ‘we started as opponents, and in the process 
we became partners in a process that took SA to democracy based on one-person-one-vote 
enshrined in the final Constitution adopted [by] the two houses of parliament sitting together 
as a Constitutional Assembly’ (Maharaj, 2014). Maharaj was very clear that the relationship 
between the parties involved was ‘not static’ (Maharaj, 2014). 
Referring to the Record of Understanding, Maharaj said that it was not a surrender or sign of 
defeat on either side. Rather it was ‘a reflection of the changed balance of forces internally 
and externally’ (Maharaj, 1997). According to Maharaj, the Record of Understanding 
reflected the reality: the NP was no longer a legitimate government and represented a 
minority. Maharaj refers specifically to the Record of Understanding of 26 September 1992 
as a point where the negotiations where ‘irreversible’ (2014). 
In 1994, Maharaj admitted that while he had realised that negotiations were inevitable, the 
ANC approach would have to be to ‘pursue a strategy that doesn’t say we are heading for 
negotiations. Build your strength so you can wage the struggle for any eventuality’ (Maharaj, 
1994B). Maharaj was not entirely committed to the negotiations, showing that he would like 
the ANC to maintain another source of power, perhaps in order to create leverage. However, 
in 2014 Maharaj said that from De Klerks’s February 1990 speech ‘the ANC committed itself 
to mounting all-round pressure to ensure that formal negotiations took place’ (Maharaj, 
2014).  
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In 1993, Maharaj claimed that the ANC used the argument of certain deals being hard to sell 
to their grassroots supporters as enhancing ‘the moral high ground’ (Maharaj, 1993). On the 
unilateral suspension of the armed struggle before the August 1990 negotiations which lead 
to the signing of the Pretoria Minute, Maharaj says that the ANC asked itself what it could do 
to gain the moral high ground in order to force the NP to ‘respond in kind’ (Maharaj, 2000B). 
This continued referral to the moral high ground as a bargaining chip is congruent with a 
Benchmark Agreement. 
In an interview with Patti Waldmeir in 1995, Maharaj admits that he was ‘very disgusted with 
FW [de Klerk] as a person’ (Maharaj, 1995A:1). Maharaj continued to note his negative 
feelings on De Klerk, likening his experience to that of Nelson Mandela’s losing confidence 
in De Klerk. According to Maharaj, De Klerk ‘likes to behave like he knows, he is going to 
tell us how to run government’ (Maharaj, 1995A:2). Maharaj found De Klerk he couldn’t 
relate to De Klerk, and referred to De Klerk as ‘pretty racist’ (1995A:2). Maharaj found 
Meyer to be a ‘difficult guy’, referring to him, as well as ‘their culture’, as ‘very officious’ 
(Maharaj, 1995A:14).  
Regarding the issue of trust, Maharaj is ambivalent. He notes that he ‘never approached FW 
[de Klerk] from the point of view do I trust him or don’t I. I accepted that he will try and slip 
something past us’ (Maharaj, 1999). He continues by saying that (Maharaj, 1999): 
…trust is not the issue for me. What is important is that you recognise that you are 
rivals sitting at a table, that you are seeking an outcome which will give you as a 
particular political force greater space to gain advantage from it but that you 
conduct yourself in such a way that no matter how much heat is generated at the 
moment you are constantly keeping your eye on the ball, that you are not engaged 
in negotiations simply to bring it to an end so that you can revert to the earlier 
status quo. 
Maharaj’s continued negativity towards De Klerk as well as Meyer would make the 
formation of a Social Contract almost impossible. Maharaj does not believe that trust is 
necessary for negotiations, and as such is a value position that is not compatible with the 
political culture needed to nurture a Social Contract. 
On the draft constitutional proposals of 1993, Maharaj felt that a win-win situation had been 
created, but that the IFP was curbing the final agreement by refusing ‘to accept a situation 
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where all can emerge as winners’ (Maharaj, 1993). However, on the Interim Constitution, 
Maharaj found that the ‘other side’ (the NP) held ‘third power in hoping to co-opt us… we 
must understand the sunset clauses and the negotiating process’ (1995A:4). Maharaj was 
hoping to manipulate the power relationship so that the ANC ‘will be in the position to say 
now we have created the condition where we can co-opt them for our needs’ (Maharaj, 
1995A:4). This shows an inclination toward thinking about the negotiations process as a more 
fluid and changeable agreement in the form of a Benchmark Agreement. Maharaj was hoping 
to change the power relationship in such a way that the ANC held the stronger position and 
could impose its will unilaterally. 
On the issue of the Sunset Clauses and creating a vice presidential post for FW de Klerk, 
Maharaj said that the ANC waited to deliver this idea until they knew that both the ANC and 
De Klerk’s personal interests could be accommodated (Maharaj, 1995A:13). By April 1995, 
Maharaj found that the ‘transition was moving smoothly’ and that they had ‘it on track’ 
(1995B). Maharaj considered the right wing to be under control, and on the issue of the 
economy, he noted that the ANC was ready to commit to an agreement ‘that all of us can 
agree with’ (Maharaj, 1995B). 
The issue of amnesty had proved a contentious area in the negotiations. The wording finally 
settle on was that there ‘shall be amnesty’, which according to Maharaj meant ‘not that there 
may be amnesty, but that there shall, a mandatory form’ (1998). Maharaj refers to the issue of 
amnesty being settled by means of a trade-off for the decision-making procedures in the 
cabinet: ‘that meeting did not even spend five minutes after we settled the post-amble 
[concerning amnesty] on a discussion which is what agendas on the cabinet decision making’ 
(Maharaj, 1998). Trade-offs are usually found in a Constitutional Contract. 
While recognising that the NP would continue to push for permanent power-sharing, Maharaj 
was certain that an elected Constituent Assembly would not permanently entrench power-
sharing (1993). In the period of five years in which the Government of National Unity would 
rule, ‘the arrangements must be such that there cannot be a denial of majority rule. They must 
be such that they lead the country towards majority rule, an acceptance of majority rule’ 
(Maharaj, 1993). However, in 2014, Maharaj said that he ‘would assert that both in the period 
of the GNU and up to the present, it is seldom that cabinet decisions are arrived at through a 
formal vote’ (Maharaj, 2014). Maharaj is adamant that while the ANC was elected ‘by 
overwhelming majority’, they continued to seek a ‘spirit of consensus’ (Maharaj, 2014). 
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On the settlement itself, Maharaj believes that it ‘favoured all parties in the sense that it 
created the conditions where all parties could take advantage of it and benefit from it’ (1997). 
He stated that the NP failed to make use of this opportunity by continually trying to weaken 
the ANC, while Mandela negotiated to become ‘better and stronger’ (1997). 
Referring to the term ‘consensus-seeking spirit’, Maharaj (2014) states that it meant that 
members of the coalition, specifically the ANC, the IFP and the NP, would be involved in 
‘considerable discussions’ and agreements would reflect ‘compromises that each of the 
coalition partners could live with.’ Maharaj does however mention that the ‘requirement of 
consensus-seeking does not feature in any of these [34 Constitutional] principles’ (2014). 
Maharaj felt that throughout the negotiations, the NP had tried to ‘co-opt’ the ANC, but that 
the ANC had anticipated this strategy and had avoided it. He said that ‘we [the ANC] only 
carry out that negotiation with that perspective with the view that once April takes place 
there’ll be a changed relationship where our objective would be to co-opt them because we 
now sit in that framework’ (Maharaj, 1995B). Maharaj was very clear that by 1999, the 
constitution would not include ‘enforced coalition’ (1995B). Maharaj also says that ‘views 
are not immutable, the Constitution is not mechanical. It will change. That’s the nature of the 
convention of ideas’ (2014). Maharaj continues to mention the changing power relationship 
and the ability of co-opting one’s opponent once that relationship has changed. This type of 
thinking is associated with a Benchmark Agreement. 
6.2.9. Nelson Mandela 
As a prominent leader within the ANC, Nelson Mandela played an integral role in the secret 
meetings leading up to the negotiations in the early 1990s. He was elected president of the 
ANC in July 1991, having been interim leader since his release from prison.  He remained 
president of the ANC throughout negotiations, and became President of South Africa in the 
1994 election. While not officially labelled as negotiator during the negotiations, Mandela 
was tasked with breaking deadlocks with NP/government leader F.W. de Klerk as well as 
leading the ANC’s decision-making during the process. From his memoirs Long Walk to 
Freedom (1994) as well as a compilation of previously unpublished works, Conversations 
with Myself (2010), insight into Mandela’s beliefs and opinions during the negotiations may 
be gained. 
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In a letter to F.W. de Klerk in December 1989, Mandela made clear his resolution that talks 
were the only way forward for South Africa. Mandela explained that the ANC’s willingness 
to enter into negotiations would serve as the ‘honest commitment to peace’ that the 
government had requested, refusing to suspend the ANC’s armed struggle (1994:543). 
Mandela continued to say the he was in full support of the ANC’s Harare Declaration, which 
‘put the onus on the government to eliminate obstacles to negotiations that the state itself 
created… [including] the release of political prisoners, the lifting of all bans on restricted 
organizations and persons, the ending of the State of Emergency and the removal of all troops 
from the townships’ (1994:544). Mandela also noted that without a commitment to a 
ceasefire from both sides, no talks could take place. 
In a meeting with De Klerk in December 1993, Mandela rejected outright the 
NP/government’s proposal of group rights. Mandela saw this as a way to preserve ‘white 
domination’ and told De Klerk that is was ‘unacceptable’ (1994:544). However, after this 
meeting, Mandela found that De Klerk was ‘a man we could do business with’ (1994:545). 
For a Social Contract to form, opposing parties need to revaluate their perceptions of each 
other. Here, Mandela was learning that he could work with the enemy.  
Mandela knew that there was a ‘middle ground between white fears and black hopes’, 
opening the way for negotiations (1994:559). All pre-negotiations (including those held in 
secret) had led Mandela, and with him, the ANC, to believe that a contract zone existed. 
Without both parties realising the existence of a contract zone, no negotiations could take 
place. However, Mandela found that just the fact that negotiations were going ahead was a 
victory for the ANC, because it meant that the government could not sustain apartheid any 
longer, and a show of the government’s weakness, and it signified what the ANC had been 
fighting for (1994:583). In an interview with Patti Waldmeir Mandela said that the struggle of 
the ANC was ‘to normalise the country’s political and economic situation. These negotiations 
are a milestone in it.’ (Mandela, 1992:1). 
According to Mandela, the ANC’s mission, as well as his own goal was a ‘non-racial, united 
and democratic South Africa based on one-person, one-vote on a common voters’ roll’ 
(1994:560). In Mandela’s view, De Klerk’s goal was a power-sharing system based on group 
rights. For the ANC, this would mean continued minority power in South Africa: exactly 
what they had been fighting against. De Klerk was strongly opposed to winner-takes-all 
majoritarianism, calling for proportional representation. He continued to seek some form of 
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minority veto. Mandela was strongly opposed to this in any form. He referred to is as 
‘apartheid in disguise, a ‘loser-takes-all’ system’ (1994:569).  
Arguing for the suspension of the armed struggle in 1991, Mandela stated that it ‘was 
necessary to show our good faith’ (1994:578). In an interview with Hermann Giliomee in 
1992, Mandela said that the greatest concession that the ANC had made at that point was the 
suspension of the armed struggle (Mandela, 1992:7). He reiterated the ANC’s commitment to 
peace, ‘because we had no other alternatives’ (1992:4). By May 1991, the relationship 
between the opposing parties was changing. Mandela quotes Thabo Mbeki as saying that 
‘each side had discovered that the other did not have horns’ (1994:570). A fundamental 
redefinition of opponents was taking place. The meetings between the parties ‘represented… 
an end to the master/servant relationship that characterised black and white relations in South 
Africa. We had the meeting not as supplicants or petitioners, but as fellow South Africans 
who merited an equal place at the table’ (Mandela, 1994: 570). Entering negotiations on 
equal standing is a low-context negotiation indicator, placing this type of thinking into either 
the Constitutional Contractarian or Social Contractarian conceptual frameworks.  
The ANC campaigned fiercely for an elected constituent assembly to draft the new 
constitution (Mandela, 1994:570). The agreement reached on the first day of Codesa was the 
‘minimum acceptable constitutional threshold for the new South Africa’, including a Bill of 
Rights, a multi-party democracy, and the supremacy of the constitution. The constitution 
would be safeguarded by an independent judiciary (Mandela, 1994:587). However, after a 
scathing closing speech made by F.W. de Klerk and a contemptuous retort by Mandela, 
Mandela felt that ‘much trust had been lost’ (1994:589). Without trust and good faith from 
both sides, the evolution of a Social Contract would be unlikely. 
After the referendum held by the NP/government in 1992, Mandela found that the 
NP/government ‘toughened their negotiating positions’, emboldened by the support that the 
referendum had received (1994:590). Mandela did not believe that this was a smart move by 
the NP/government. Mandela attributed the breakdown of Codesa II to the NP/government’s 
‘insistence on an unacceptably high percentage of votes in the assembly to approve the 
constitution (essentially a back-door veto); entrenched regional powers that would be binding 
on a future constitution; an undemocratic and unelected senate that had veto power over 
legislation from the main chamber; and a determination to make an interim constitution 
negotiated by the convention into a permanent constitution’ (1994:595). 
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In a draft letter to F.W. de Klerk in 1992, Mandela wrote that he found contradictions in De 
Klerk’s behaviour, specifically regarding his lack of action to curb the ongoing violence, 
which undermined his perception that they were both acting in good faith (Mandela, 
2010:334). After the terrible surge of violence at Bisho, both sides tried to rebuild good faith 
within the negotiations (Mandela, 1994:597). 
The ANC continued to oppose the idea of power-sharing. When Joe Slovo proposed a 
Government of National Unity that would expire after five years, after which the ANC would 
attain its goal of simple majority-rule government, the ANC considered a shift in their 
position (Mandela, 1994:598). The cabinet in the GNU would make decision by consensus 
and not as suggested by the NP/government, by a two-thirds majority.  
According to Mandela’s view, the NP/government ‘gave way on our insistence on a single 
ballot paper of the election’ (1994:603). In the sequel to his autobiography, which was partly 
published in the book Conversations with Myself (2010), Mandela notes the ‘core principle of 
the Freedom Charter which declares that South Africa belongs to all its people, black and 
white’ (2010:357). He also notes the rule of law, noting that no one, including the President, 
is above the law in South Africa (2010:357). 
After accepting the Nobel Peace Prize together with F.W. de Klerk in 1993, Mandela praised 
De Klerk for having ‘the foresight to understand and accept that all the people of South 
Africa must, through negotiations and as equal participants in the process, together determine 
what they want to make of their future’ (Mandela, 1994:604). Mandela also notes in his 
autobiography that ‘[t]o make peace with the enemy, one must work with that enemy, and 
that enemy becomes your partner’ (1994:604).  
The ANC won a 62.5% majority in the 1994 election. Some within the ANC were not 
satisfied with the result as it missed the crucial two-thirds majority it had needed to write the 
constitution without input from other parties. Mandela, however, was ‘relieved’, knowing 
that without the input of other parties, ‘people would argue that we had created an ANC 
constitution, not a South African constitution’ (1994:611). Mandela is clearly not in favour of 
unilaterally writing the constitution, instead advocating a shared ownership of the 
constitution. In 1992, he stated that the African and Afrikaner nationalism were ‘going to 
become combined and solve the problems of the country’ (1992:3). Redefining one’s 
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opponent and creating a shared ownership of the agreement is associated with the political 
culture conducive to the formation of a Social Contract. 
6.2.10. Thabo Mbeki 
Thabo Mbeki, who would later become president of South Africa, played a vital role in the 
secret meetings leading up to the substantial negotiations in the early 1990s. Mbeki was 
present at the Groote Schuur Minute, and started out as leader of the ANC’s negotiating team. 
He was later replaced by Cyril Ramaphosa. At Codesa I and Codesa II, Mbeki lead the 
ANC’s team in Working Group 3, and he was part of Ramaphosa’s team at the MPNP. The 
assessment of Mbeki’s views relies primarily on two interviews conducted by Patti Waldmeir 
(1995A; 1995B) as well as a book of his speeches (Corrigan, 1999). 
Mbeki specifically mentions what the NP has ‘lost’ and what they have ‘gained’. According 
to him, the NP has not lost ‘whatever prosperity they had, they haven’t lost language and a 
whole manner of things’, nor has the transition had a ‘negative material impact on them’ 
(Mbeki, 1995A:3). What the NP has gained, according to Mbeki, is ‘a rediscovery of South 
Africaness – they are proud to be South African’ (Mbeki, 1995A:3). He also finds the new 
political arrangements to be beneficial to the NP, adding that having a deputy president and 
several cabinet ministers meant that the NP was ‘very much part of the process of governing 
the country… So I think in reality in terms of the trappings of power they think they have got 
a fair share and they probably have’ (Mbeki, 1995A:3). Mbeki does not believe that anyone 
on the side of the NP could have ‘produced a result that was any different’ (Mbeki, 1995A:8). 
Arguing in terms of wins and losses falls in line with a Constitutional Contract. 
In a book of speeches and quotes by Thabo Mbeki, Mbeki: His Time Has Come, compiled by 
Corrigan (1999), some insight into Mbeki’s opinion on the 1993 and 1996 constitutions can 
be identified. More specifically, at a business conference in London in September 1990, 
Mbeki defined what the ANC meant by majority: ‘When we speak of a majority, we refer to a 
political majority and not one that is defined in racial or ethnic terms. At no stage have we 
ever spoken of black majority rule’ (Mbeki, 1990, in Corrigan, 1999:23). 
In 1995, Mbeki assured the media that the ANC was not drafting an ‘ANC constitution’, but 
rather a constitution that could be supported by all South Africans (Mbeki, 1995, in Corrigan, 
1999:23). That same year in a speech made in Vienna, Mbeki stated that ‘nobody would lose 
and everybody would gain from sharing a common nationhood’ (Mbeki, 1995, in Corrigan, 
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1999:33). At the same conference, Mbeki spoke of the development of a national consensus 
on ‘the basic constitutional and political requirements which would assure everybody that 
they are assured of equal and inalienable rights in a free and prosperous society’ (Mbeki, 
1990, in Corrigan, 1999:23). 
Mbeki is of the opinion that over the years that it took from negotiations to the elections, 
‘some kind of consensus about some things’ was forming among the participants (Mbeki, 
1995B). Mbeki believed that all the parties involved had one purpose: ‘to get rid of apartheid 
and the consequences of apartheid’ (Mbeki, 1995B). Because of this, Mbeki held that a ‘more 
classical opposition’ party would only emerge in time.  
Mbeki is convinced that all parties had to make compromises to achieve the outcome, and the 
no party will be ‘happy with all its provisions’ (Hansard, 1996:91). He mentions specifically 
the Property Clause as a provision that the ANC was unhappy with, but had complied with in 
the spirit of ‘give-and-take’ (Hansard, 1996:91). In the same speech in the Constitutional 
Assembly in 1996, Mbeki identified the final Constitution as ‘another peg in the negotiated 
transition process begun in 1990, but we have not yet completed that process’ (Hansard, 
1996:90). This type of argument is usually found in negotiators congruent with a Benchmark 
Agreement. 
In 1998, Mbeki stated that the ANC-run government believed that ‘any changes to the 
constitution must reflect a broad consensus. It must also involve not only the other parties in 
Parliament, but also the citizens of the country, who have already played such an important 
role in drawing up the constitution’ (Mbeki, 1998, in Corrigan, 1998:24). This focus on a 
consensus among participants is reconcilable with Social Contractarian thinking. However, 
Mbeki is later quoted as saying that ‘the negotiations for an interim constitution were 
“contrived elements of a transition” necessary to end white domination. At no time did the 
ANC consider them “as elements of permanence”’ (Giliomee, 2012:361). Mbeki felt that the 
constitution ‘is meant to overhaul and redress socio-economic distortions and imbalances 
which are so deeply embedded in the fabric of society… the task of maintaining and 
defending the unity and the integrity of the state should be done with appreciation and 
sensitivity to the rich diversity of our demography, ethnicity, language, culture and 
environment’ (Mbeki, 1995, in Corrigan, 1999:23). This type of thinking is usually exhibited 
when seeking an agreement akin to a Benchmark Agreement. Mbeki’s opinion shows 
indications of all three categories. 
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6.2.11. Roelf Meyer 
Roelf Meyer replaced Gerrit Viljoen as chief negotiator on the side of the NP/government in 
May 1992. Meyer was Minister of Constitutional Affairs in De Klerk’s cabinet and chairman 
of the cabinet sub-committee on negotiations, and chief negotiator. Meyer would continue to 
be chief negotiator throughout the MPNP. Several interviews with Meyer conducted by 
Padraig O’Malley as well as some interviews by Patti Waldmeir and the author provide the 
basis for the assessment of Meyer’s opinions and beliefs regarding the 1993 and 1996 
Constitutions. 
Meyer talks specifically about the period between May and September 1992 during the 
negotiations as bringing about ‘credibility’ and a feeling of mutual trust between the ANC 
and the NP. Meyer beliefs that the NP and the ANC ‘started as opponents, even enemies. We 
were part of parties lined up against each other. Later, we started to understand and respect 
each other and this lead to trust. There was not trust at the beginning, but at the same time we 
took an interest in one another’ (Meyer, 2014). He believed that the ANC wasn’t certain that 
the NP was serious about a democratic outcome and holding on to minority rights (Meyer, 
1994A). Meyer refers to the NP’s strong approach after the emboldening effect of the 
referendum in March 1992 as being a mistake in the building of trust, believing that they 
could put more pressure on the other side. Meyer is adamant that without the trust-building of 
the May-September 1992 period, neither the Government of National Unity nor the elections 
would have been successfully brought about.  
During the negotiations it was decided that the interim constitution would be changed after 
the elections. In June 1992, it was decided that a new and final constitution could only be 
ratified by a two-thirds majority (Meyer, 1994A). Meyer saw this as a ‘continuous process of 
constitution-making’. Meyer identifies this as well as the formulation of the power-sharing in 
the executive as concessions made by the NP (1993). Meyer’s view on the outcome is that ‘it 
worked out in the end better than I even hoped for throughout the period of four years’ 
(1994A). Meyer refers back to the unilateral decision of the setting of a fixed timeframe and 
keeping to that timeframe as integral to the process (1994A). 
Meyer is convinced that (Meyer, 1994B:9): 
…the solution that we arrived at on the one side, we gained more than we expected, 
and on the other side we probably lost more than we expected, and in that sense not 
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probably for FW [De Klerk] only, but for others too. The way in which the power-
sharing model was to some extent reduced was not what they intended originally. 
But on the other side, I must say that the approach that we have outlined at that 
stage, ’91 and even still during the first part of ’92, was not a workable model, it 
was not even something that could work, could produce a result. I mean, even 
looking back at the situation now where we are today, it would have been a disaster 
to have that kind of rotating presidency as the executive model… I think it was at no 
stage a realistic model. 
Meyer mentions the relationship between Mandela and De Klerk as being strained from 
Codesa I until after the election, noting that Mandela had lost trust in De Klerk. Meyer 
believes that this lack of trust was detrimental to the process (Meyer, 1994B:13). When asked 
about his working relationship with Cyril Ramaphosa, Meyer notes their difference in 
negotiating styles but recognition on each side that the other person ‘means best for the 
country’ (Meyer, 1994B:14). He refers back to the NP’s negotiations in Working Group 2 as 
not being ‘in the best spirit of negotiations’ as they took different positions on the issues 
‘from almost day to day’ (1994B:14). 
In a public lecture given by Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa on the 28
th
 of June, 1996, in 
Belfast, Ireland (transcribed by Padraig O’Malley), Meyer talked about letting go of 
prejudices, noting specifically F.W. de Klerk’s willingness to surrender power. He stated that 
the NP ‘always thought that we could tell the other side what to do, because we were in 
government. It was only when we realised that was not the way to resolve things that things 
started to moved forward’ (O’Malley, 1996:18). In an interview with Patti Waldmeir, Meyer 
mentions the fact that the NP had to ‘fight against the historic background’ (1995A:10). He 
knew that ‘ there was only one way to find a negotiated solution and that is to bring a balance 
on how to share power in the country, for us to give up and for them to take’ (Meyer, 
1995A:11).This notion of changing perceptions and a fundamental redefinition of the conflict 
is associated with the Social Contractarian thinking. Meyer also praised the fact that Mandela 
did not hold on to the grudge of apartheid, or continually refer back to the atrocities 
committed during this time (1996:18). Meyers argued that by being prepared to ‘let bygones 
be bygones’, the process continued to move forward constructively (O’Malley, 1996:19). 
Meyer explicitly states the importance of the NP’s reassessment of the problem in South 
Africa: ‘…it was only when we decided that we were facing a political problem [as opposed 
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to a security problem] that we were forced to the conclusion that we had to look for a political 
solution to the problem. Which meant we had to sit down and find the negotiated political 
answer’ (O’Malley, 1996:20). The realisation that negotiation is the only viable option 
creates a situation conducive to the formation of a Social Contract, as parties refrain from 
enegaing in other activities in order to advance their ideals and show commitment to 
negotiations, which provides a basis for mutual trust. Realising that the problem could not be 
resolved by the NP government alone, and that other parties, more specifically the ANC, 
would have to be involved, created a platform from which a Social Contract could be formed. 
To Meyer, it was also important that negotiators attempt to form an understanding of each 
other’s positions (1996:20). This is also reconcilable with the Social Contract. 
Meyer believes that it would not ‘be good for the country for one party to have that much 
power’ (should the ANC win the 1994 elections with a two-thirds majority) (1994C). 
However, Meyer was of the opinion that the ANC would not ‘be so concerned about writing 
their own constitution because they are basically happy with the existing constitution. This 
constitution will remain’ (Meyer, 1994C).  
Meyer was optimistic that the ANC would concede on a continuing model of power-sharing 
after the initial period of five years, noting that the ‘transition’ will not be over within that 
timeframe (Meyer, 1995B). While the exact composition of the power-sharing arrangement 
may change, Meyer believed that ‘for the sake of further stability, the concept of … the 
Government of National Unity should be extended for a further period at least’ (Meyer, 
1995B). Meyer realised that for there to be ‘non-racial cooperation’ in the country, some type 
of ‘mechanism’ would have to be entrenched (1995C). He suggested the continuation of the 
Government of National Unity, or something based on the model. Meyer believed that 
without such a mechanism, there would be a ‘polarisation between black and white’ (1995C). 
This type of mechanism is congruent with one of the conceptual properties of a Social 
Contract. According to Meyer, proportional representation can be used in order to ‘allow 
political parties to act as vehicles for minorities’ (Meyer, 1990). In the Constitutional 
Assembly in 1996, Meyer noted his belief that ‘constitution-making never stops’ and that the 
Constitution should hold a mechanism which facilitated this, ensuring that the Constitution 
remain ‘a dynamic document’ (Hansard, 1996:155). 
By the end of 1995, Meyer was convinced of the ‘spirit’ prevailing in the Constitutional 
Assembly: ‘I think amongst the other parties the spirit that prevails is that we would like to 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
187 
 
find general consensus on the new constitution. In other words that there would not even be, 
look for a vote, but rather overall general consensus’ (Meyer, 1995C). The continuing ‘spirit 
of consensus’ is indicative of the political culture that typifies a Social Contract. Meyer finds 
that the respect for individual rights is the ‘core of the spirit of the Constitution… This was 
the key n ensuring that no one is superior to the other’ (Meyer, 2014). Meyer also spoke of 
the need for ‘collaborative decision-making’ as forming part of the spirit of the agreement. 
This type of decision-making is indicative of Social Contractarian thinking. 
After the adoption of the final Constitution in 1996, Meyer reiterated the negotiations’ focus 
on consensus: ‘I think it remains one of the smaller miracles of the whole process right from 
the start up to the very last moment on 8th May that the intention remained amongst the 
ANC, National Party and most of the other parties too to arrive at a constitution that could be 
adopted through consensus’ (Meyer, 1996A). He believed that the search for consensus was 
the driving force not only at Codesa and the MPNP, but also in the Constitutional Assembly. 
Meyer is adamant that the ANC ‘fought hard to get a constitution through consensus’ 
(1996A). 
Meyer highlights the fact that opposing sides had differing expected outcomes, but one point 
on which there was clear agreement was the ‘paradigm of equality, the equal status of 
individual rights’ (Meyer, 2014). Meyer refers specifically to the Bill of Rights as espousing 
this, and that with the Bill of Rights ‘we overcame the paradigms of the past’ (Meyer, 2014). 
Regarding the Property clause, Meyer stated that it was ‘a give and take situation right up to 
the very end and the ANC I think in some respects gave quite a lot at the end’ (Meyer, 
1996A). The Education clause ‘was also a question of give and take, but there on both sides’ 
(Meyer, 1996A). This type of give and take argument is usually indicative of Constitutional 
Contractarian thinking. Just before the vote on the 1996 Constitution, Meyer tasked NP 
adviser Rassie Malherbe with drawing up a list of the items that the NP had lost/won during 
the negotiations (also mentioned in Chapter 4). Meyer states that there was a need for an 
‘objective’ look at the negotiations up until that point (Meyer, 2014). This type of ‘balance 
sheet’ gives insight into the mind-set of the NP members at the time, which is congruent with 
Constitutional Contractarian thinking. 
On the issue of the electoral system, Meyer notes that the system was built on the basis of 
compromise: ‘It was thought at the time that the proportional list system would help ensure 
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that smaller parties are not overrun by bigger parties, and that a system of constituencies 
would be overrun by one party’ (Meyer, 2014). He does however concede that South 
Africans need to reflect on whether this was a true assessment, advocating the start of a new 
debate on the electoral system. He is in favour of a more ‘practical system, like the German 
system which is a mix of proportional list and constituencies’ (Meyer, 2014). Meyer also very 
clearly states that changing the electoral system ‘won’t affect the agreement’ (Meyer, 2014). 
Meyer mentions the NP’s gains and losses in a typically Constitutional Contractarian 
statement in the Constitutional Assembly in 1996 (Hansard, 1996:194): 
If one looks at the overall perspective –and various speakers on the side of the NP 
have, of course, indicated our positions on various chapters of this constitution and 
stated where we were either totally happy with the contents, satisfied with the 
compromise reached or unhappy with the end result – and if one puts all those in a 
basket and weighs them in terms of a profit and loss account or a balance sheet, so 
to speak, then I think one can say that the overall impression is that we have 
effectively achieved the goals that we have set for ourselves in terms of this process. 
Meyer concedes that had the NP written the constitution, there are elements that would differ. 
However, he is of the opinion that (Meyer, 1996B): 
…the constitution to a great extent remains a compromise on some critical issues, 
on matters of principle in some cases but that is not the point. I think we have a 
product that we can be proud of. It's almost an idealistic constitution in the sense 
that it sets a set of ideals to which we can aspire and hopefully implement over the 
time to come as far as society in general is concerned. 
Meyer reports that he ‘felt good’ about the Constitution: ‘I personally felt very strongly about 
this constitution. Three quarters of my life went into it over the last six years and I feel 
personally so emotionally committed and involved in it that I almost can say it's my 
constitution’ (Meyer, 1996A). Meyer identifies three key factors to the success of the 
negotiations: (1) trust; (2) the inclusive nature of the process; and (3) taking ownership of the 
process by not allowing the interference of a third party (Meyer, 2014). Meyer places an 
overwhelming importance on the element of trust and trust-building, which places his 
statements within the Social Contract framework.   
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When reflecting on the final result, Meyer considered that his ‘ego was probably satisfied 
with the result I could show at the end of the day, if that was important but my approach was 
rather to look at the score board, not how I could personally behave but what I could achieve 
and to go back to my principle and say well, there it is’ (Meyer, 1995A:12). This argument in 
terms of a ‘scoreboard’ is congruent with one of the indicators associated with the 
Constitutional Contract.  
As to whether the agreement has or will change, Meyer stated that ‘as time goes on, 
generations will find ways to improve and change the Constitution. The Constitution can be 
amended with majority support; there must be an overall desire for the change, that’s why 
there are in built majorities for changing the Constitution.’ Meyer’s focus on an 
accommodating mechanism as well as trust and consensus is also reconcilable with the Social 
Contract. According to Meyer, ‘until today there have been no breaches of this contract. The 
Constitution is one point of reference South Africans can still agree on’ (Meyer, 2014).  
 
6.2.12. Valli Moosa 
Valli Moosa was involved with the United Democratic Front and formed part of the ANC’s 
negotiating team at the MPNP. Moosa served as ‘co-convenor’ in Working Group 2 at 
Codesa (Moosa, 1992). Moosa talks about the challenges faced within the ANC during the 
negotiations. The ANC faced the dilemma of ‘determining what was within the realm of 
possibility and at the same time keeping with the overall objectives of the liberation 
movement and fighting for that inside the ANC itself’ (Moosa, 1994A). Interviews with 
Moosa by Patti Waldmeir as well as Padraig O’Malley from 1991 to 1998 give insight into 
his values and opinions for the purpose of this study. 
In 1991, Moosa stated that the ANC leadership had ‘lost confidence in De Klerk’ (Moosa, 
1991). To him, trust was not an essential component of negotiations: ‘negotiations take place 
between adversaries otherwise there is no point in negotiating… We have never trusted them 
and I don’t think we are ever going to trust them, but that does not mean negotiations cannot 
take place’ (Moosa, 1991). He continued by saying that the ANC had to ‘mobilise the 
strength we have to bring them to the point where they would have no choice but to adhere to 
agreements arrived at.’ Changing the political playing field so that agreements happen in the 
party’s favour is an indicator associated with the Benchmark Agreement. 
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On the NP/government negotiators, Moosa says that he ‘didn’t think they were smart’ and 
that he ‘wasn’t impressed by them’ (1992). Moosa is adamant that the NP were not 
negotiating ‘for altruistic reasons’, but rather that they would not settle for an agreement 
‘which meant that there was nothing in it for them’ (1994B). According to Moosa, the ANC 
had to determine what it was the NP wanted. He mentions that the ANC was specifically 
concerned with the civil service: ‘The civil service would not make the settlement happen if it 
meant the day after elections that they all walked the streets, lose their pensions and walked 
the streets’ (Moosa, 1994B). The ANC could deal with this concern by introducing the idea 
of the sunset clauses, and Moosa noted that the ANC ‘had to accept from our side that a 
negotiated settlement entails compromises. We have to compromise somewhere or we are not 
serious about a negotiated settlement’ (Moosa, 1994B). Moosa was prepared for compromise, 
but argues against any compromise that would ‘prevent democracy in itself’ (1992). This type 
of quid pro quo argument is associated with Constitutional Contractarian thinking. He 
realised that for participants to accept the agreement, they had to feel that they had a part in it 
(Moosa, 1994B). 
In November 1993, Moosa stated that ‘the settlement package is very, very favourable from 
our [the ANC’s] point of view’ (Moosa, 1993). He continues by saying that not only does the 
Interim Constitution pave the way forward for elections, but also ‘begins in earnest the entire 
process of democratising the state’ (1993). Moosa notes that the Interim Constitution is ‘long, 
it’s convoluted, [and] it has all sorts of details in it…’ (Moosa,1995B). To him, the Interim 
Constitution played the role of an ‘instrument’ for the South African transformation. 
According to Moosa, the ANC did not necessarily view the Interim Constitution as a starting 
point for the new constitution, but instead saw the Constitutional Assembly as drafters of a 
completely new constitution (Moosa, 1995A). He states that while the negotiations at 
Kempton Park (Codesa and the MPNP) were aimed at negotiating a settlement, the 
Constitutional Assembly were drafting a new constitution; ‘the best constitution this country 
should have’ (Moosa, 1995A). He believed that while it would be better to adopt a 
constitution by consensus, a lack of support of specifically the IFP would not halt the process. 
Moosa pledges his loyalty to the 1996 Constitution (1998):  
The ANC is of the view that the SA constitution represents and embodies the values 
of our struggle and therefore the ANC will always and must protect this 
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constitution, uphold it, protect it and mobilise loyalty towards the constitution. The 
core values of the constitution are set out in the open lines of the constitution, 
section one of the constitution called 'Founding Principles', and those are values 
that should always be deeply respected. 
This feeling of ownership is congruent with Social Contractarian thinking. He also points out 
which aspects of the 1996 Constitution are most important to him (1998): 
…values which talk about the pursuit of equality, non-racialism, non-sexism, 
multiparty democracy, etc., regular elections. If you tamper with those principles 
you are in fact overthrowing the constitution, that's what you're doing if you amend 
provisions in the constitution which provide for universal adult franchise, 
multiparty democracy, regular elections, you are in fact overthrowing the 
constitution. 
Moosa (1996) refers to any form of discrimination, be it race, gender, religion or sexual 
orientation as ‘unconstitutional’. He does however concede that certain aspects of the 
Constitution may require amendment occasionally (1998). He notes that changing the 
Constitution with a two-thirds majority is sticking to the original agreement, and that such a 
change would hinge on this rule (1998). 
Moosa advocated a system of proportional representation as he believed that this would 
guarantee parties with enough support a place, and a say, in the Constitutional Assembly 
(1991). On the local level electoral system, Moosa states that ‘in any local authority area one 
should have at least 30% of all the councillors, which is what the case would be now, at least 
30% of all the councillors should be from the former white local authority area. It also means 
of course that at least 30% would be from the former black local authority area. It's a kind of 
a softening of the impact of democracy on those that fear it’ (Moosa, 1995). 
Moosa advocated a ‘lean, short and easy to understand’ constitution (Hansard, 1995:113). He 
identified the importance of avoiding ‘unnecessary details so that the constitution become a 
durable constitution and so that it does not become obsolete after a few months, requiring 
numerous amendments’ (Hansard, 1995: 114). Moosa was also against the use of numerical 
values in the constitution: ‘once we have put such numbers in a constitution, we could find 
after a year or two that those numbers are wrong. The need to change them again would begin 
to question the actual durability of our constitution’ (Hansard, 1995:114 – 115). Moosa 
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reiterated the view that all parties in the Constitutional Assembly sought consensus on the 
final Constitution (Hansard, 1996:17-18). This type of constitution is reconcilable with Social 
Contractarian thinking. 
Moosa repeated the ANC’s view that human dignity was the basis of the final Constitution, 
placing enormous importance on the first clause of the constitution (Hansard, 1996:238). 
Moosa believed that the final Constitution had entrenched ‘a mechanism to ensure that people 
co-operated with one another’ (Hansard, 1996:239). In interpreting the 1996 Constitution as 
being such a type of mechanism, he endorsed the view that Constitution was to serve as a 
Social Contract. 
Moosa’s opinion can be interpreted as vacillating between a Benchmark Agreement, a 
Constitutional Contract and a Social Contract. However, his focus on consensus as well as his 
argument against numerical values are reconcilable with the Social Contract. 
6.2.13. Cyril Ramaphosa 
Cyril Ramaphosa replaced Thabo Mbeki as lead negotiator of the ANC and proceeded to lead 
the ANC’s negotiating team in Codesa I, Codesa II and the MPNP. During the Codesa 
negotiations, Ramaphosa took the lead in Working Group 2, which was set to define general 
constitutional principles and the mechanism for writing a new constitution. In his biography 
on Ramaphosa, Cyril Ramaphosa, Butler (2007:ix) writes that Ramaphosa is ‘invariably 
unrevealing about his beliefs and opinion’, but a close reading of several interviews 
conducted with Ramaphosa provide insight into his personal beliefs. 
Before 1976, Cyril Ramaphosa had a clear idea about whites: they were the enemy, and 
responsible for the suffering of blacks. White people ‘were not to be trusted’ (1995A:4). 
After going to prison and being released in 1977, Ramaphosa made a fundamental shift away 
from this type of thinking. He realised that in order to realise the objectives of the ANC’s 
struggle, he had to come to the realisation that ‘there were whites we could actually work 
with’ (Ramaphosa, 1995A:4).  
In a public lecture given by Roelf Meyer and Cyril Ramaphosa on the 28
th
 of June, 1996, in 
Belfast, Ireland, some insight can be found into their personal feelings surrounding the 
constitutional negotiations. The purpose of this lecture was for these two major negotiators in 
the South African transition to impart some aspects of their experience to other countries (in 
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this case, Ireland) which were experiencing similar types of conflict. A transcribed version of 
this lecture is authored by Padraig O’Malley.  O’Malley writes in his introduction that ‘ in the 
absence of alternative and the commitment on the part of both the ANC and the NP to a 
negotiated settlement, they made the tough and sometimes unpalatable compromises that 
resulted, in their own words, in a ‘win-win’ situation’ (1996:2). 
According to Ramaphosa, at that time they had ‘just finished the process’ (1996:11). By 
finalising the new constitution (on the 8
th
 of May 1996), the Constitutional Assembly had 
brought the process to a close. In his own words, Ramaphosa viewed the constitution as one 
which would govern South Africa ‘hopefully for generations to come’ (1996:11). The 
element of permanence is associated with the Constitutional Contract. 
Ramaphosa specifically noted his own part in the process as a privilege. He stated that the 
constitution ‘is a document that forbids for all time the oppression of one South African by 
another’ (O’Malley, 1996:11). Ramaphosa also mentioned the importance of involving all 
political parties in South Africa in the negotiation process (O’Malley, 1996:13). By involving 
all interested parties, parties ‘owned the process, and the process was theirs to move forward 
to the next phase’ (O’Malley, 1996:15). However, Ramaphosa also highlighted the 
importance of bilateral meetings in order to break deadlocks (O’Malley, 1996:15). Feeling 
part of the process and including all the interested parties is an indicator of the formation of a 
Social Contract. 
Regarding the element of trust, Ramaphosa (1991) notes that negotiations tend to take place 
between adversaries:  
…people who have two interests that are conflicting and when you contest for state 
power you always find that negotiations are between enemies. Enemies don't 
usually trust each other and they don't really respect each other but you see that 
grows out of a process. As you go on you build relationships, you cut deals on small 
little issues that may be insignificant and as you both deliver, as your stature grows 
in the eyes of the other then you become more trustful of the other. 
Asked whether he trusted the NP government in 1993, Ramaphosa replied that it was 
‘difficult to trust a lot that has proved untrustworthy’, arguing that the government did not 
keep to the agreements they made (Ramaphosa, 1993). Upon reflection, Ramaphosa said that 
creating trust amongst parties was one the most important features of the negotiations. He 
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argued that ‘without this trust we would never have been able to reach the settlement that we 
eventually reached… in the end individuals involved had to have some form of chemistry’ 
(O’Malley, 1996:15). This type of ‘chemistry’ and continual trust-building is reconcilable 
with the framework of a Social Contract. 
By August 1993, Ramaphosa admitted that while the ANC had made compromises, they had 
not compromised on fundamental issues. In 1996, Ramaphosa talked of the reciprocating 
nature of the concessions made during the negotiations. He takes specific notice of the NP’s 
unbanning of the ANC, for which the NP wanted some form of reciprocity. He also mentions 
the ANC’s suspension of the armed struggle, in return for which they required the resumption 
of negotiations (O’Malley, 1996:26). Ramaphosa stated that in turn for the adoption of the 
concept of a government of national unity (which the ANC was originally strongly set 
against), the ANC asked that the NP ‘had to make sure that the civil servants were part of the 
settlement; that the defense force was part of the settlement; that the police were part of the 
settlement’ (O’Malley, 1996: 27). This is congruent with the concept of the Constitutional 
Contract, in contrast with some of Ramaphosa’s previous statements.  
According to Ramaphosa, both the ANC and the NP ‘failed in our original objective’, or fell 
short of their ideal settlement (O’Malley, 1996:27). By realising that neither party could 
completely defeat the other, ‘we were left with no alternatives: there had to be an 
accommodation, a compromise, and the compromise had to be a win-win type of situation’ 
(O’Malley, 1996:27). Ramaphosa states that the ANC had always opposed any form of power 
sharing, but that in order for the negotiations to move forward, they had to ‘give up a number 
of things’, including a winner-takes-all system (O’Malley, 1996:27). Perceptions of this type 
of win-win outcome are congruent with one of the conceptual indicators of a Social Contract. 
On the outcome of the 1994 elections, Ramaphosa (1994) said that: 
Not achieving two thirds, in my view, has not reduced the stature of the ANC or the 
influence of the ANC and the ANC has a great deal of stature, it has a lot of 
influence in our country and it's beginning in a very informal way to show that it 
can lead, it can influence the turn of events in our country in a positive way and I 
think in the end persuasion of other parties, even in drafting the constitution is what 
we should rely on most because in the end you want to have a constitution that will 
be broadly acceptable to all South Africans and you want to have a constitution 
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which you know all parties have drafted by fighting for certain principles which 
they can try and have other parties accept. You therefore don't really need, if you 
are ANC, a two thirds majority. You want to get other parties on to your side 
through gentle consistent persuasion to come on to our side. 
Ramaphosa stated that the Interim Constitution could serve as reference when drafting the 
final Constitution, but that the final Constitution would not be a reflection of the Interim 
Constitution (Ramaphosa, 1995). Ramaphosa described the constitutional principles as ‘cast 
in stone’ (Ramaphosa, 1993) and that they were ‘very happy’ with these principles. He was 
of the opinion that the constitution would have to set out principles ‘that will enhance the 
reconstruction and development of the country’ (1995). He (1991) held that ‘we [the ANC] 
are not going to hold out rights for people on a racial basis, and especially rights for people 
on a racial basis or ethnic basis or even regional basis, because if you do that in a constitution 
or whatever document, that would be a recipe for disaster’. Ramaphosa (1991) refers to the 
Bill of Rights as the ‘core of [a] constitution’. On the issue of property, Ramaphosa (1991) 
was clear: ‘The government must give up land that it owns because of the injustice that our 
people have suffered throughout the years. The government must release all tracts of land that 
it owns and give it to people’.  
In an interview with Patti Waldmeir, Ramaphosa admitted that in a way he tried to get into 
Roelf Meyer’s mind, trying to understand and analyse his opponent’s position. To 
Ramaphosa it was clear that both parties were seeking a settlement, but that their ideas of 
what this settlement would embody were divergent. Ramaphosa says that Meyer ‘wanted to 
win so that he can be able to demonstrate to his bosses that he had hoodwinked us … but I 
knew that he wanted to emerge victorious and in a away I never wanted to come back home 
knowing that we had been hoodwinked, we had not achieved our objectives and we had been 
defeated at the hands of people like Roelf’ (1995A:13). Ramaphosa refers to a critical 
moment in the bilateral negotiations with Roelf Meyer where he had taken ‘things to the 
precipice because it was important we [the ANC] should win that battle and one and for all 
gain the upper hand’ (1998). Ramaphosa refers to the outcome of the negotiating process as a 
‘magnificent victory’ (1994). Arguing in terms of wins and losses is reconcilable with one of 
the conceptual indicators of the Constitutional Contract. 
In April 1996 in Parliament, Ramaphosa, as the Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, 
spoke of the ‘spirit of give-and-take’ that was continually exhibited by all parties in the 
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Constitutional negotiations of the Constitutional Assembly (Hansard, 1996:83). He continued 
by saying that ‘no constitution could satisfy the needs of each and every participant in each 
and every party’, but that ‘all parties, in my view, emerge a winners in this document’ 
(Hansard, 1996:83). 
Asked to rate the Final Constitution on a scale of one to ten, Ramaphosa rated it ‘an eight and 
a half, possibly a nine’, noting that like any other document it was ‘not flawless’ (1996). He 
continues by saying that the ANC ‘got quite a bit of what we wanted’. Ramaphosa identified 
a ‘good measure of consensus’ in the debates and negotiations in the Constitutional Assembly 
(Hansard, 1996:229). He also mentioned the importance of moving toward a ‘win-win 
situation’ (Hansard, 1996:229). Ramaphosa pointed out his belief that ‘we still have to 
transform South Africa into a truly democratic, non-racist and non-sexist country, and to 
make it a country where all our people can enjoy justice and prosperity. These objectives, 
much as some of them may have been attained, have not all been fully attained’ (O’Malley, 
1996:32).  
Ramaphosa describes the 1996 Constitution as ‘a Constitution acceptable to all’ (Hansard, 
1996:85). Ramaphosa pointed out the Chapter 9 Institutions as ‘aimed at supporting 
democracy’(Hansard, 1996:85):  
The Public Protector will monitor and take steps to remedy governmental abuse or 
corruption. The Human Rights Commission and the Commission for Gender 
Equality will deepen and establish a formidable human rights culture and ensure 
gender equality, respectively. The Electoral Commission is aimed at preventing the 
manipulation of elections, while the Auditor-General will monitor State finances. 
On the final Constitution, Ramaphosa (1998) believes that: 
…in the end the constitution has an in-built mechanism of a review of the 
constitution on an ongoing basis and that should be relied upon in the light of 
current experiences to see whether certain provisions are still working as they did. 
A constitution can never be a static document. The American constitution has been 
amended millions of times and similarly our constitution needs to be reviewed in 
terms of those guidelines that we've got in the constitution to see how best it can be 
made more effective particularly for governance to be much stronger and more 
effective. 
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This statement moves away from the fixed nature of the Constitutional Contract and towards 
the more fluid and changeable Social Contract.  Arguing in terms of gains and losses as well 
as the importance of trust building and mutual compromise places the interpretation of the 
constitution by Ramaphosa into aspects of both the Constitutional Contract and Social 
Contract conceptual frameworks. 
6.2.14. Joe Slovo 
Joe Slovo was the leader of the SACP and a member of the ANC. He was a delegate at the 
Codesa I, Codesa II and the MPNP. Slovo played an integral role in the negotiations by 
proposing the idea of ‘Sunset Clauses’. After the 1994 elections he became Minister of 
Housing in Mandel’s parliament until his death in 1995. Slovo’s autobiography, Slovo: The 
Unfinished Autobiography (1995), does not cover the timeframe addressed in this study. 
However, several interviews with Slovo conducted by Padraig O’Malley, Hermann Giliomee 
as well as Patti Waldmeir provide the platform for the assessment of his values and beliefs in 
line with the conceptual framework. 
In an interview with Hermann Giliomee in 1988, Slovo identified the reasons for the 
government’s movement towards negotiation as ‘for the first time they were beaten in a 
battle, not in a war, but in a battle which foretold perhaps what could happen to them in the 
future, because they no longer have military superiority, or even ground superiority.’ He felt 
that PW Botha was at the point where he would ‘begin discussing the process of moving 
towards majority rule’ (Slovo, 1988: 5). Slovo shows that he saw the ANC in a position of 
strength entering into the negotiations. 
Slovo went further to say that ‘if the entire block shows signs that it is really prepared to 
engage in a dialogue moving towards majority rule then the mechanisms, the process, and the 
pace, are all things which depend on the actual power relationship. Then each organisation 
has to decide if it is getting enough to make a qualitative step forward and not just a 
surrender’ (1988:6). Slovo was clearly in favour of majority rule for the ANC, but that the 
‘power relationship’ would govern the outcome.  
Slovo identifies areas of common concern between the ANC and the NP government, 
including the Bill of Rights and the prevention of incursions on human rights (Slovo, 1992B). 
He did however make it clear that he did not believe that the future economic system of the 
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country should be decided by the negotiations, but rather by an elected future parliament 
(1992B). 
Slovo also mentioned that not only would wealth be redistributed, but that blacks would be 
put in positions where they could ‘learn on the job’. He conceded that it may not work at first, 
but that it would require a balance between retaining those already in the jobs in order to 
make the process ‘smoother’ (1988:7). In an interview with Patti Waldmeir in 1990, Slovo 
again stated the ANC’s main goal as bringing about the redistribution of wealth in order to 
‘redress the imbalances in the economic sphere’. 
Slovo believes that the ANC had been consistent in their bottom lines while trying to 
‘accommodate the fears and concerns of the other side’, conceding that during the negotiating 
period his own views had changed, albeit slightly (Slovo, 1993B). On the issue of the GNU, 
Slovo says that the ANC made the concession ‘not just in order to entrap the other side to 
reach a settlement but even if we decided not to institutionalise it in the form of legal 
imperatives, it is in our interests, in the interests of governance, in the interests of getting over 
the hump that we are going to be forced to get over after April 27th, it is in the interests of 
our constituency’ (1993B). 
In an interview with Padraig O’Malley in 1993, Slovo very specifically refers to F.W. de 
Klerk as a ‘negotiating enemy’ and a ‘political enemy’ (1993A). The formation of a Social 
Contract is unlikely when negotiators do not fundamentally redefine their opponents. 
Slovo refers back to De Klerk’s insistence on a form of minority veto, saying that De Klerk 
had proposed this so that ‘the country couldn’t be governed without the agreement of whites 
in all major respects’ (Slovo, 1994). Slovo is of the opinion that the ANC ‘won the battle’ on 
this issue, forcing De Klerk to concede in the Interim Constitution. Slovo continues by saying 
that ‘although there is a GNU there is majority rule and whether that GNU would work 
depended not on a constitutional mandate of sharing decision making but basically on the 
spirit of the concept’ (Slovo, 1994). Slovo’s interpretation on the clause concerning decision-
making in the Cabinet is that decision will be taken by simple majority. He notes the wording 
in ‘the spirit of national unity’, but states that this in practice means by simple majority 
(Slovo, 1993B). Arguing against the ‘spirit’ means that Slovo’s views cannot be reconciled 
with the Social Contractarian perspective. 
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6.2.15. Gerrit Viljoen 
Gerrit Viljoen played the role of lead negotiator and main constitutional and political advisor 
of the NP until May 1992 when he resigned and was replaced by Roelf Meyer. 
According to Viljoen, at the start of the negotiations both the NP and the ANC had concluded 
that violence would not produce a solution. Violence would have to be eradicated and 
negotiation would have to take its place (Viljoen, 1994:1). Viljoen refers to the secret talks 
that had been taking place leading up to the official negotiations. He considers these talks as 
integral in establish one’s opponents as ‘reasonable people’ (Viljoen, 1994:1). Viljoen was 
later impressed with the intelligence and logic of his oppenents in the negotiations (1994:10). 
The redefinition of one’s opponents is integral in the establishment of a Social Contract. He 
also considers the fall of the Soviet Union and the ‘collapse of… socialism worldwide’ as 
playing a central role in reducing the risks involved in negotiations. This ‘influenced thinking 
away from the fear that any major concession would result in national suicide’ (Viljoen, 
1994:1).  
For Viljoen, negotiations mean ‘that the process would [not] be simply an imposed solution 
by a black majority but a negotiated solution produced by the interaction of minds, by give 
and take, so by definition then starting form such a road wouldn’t imply a solution in which 
you have to give up everything but the method to be followed implied a give and take in 
which even a black majority would be subject to restrictions preventing it from misusing its 
power’ (Viljoen, 1994:1). This argument in favour of a process of give and take is 
reconcilable with the Constitutional Contract. 
Viljoen continues to speak in terms of a quid pro quo relationship with the ANC, referring to 
the ANC’s suspension of the armed struggle under certain conditions met by the NP. The NP 
had certain demands as well, including the rejection of communism. In negotiations with 
Mandela the NP tried to find a ‘formula that would be acceptable to him and to us’ (Viljoen, 
1994:5). 
In July 1991, Gerrit Viljoen spoke of the NP’s continued insistence on the definition of 
minority groups in the constitution. He was of the opinion that the NP’s thinking had moved 
away from this view, realising that ‘once groups are defined in a constitution, there’s a 
certain rigidity and a certain inflexibility which militates against the concept of voluntary 
association’ (Viljoen, 1991). He defined power-sharing as a system ‘where after an election 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
200 
 
in everything the majority takes all, but that there are areas in which the majority must also 
persuade the minority to obtain its support, either in an absolute sense or in the sense of 
having a say’ (Viljoen, 1991). Asked whether this type of power-sharing would be part of the 
‘final solution’, Viljoen said that ‘no solutions are final’ (1991). 
The NP believed that black majority rule was not an eventuality, and that going ‘beyond 
simple majority rule and … meaningful checks and balances… and protection to minorities’ 
was at the forefront of the NP’s requirements for a new constitution (Viljoen, 1994:7). While 
Viljoen believes that ‘a significant number of checks and balances’ were achieved in the 
agreement, it was not in the way that they had originally planned: ‘But from the outset I and 
those working closely with me and certainly FW de Klerk realised that we won’t be able to 
get all that we ask for and we’ll have to swallow certain things as part of a give and take 
process’ (Viljoen, 1994:7). 
Viljoen describes the Interim Constitution and the Constitutional Principles as ‘not ideal in 
the eyes of many of them [the parties involved] but which is something with which all of 
them can live, in other words by way of compromise’ (Viljoen, 1993). Viljoen talks of the 
‘de-demonisation of the opponent’ and the realisation that a solution can be reached by means 
of ‘give and take’ (Viljoen, 1997). In retrospect, Viljoen notes that the NP negotiators could 
have put more pressure on the ANC to include some form of continuing power-sharing in the 
executive. 
Viljoen places the NP proposal of a rotating presidency in the position of an ideal settlement, 
knowing that the chances of achieving such a presidency were very slim (Viljoen, 1994:14). 
Viljoen makes clear his concern that a measure for ensuring the meaningful participation of 
whites in local government was not incorporated. However, he sees the power-sharing aspect 
of the constitution as a ‘major success’ (1994:14). Viljoen’s argument in terms of quid pro 
quo and give-and-take is congruent with one of the conceptual properties of the 
Constitutional Contract, while his opinion regarding a more inclusive local electoral system is 
reconcilable with one of the conceptual indicators of a Social Contract, placing the meaning 
he invests into the Constitution into both categories. 
6.2.16. Leon Wessels 
For two years, Leon Wessels was a fulltime negotiator on the side of the NP/government 
together with Roelf Meyer, Dawie de Villiers and Tertius Delport. He also served in F.W. de 
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Klerk’s cabinet. He took part in Codesa I; Codesa II; and the MPNP. After 1994, he became 
deputy chairman of the Constitutional Assembly which drafted the 1996 Constitution 
(Wessels, 2010:247; 251). 
In an interview with Padraig O’Malley in July 1990, Wessels did not completely dismiss 
majority rule (contrary to the NP’s continued dismissal thereof), carefully mentioned power-
sharing and group rights, and noted that the process which was underway was irreversible 
(Wessels, 2010:300). He also noted the importance of getting the greatest possible consensus 
among all South Africans. Asked what he meant by this ‘consensus’, Wessels replied that 
‘The consensus is about the founding provisions, the structure (framework) of the 
constitution as well as the transformative nature (achievement of equality, advancement of 
human rights) provided for in the Constitution’ (Wessels, 2014).  
Wessels refers specifically to Section 45 (1) (c) of the 1996 Constitution, which allows for 
the establishing of ‘a joint committee to review the Constitution at least annually’ by the 
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, as providing for the continuation 
of talks on an annual basis (Wessels, 2014). He continues by saying that ‘[a]nyone who felt 
strongly about any particular issue should have the opportunity to continue the debate and not 
be sidelined’, but that the ANC later viewed this provision as a ‘nice to have’ and that ‘those 
for whom it was intended have never properly used it’ (Wessels, 2014). 
According to Wessels, if the majority of white people walk away from the negotiation table, 
or if the majority of black people walk away, there would be no political agreement 
(2010:302). He continued to espouse this view in August 1990 in Oslo, where he noted  ‘the 
challenge is to live in a spirit of true nation-building to reach out to the future on the other 
side of apartheid’ (Wessels, 2010:238), alluding to the idea of an ongoing social contract. In 
this same speech, he mentions the ‘common goal of true freedom and South Africanism’ 
(2010:238). 
Wessels believes that after the 2 February speech made by De Klerk, De Klerk believed that 
he ‘would be able to control and to manage everything the way he wanted it and that amongst 
others would mean managing the process to such an extent that he would end up in a 
favourable position in the elections themselves’ (Wessels, 1995:13). Wessels does not 
criticise the final agreement made by De Klerk: ‘it was the way the transition was taking 
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shape, caving in in the sense that it was giving up power but after all it was power that was 
not representative and legitimate’ (1995:20). 
Wessels describes getting to know people like Chris Hani, Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo and 
becoming ‘friends with them’ (Wessels, 1996). Wessels very specifically uses the term 
‘negotiating partners’ (Wessels, 1990):  
I believe that the negotiating partners should not look at one another as 
adversaries. They may not agree on all the issues, but I believe that you would find 
they may agree on some issues and differ on other issues. That's the way I would 
like to see it. In other words, the consensus may go from one to the other. I don't 
think it will be in the interest of the process if we arrive as adversaries, people 
sitting across the table from one another. 
From Wessels’ retelling of his experience as negotiator in his autobiography Vereeniging: 
Die Onvoltooide Vrede (Union: The Unfinished Peace), some clear indicators of a low-
context negotiator arguing in favour of a Constitutional Contract can be found. He notes the 
1996 Constitution as ‘the solid foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the 
divisions and strife of the past’ (2010:255). He also takes note of the NP’s wish that there 
would always be a constitutional government as well as a parliament, alluding to an element 
of permanence, which is consistent with the values and beliefs of a Constitutional 
Contractarian perspective (Wessels, 2010:302). 
Wessels refers to the ‘art of negotiation’: ‘you reach a settlement and an agreement that does 
not meet with all the demands that you set, but that it meets with a majority of demands of 
everybody’ (Wessels, 1990). Wessels knew that as a negotiator and as a politician he would 
have to determine his Realistic Settlement, and for him this was democracy in a constitutional 
state (Wessels, 2010:259).  
Wessels also refers to the countless compromises made during the negotiations (2010:259). 
He found that the only common denominator, the only viable option, between those involved 
in the negotiations was the formation of a Rechtsstaat, and the NP’s Realistic Settlement at 
this point was a government of national unity within a constitutional democracy (Wessels, 
2010:261). Wessels identifies one of the major concessions by the NP as power-sharing as a 
transitional arrangement, while the NP had been pushing for power-sharing on a permanent 
basis (Wessels, 1993). However, Wessels is of the opinion that the process ‘was not an 
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individual effort of the effort of one group of one political part’, quoting Nelson Mandela: 
‘When you negotiate you don’t talk to yourself. That is why we had to compromise’ 
(Wessels, 2014). 
Asked whether the NP had grown concerned that the ANC would win a two-thirds majority 
in the 1994 elections and ‘single-handedly’ write the Constitution, Wessels replied that ‘if the 
NP and all the other parties together can't prevent a two thirds majority then they do not 
deserve to have that particular leverage over the constitution’ (Wessels, 2000B). Wessels says 
that ‘the ANC carries 60% support with it and it has to be reflected in the constitution, but 
60% does not mean 100% and therefore they are still sensitive to suggestions and proposals 
from other parties, also from the NP’ (Wessels, 1996). In 1994, Wessels raised his concern 
that ‘the [propotional] list system is not the ideal system’, but that for the time being it served 
the purpose of bringing forth successful elections (1994). He however does not mention an 
alternative. 
Wessels does recognise the need for ongoing constitutional discussions, mentioning that the 
constitution itself provides for the continuation of talks on an annual basis, which is the 
essence of Social Contractarian thinking. However, in line with the Constitutional 
Contractarian view, he notes that these talks should continue ‘binne die hoeke van die 
grondwet’ (within the parameters of the Constitution), and only on ‘issues of national 
importance’ (2010:277).  Wessels himself concedes that there were few issues addressed 
during the negotiations that the parties valued equally – for example, the ANC delegation 
were deeply concerned with the issue of poverty, having been directly influenced by 
uneducated or modestly-educated family and friends, and as such sought to create a 
government that would have extensive power in order to address socio-economic inequality 
by means of socio-economic rights; while the NP/government sought limited government 
power and opposed the inclusion of socio-economic rights (Wessels, 2010:253-254).  
Wessels continues to espouse views congruent with the conceptual framework of the 
Constitutional Contract when he clearly states that a constitution cannot solve the problems 
of a country: ‘A constitution is the rules which govern – a constitution does not deliver 
services, but determines who delivers those services and what should happen to them should 
they not deliver that service’ (2010:259-260). Moreover, Wessels clearly states that ‘no one 
comes unsullied to the negotiating table’ (2010:265), showing that he does not believe that 
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one party held the higher ground over the other (Benchmark negotiators tend to stress the 
unequal standing of those entering into negotiations).  
Wessels views the position of the NP government as ‘on the back foot’ from the start of 
negotiations until the signing of the 1996 constitution (2010:59). He describes many South 
Africans’ view on Codesa and the new Constitution (2010:59): ‘not as historical events to get 
rid of old baggage and start anew, but rather as funerals.’ However, Wessels regards the 
Constitution as a ‘historic bridge’ between the deeply divided past and the future founded on 
human rights and equal opportunities (2010:60). This ‘historic bridge’ which Wessels refers 
to can be interpreted as the ‘contract zone’ within which the parties came to the negotiation 
table. In February 2000, Wessels was adamant that ‘our responsibility is the whole 
constitution; it’s the whole Bill of Rights’ (Wessels, 2000A). 
In 1996, just before the vote on the final constitution, Roelf Meyer asked one of the NP’s 
technical advisers to draw up a document which detailed all the NP/government’s negotiation 
‘profits’ and also that which they could possibly lose (Wessels, 2010:281). Wessels refers to 
this document (attached as an appendix) and notes that ‘[w]alking away would have given the 
ANC a blank cheque to draft their own constitution unilaterally’ (Wessels, 2014). Arguing in 
terms of gains and losses also represents the Constitutional Contractarian view. However, 
Wessels clearly states that there was a ‘spirit of accommodation’ present in the Constitutional 
Assembly (1996). When describing the NP’s feelings toward the 1996 Constitution, Wessels 
‘saw that none of the people looked like they believed the Constitution was the fruit of their 
labour’ (2010:282). Wessels later also noted that the members of the NP ‘were so 
disgruntled’ (Wessels, 2014). The feeling amongst the NP was not one of a shared agreement, 
but rather one of having lost – indicative of the perception that the process was about trade-
offs, about winning on some issues, losing on others, and that they lost more than they won. 
In short, a Constitutional Contract that did not favour them in overall terms.  
Wessels names Section 1 of the 1996 Constitution as the most important aspect of the final 
agreement (Wessels, 2014). To him, this section represents the essence of the agreement: 
‘that is why it is entrenched with a 75% majority’ (Wessels, 2014). 
Asked what the intention of the concept of ‘broadly representative’ mentioned several times 
in both constitutions meant, Wessels answered that the purpose was to ‘nurture a spirit of 
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inclusivity’, as opposed to being used as a rigid quota (Wessels, 2014). This is reconcilable 
with the Social Contract.  
Wessels (2010:289) noted that ‘transformation did not end with the 1994 election or the 
adoption of a constitutional rechtsstaat in 1996. It was just the beginning of the building of a 
fairer society, for all’. He understood that the negotiations meant the start of a new political 
dispensation. However, Wessels believes that this transformation should happen within the 
confines of the Constitution, which is a view not reconcilable with the fluid nature of the 
Benchmark Agreement. 
Wessels refers specifically to the NP’s withdrawal from the GNU as undermining ‘the idea of 
creating a convention (culture) of seeking consensus on matters of national interest’ (2014). 
Wessels understands the ‘unwillingness, or inability, to form alliances across political 
divisions – across language, culture and colour boundaries’ as the greatest challenge in South 
African civil society (2010:278). This shows that the constitution does not instil a process 
which rewards accommodative behaviour.  
Wessels mentions that the idea of Lijphart’s consociationalism intrigued him at the start of 
negotiations, but that ‘PW Botha and the shambles of the tricameral parliament killed 
anything that leaned in the direction’ (Wessels, 2014). Lijphart’s consociational democracy is 
congruent with Constitutional Contractarian thinking. 
Leon Wessels’ opinions regarding the constitutional negotiations as well as the 1996 
Constitution include indicators across the spectrum, but a clear preference towards a the static 
nature of Constitutional Contractarian thinking comes to the fore. His arguments in terms of 
gains and losses, as well as the supremacy of the constitution in all decision-making and 
ongoing debate indicate a view compatible with the thinking of a Constitutional Contractarian 
negotiator. 
6.2.17. ANC Debate 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a debate emerged among ANC and SACP members 
concerning the ultimate goal of what they termed the ‘liberation movement’, and how this 
goal would be achieved. This debate was published in several publications, with some of the 
writers publishing under pseudonyms in order to protect their identities. Not all of these 
writers were negotiators of the Constitution; but are included in order to provide the full 
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context to the arguments of those who did become negotiators. The opinions of these writers 
can be placed within the framework of Social Contract/Constitutional Contract/Benchmark 
Agreement by assessing certain elements and indicators found within the debate. 
In 1986, SACP-member Jeremy Cronin stated in the journal Transformation that the goal of 
the SACP within the ANC-SACP alliance was to ‘end the forcible denationalisation of the 
African majority, to end the Bantustan system, and to reject all federal, confederal and other 
regionalised confections designed to perpetuate, in one form or another, white minority rule’ 
(Cronin, 1986:75). Cronin mentioned the importance of ‘nationalising and redistributing the 
wealth of the monopolies’ (1986:75-76). 
Under the pen name of Sisa Majola, ANC and SACP activist Jabulani Nobleman Nxumalo 
wrote that capitalism was ‘at the root of their [the revolutionary masses’] misery’ in the 
African Communist Journal (1987:39-40). He goes on to note that ‘the people’ still wish to 
‘settle scores with the regime of national oppression’ (Majola, 1987:41). He reiterates 
Cronin’s final aim of socialism (1987:42). He argues strongly against a ‘deal with the racist 
regime’, noting that such a compromise would be a sign of weakness (1987:44 - 45). He also 
very specifically states that ‘the democratic republic of the Freedom Charter is only the 
beginning of a political process that will ultimately end with the establishment of socialism’ 
(1987:47). The SACP elements within the ANC advocated a strong form of socialism at this 
time, and stated that as their ultimate end goal. This type of thinking can be placed within the 
Benchmark Agreement, as the overarching goal of socialism is superior to the establishment 
of a democracy. 
Under the pseudonym ‘Brenda Stalker’, Sylvia Neame (member of the SACP) wrote in 
Sechaba, the ANC-run publication, that the ‘chief aim of the liberation movement in 
conducting talks is to isolate the most extreme elements in the White population and to look 
for a basis for acceptable compromise, a compromise with an important element of ‘national 
consensus’’ (1988:120). She finds that a ‘genuine compromise’ would lead to more 
democratic rights, which would in turn grant the liberation movement state power, which 
would ‘be a decisive element for further progress’ (1988:26). Stalker suggests a systematic, 
stage by stage process focused on talks in order to realise the objectives of the National 
Democratic Revolution (1988:26). 
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In the same publication, Thando Zuma argues strongly against ‘talks’ as the only means of 
achieving these goals, stating that neither ‘the perspective of insurrection’ nor the ‘people’s 
war’ has been abandoned (1988:10). The argument whether to abandon the armed struggle in 
order to advance negotiations continued among the ANC and SACP members. Under the 
name Alex Mashinini, Jabulani Nxumalo (known as ‘Mxala’) wrote in Sechaba in 1988 that 
the ‘end goal’ of the movement was the ‘transfer of power’ (1988:26). He noted that absolute 
victory was ‘impossible’, and that compromise would have to be made by both sides, 
resulting in ‘partial victories for warring parties’ (1988:27).  
While this type of thinking is reconcilable with some aspects of the concept of the 
Constitutional Contract, he goes on to state that partial victories can be ‘transformed’ by 
politicians and political parties into absolute victories (1988:27). To him, the biggest 
foreseeable problem was the limitations the negotiated settlement would impose on the 
‘program of social emancipation’ (Mashinini, 1988:27). This type of argument is closer to an 
understanding of the issue in terms of the concept of the Benchmark Agreement, as he does 
not view the ‘partial victory’ to be obtained as final, but rather as a changeable and unfixed 
agreement.  
Also in Sechaba, in contrast to Mashinini, Neil Zumana, another presumed pseudonym, wrote 
that the ‘mass democratic movement [had] no reason to surrender or settle for partial 
victories’ (1989:29). He quotes Oliver Tambo as speaking of ‘absolute victory’ (1989:29).  
In 1990, after De Klerk’s public release of Nelson Mandela and unbanning of the ANC, 
Ahmed Kathrada, who would become a negotiator in the constitutional negotiations, stated 
that while both parties at the negotiating table will make compromises, each would ‘strive to 
adhere to its own objectives’ (1990:11). He also makes it clear that negotiations form part of 
the ANC struggle – other strategies had not been abandoned (1990:11). As then head of the 
ANC Department of Information and Publicity, he stated that ‘the strategic objective of a 
negotiated settlement is the transformation of the social order, not its reform. The aim is to 
dismantle apartheid, not restructure it so as to make it more palatable to our oppressed and 
exploited people. The goal, in short, is to negotiate a transfer of power to the democratic 
majority’ (1990:11-12).  
In 1992 in the African Communist, Cronin set out three strategic frameworks ‘informing our 
national liberation movement’ (1992:41). He labels the first ‘don’t rock the boat’, a 
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framework based on negotiated pacts between elites. ‘Rational bargaining’ would inform this 
strategy. He argues however that while the ANC and the NP’s starting points are the same 
(both aim to move away from apartheid), their end goals are divergent. He argues that there is 
‘no common vision on the direction and character of the move’ (1992:43). If no common 
vision exists in the view of the participating parties, there can be no Social Contract.  
The second framework, labelled ‘turning on the tap’, focused mainly on using mass struggle 
as a ‘tap to be turned off and on according to perceived progress or otherwise at Codesa’ 
(1992:44). Cronin argues that this strategy is ‘elitist and instrumentalist’ (1992:44). The third 
strategic framework is referred to as ‘The Leipzig Way’: ‘It is a perspective in which people 
transfer power to themselves in an insurrectionary moment’ (Cronin, 1992:44). However, the 
‘relatively powerful repressive machinery of the apartheid regime’ would likely curb this 
initiative (1992:47). 
Cronin insists that while ‘partial and limited areas of consensus may occur between the 
national liberation movement and the ruling bloc (making negotiations possible), there is a 
fundamental, long-term, antagonistic contradiction between the primary class forces on the 
respective sides’ (1992:49). He states that the transfer of political power would come as a 
process rather than an event, which is congruent with the Benchmark Agreement (1992:51). 
It can be inferred from this that Cronin does not envision a long-term contract between 
opposing parties. Instead, agreement will be temporary and lead, over time, to the ultimate 
transfer of power to the ‘liberation forces’. 
In the same publication, Joe Slovo, who would later become a negotiator for the SACP, 
pointed out that negotiations were only part of the ‘struggle for real people’s power’ 
(1992A:36). He makes it clear that ‘the possibility for and the relative success of negotiations 
have little to do with mutual trust, or good faith, or some special chemistry between leaders. 
We are negotiating with the regime because an objective balance of forces makes this a 
feasible political strategy’ [emphasis added] (Slovo, 1992A:36). This type of argument is 
inconsistent and incompatible with the concept of the Social Contract. 
Slovo sees the outcome of negotiations as a more favourable position for the ‘liberation 
movement… from which to advance’ (1992A:37). He notes the inevitable nature of the 
agreement as a compromise, but as long as it ‘does not permanently block a future advance to 
non-racial democratic rule in its full connotation’; the agreement will be acceptable 
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(1992A:37). He notes several concession made by his party, including special majorities for 
the ratification of the constitution, but states very clearly the conditions to which they would 
not agree, including a minority veto and the entrenchment of compulsory power-sharing 
(1992A:39). This view is congruent with the concept of the Benchmark Agreement – noting 
specifically that the outcome of negotiations is changeable, and that any agreement made 
should not constrict the ultimate goal of the ANC/SACP. 
In a response to this, Pallo Jordan describes the ANC’s core strategic approach as ‘the 
destruction of the colonial state’ (1992:7). Jordan makes clear that he labelled the De Klerk 
government as ‘opposition’ as opposed to a negotiating partner, referring to the ‘conflictual 
nature of the relationship … structured by the diametrically opposed interests the two 
represent’ (1992:8 - 9). To Jordan, negotiations form only one aspect of a strategy. He states 
that ‘one or other party to the dispute must go under. Negotiations, in such a situation, are not 
aimed at composing differences, but are aimed at the liquidation of one of the antagonists as 
a factor in politics’ [emphasis added] (1992:10-11). Jordan is advocating a win-lose situation. 
Nzimande (1992) also criticises Slovo’s approach. He labels Slovo’s compromises as 
dangerous, noting that their main strategic objective should be the handing over of power to 
the people (1992:17). He shows severe mistrust of the De Klerk government. Nzimande saw 
negotiations as ‘a site of struggle: it enabled the national liberation movement to relate its 
own unbanning not to being a break with the past but a continuation of a long process of 
national democratic revolution under new conditions’ [emphasis added] (1992:19). He does 
not agree with Slovo on any of the proposed compromises. He fears the emergence of an 
entrenched power-sharing regime (1992:21). He states clearly his feeling toward the NP: 
‘There are irreconcilable differences between the objectives of the white ruling bloc in South 
Africa and the national liberation movement. The first step towards the total abolition of 
apartheid is the total and decisive defeat of the National Party, which is our immediate enemy 
in terms of national democratic transformation’ [emphasis added] (1992:22). He maintains 
that an elite pact will not lead to ‘real democracy’ (1992:23). 
Jordan as well as Nzimande’s distrust of the De Klerk government and the NP reveal that 
neither hold an interpretation of the new (yet to be) negotiated constitution as compatible 
with either the conceptual framework of the Social Contract or the Constitutional Contract, 
but rather a win-lose outcome in which the ANC/SACP are completely victorious. 
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Also published in the African Communist, Raymond Suttner stated that by sitting down at the 
negotiating table with ‘the enemy’, the ‘contradictions between us’ do not disappear 
(1992:30). He writes that in order to succeed in realising their goals, the ANC would have to 
use their strength. He finds that ‘no settlement will satisfy our people’s aspirations unless it is 
part of an ongoing process of empowerment and transformation’ (1992:34). He argues 
against ‘unilaterally imposing our will’, stating that had such a move been possible, they 
would have done so (1992:36). 
From this debate within the ANC/SACP alliance is become clear that those taking part in the 
debate were not in favour of any type of long-term, fixed contract. None of these writers had 
fundamentally redefined their opponent into negotiating partners, and were, in 1992, still 
concerned with a ‘complete victory’ – even if through a temporary ‘partial victory’. It is 
important to note this type of thinking within the ranks of the ANC as these writers play a 
formative role in the opinions and decisions of the negotiators. None of these writers are 
inclined towards a shared outcome, but rather at creating a changed political arena within 
which to achieve their ultimate goals, away from the NP. This debate can be accommodated 
within the conceptual framework of the Benchmark Agreement, moving away from low-
context outcomes and towards temporary markers in order to achieve a superior goal. In this 
case, the superior goal is that of the National Democratic Revolution. 
6.3. Conclusion 
In order to gain access to the original negotiators opinions and views, several resources were 
consulted. In some cases, negotiators were contacted by email in order to conduct interviews 
with them. Several negotiators were contacted, including Leon Wessels, FW de Klerk, Roelf 
Meyer, Mac Maharaj, Thabo Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa, Tertius Delport, and Fanie van der 
Merwe. In several cases I received no response. In other cases, the data gathered was not 
usable. Some of the memoirs consulted also did not yield information relevant to the study, 
including Benjamin Turok, Ahmed Kathrada and Joe Slovo. Seven negotiators’ memoirs 
were closely consulted and usable, listed in the bibliography. Eighty-nine full-text interviews 
with negotiators were used in this assessment, as well as one full-text speech and three books 
of speeches of negotiators. Several articles written by negotiators were also used, as well as 
the words used by negotiators in parliamentary sessions found in Hansards. 
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Several negotiators have revealed themselves as congruent with the conceptual framework. 
Colin Eglin provides an apt example of a Social Contractarian thinker, showing a preference 
for inclusive negotiations with a focus on a constituency-based electoral system.  FW de 
Klerk represents an overlap between Social Contractarian thinking and Constitutional 
Contractarian thinking. De Klerk’s original thinking is congruent with the Social Contract – a 
focus on accommodative, inclusive behaviour and ongoing negotiation. He does however 
concede that this did not occur.  
Mac Maharaj represents the Benchmark Agreement, with a clear preference towards a 
constantly changing agreement, a contract that evolves as society and the power relationships 
change. Thabo Mbeki shows signs of all three types of thinking, and his view are reconcilable 
with several of the concepts. 
Leon Wessels’ views and opinions are reconcilable with the Constitutional Contract. His 
insistence that all future decision-making be dictated by the Constitution as well as his focus 
on give and take makes him an apt example of the thinking present within this concept. 
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Chapter 7: Summary of Findings and Conclusion 
7. 1. Introduction 
The dispute presented in Chapter 1 of this study highlights the argument between former 
President F.W. de Klerk and current Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa as a clear dissensus 
on the nature of the 1996 Constitution. The puzzle arising from this dissensus is that it 
follows from an outcome widely supported by those involved in its drafting, with 85 per cent 
of the Constitutional Assembly supporting the adoption thereof. 
While several studies have addressed the process and so-called miraculous outcome, this 
study has sought to identify the meanings that the original negotiators invested into this 
outcome at the time. The study aimed to address whether this dissensus was present during 
the negotiating process (1990 to 1996), and whether the negotiators’ agreement on the formal 
text of the constitution obscures fundamentally diverging interpretations.  
The conceptual framework in Chapter 3 identified three conceptual types of written outcomes 
of negotiations about accords: the Constitutional Contract, the Social Contract and the 
Benchmark Agreement. Each concept was operationalized into key terms and indicators, 
identifiable within the written document itself. 
In order to categorize the negotiators’ opinions into this typology, it was first necessary to 
study the process of negotiation that took place in South Africa, with specific focus on the 
substantive negotiations between 1990 and 1996. This in-depth timeline allowed for the 
understanding of negotiators’ viewpoints at specific times and on certain issues, as well as 
how these negotiators’ opinions fall in line (or not) with the perspective of the parties they 
were part of during the negotiations. 
Both the 1993 and the 1996 Constitutions were studied at length in order to determine 
whether the texts contained aspects that would be open to interpretation as being indicative of 
any one of these three conceptual descriptions. Relevant sections were highlighted. It should 
however be noted that this is not a study in law, but rather a study of political perceptions in 
the form of individual interpretations of the nature of the Constitutions. Such a study of law 
and the letter of the Constitutions would comprise an entirely different study. Some clear 
indicators of characteristics of both the Social Contract as well as Constitutional Contract 
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were identified, with specific emphasis on the use of the terms ‘spirit of consensus’ and 
‘broadly representative’. How these terms are perceived, however, is not necessarily 
identifiable within in the texts themselves, but is rather found in the opinions and views of the 
original negotiators. 
Chapter 6 looked at the original negotiators in turn. Many negotiators were involved during 
the South African process, and more than 400 delegates made up the Constitutional Assembly 
after 1994. A study of each individual negotiator would comprise a much larger study, and 
would be the product of a research design different to the one used here. Determining who 
were negotiators and what roles certain players played proved difficult, more so than 
anticipated. This study chose negotiators who wrote memoirs and on whom relevant data was 
available. The study is an in-depth understanding of a few negotiators as opposed to an 
interpretation of many, making it a qualitative study.  
The information available was sorted in order to place quality over quantity – only sources 
where the original negotiators themselves expressed their views were used. It became clear 
during the course of the study that while numerous sources were available regarding 
individual negotiators, few could claim to be authentic voice of the negotiator. It also became 
clear that it is difficult to distinguish the voice of the negotiator from the voice and opinion of 
the party which he or she represented during the timeframe. The focus of this study was the 
individual and not the party, which made certain sources irrelevant or unusable. Care was 
taken to separate the opinion of the negotiator from the opinion of the party, and as such the 
focus of the study was primarily on memoirs and full text interviews conducted with the 
negotiators. 
This Chapter will provide a summary of the thesis, as well as an in-depth review of the 
findings. Each research question will be addressed in turn. New insights in the field of 
research will be explored, as well as new questions arising from the research.  
7. 2. Research Questions 
A Conceptual Framework 
The first research question revolved around the construction of a conceptual framework: 
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Can a conceptual framework be constructed with which to classify and categorise the range 
of divergent interpretations that constitutional negotiators can assign to negotiated 
democratic institutions which are aimed at resolving long-standing internal conflicts? 
A survey of the literature presented in Chapters 2 and 3 showed that negotiations who 
succeeded in resolving conflicts in deeply divided societies invariably lead to written 
outcomes, often in the form of a constitution. The theory of negotiation lead to the 
identification of three positions that negotiators can identify: an Ideal Settlement, a Realistic 
Settlement and a Fall Back Position.  
A further look at the relevant literature lead to the identification of three different types of 
outcomes: the Constitutional Contract; the Social Contract and the Benchmark Agreement. 
Each concept was operationalised by establishing a set of indicators with which to 
empirically observe the concept. The Constitutional Contract was identified as a rigid, fixed, 
written document, while the Social Contract placed focus on ‘process over institutions’, and 
on an accommodative political culture. The Benchmark Agreement stood apart in assigning 
negotiated outcomes as being part of and subject to a larger, superior goal and changeable in 
a culture of ongoing bargaining shaped by ever-changing power relations. 
Certain concepts proved more difficult to identify with observable empirical indicators than 
others. The Constitutional Contract in its nature is more easily identifiable given its written 
form, with indicators such as quotas, fixed targets and permanence. The Social Contract 
comprises a different set of indicators, while some of these indicators overlap with the 
Constitutional Contract. The Social Contract was most easily identifiable by the kind of 
process that could emerge from institutions, such as the electoral system, with a focus not on 
a proportional list system, but rather any system that is conducive to the process of vote 
pooling. 
The Benchmark Agreement is not as easily operationalised as in its nature it is fluid and 
changeable. This type of agreement tends to be found in cultures that regard contextual 
factors, located within the particular history of conflict as salient. This kind of agreement 
tends to focus on past injustices, and tend to identify victims and perpetrators, with the 
concomitant implication that all negotiators are not equal in moral standing. 
In order to apply this conceptual framework, the South African negotiated outcomes 
concluding with the 1993 and the 1996 Constitutions was identified as a case study. 
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Negotiators’ views and opinions were analysed in order to identify dispositions reconcilable 
with each of the concepts identified in Chapter 3.  
Additionally, the operationalisation of the concept ‘Social Contract’ contributes to knowledge 
as contemporary studies, for example that of Basset (2004), uses this term but leaves it 
undefined and unoperationalised.  
Diverging Interpretations 
The second research question brought the focus onto the South African process: 
Was there present among the ranks of the negotiators of the South African Constitution 
diverging interpretations of this outcome at  the time of concluding the settlement, that is, did 
the constitution have different meanings to different negotiators? 
It has become evident from the findings that there were indeed present among the ranks of the 
negotiators of the South African Constitution diverging interpretations of this outcome. While 
certain negotiators placed focus on the mutual trust built up between parties, others negated 
the necessity of trust in negotiations. 
It also became apparent that while some negotiators (specifically negotiators in the NP) 
viewed the interim Constitution as a basis for the final Constitution, other negotiators 
(notably within the ranks of the ANC) preferred to draft the final Constitution from scratch. 
Colin Eglin and Tony Leon found the Interim Constitution to be acceptable, but warranting 
several changes, while Kader Asmal and Valli Moosa found the Interim Constitution overly 
detailed. Roelf Meyer and Dawie De Villiers both thought that the Interim Constitution 
would serve as a good basis for the final constitution, while Cyril Ramaphosa and Valli 
Moosa argued that the final constitution would not be a reflection of the interim Constitution.  
Negotiators’ divergent views on specific clauses also became evident during the course of the 
study. The property clause as well as the issue of amnesty was clearly contested. Colin Eglin 
and Tony Leon argued that the final agreement encapsulated in the Property Clause provided 
an ‘inadequate guarantee for property rights’, while De Klerk found that the NP had ‘won’ on 
this issue. Tertius Delport found that the NP had ‘sold out’ on this clause, and that it did not 
provide a guarantee on keeping property, while Mbeki noted that the ANC was unhappy with 
the Clause, but that it formed part of a give and take.  
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Several negotiators mentioned the consensus present in the Constitutional Assembly during 
the negotiations on the final Constitution. Colin Eglin, Kader Asmal, Leon Wessels, Thabo 
Mbeki, Roelf Meyer, Valli Moosa and Cyril Ramaphosa mentioned the importance of this 
sense of consensus. Eglin, De Klerk, Maharaj and Ramaphosa stated the importance of 
establishing a win-win outcome.  
A number of negotiators mentioned the redefinition of their opponents, including Eglin, De 
Klerk, Asmal, Wessels, Meyer, Ramaphosa and Viljoen. By contrast, Slovo, Maharaj and 
Moosa had not fundamentally redefined their opponents, continually viewing those they were 
negotiating with as ‘opponents’ as opposed to ‘partners’. 
On the electoral system, the negotiators were divided. Eglin and Leon advocated the use of 
constituencies, while Asmal argued that for the time being (1994), proportional list was the 
best option because of the uneducated electorate at the time, but that the system could later 
evolve into one based on constituencies. Wessels found the proportional list system ‘not 
ideal’, while Delport was in favour of a numerically-based, mixed system. De Villiers and 
Moosa were in favour of the proportional list system.  
Eglin argued that the GNU should definitely not become a permanent fixture, while both 
Meyer and De Klerk advocated the prolonging of the period of five years. Eglin, Asmal, 
Moosa and Ramaphosa were in favour of the ongoing revision of the constitution, while 
Wessels agreed he mentioned that this could only take place within the confines of the 
Constitution.  
From this it becomes clear that divergent opinions were present amongst some the negotiators 
of the meaning of several clauses in the constitution. 
Categorisation 
If divergent, can these interpretations be categorised according to the conceptual framework 
constructed for this purpose? 
This framework proved significantly helpful in identifying whether the views of the 
negotiators were divergent – on several levels, drastic differences between negotiators during 
the negotiating period came to the fore. I was able to place several original negotiators into 
either, some or all of the concepts by a close reading of their memoirs, speeches and 
interviews conducted with them. From Chapter 6, which places each studied negotiator into 
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one, two or three of the categories, a comprehensive summation of the findings shows that 
the negotiators can be categorised in to the conceptual framework established in Chapter 3.  
However, the Benchmark Agreement proved more difficult to establish as certain elements 
inherent in this type of agreement are only identifiable once the agreement has been 
implemented. 
It became clear that certain interpretations were more easily categorised than others: while 
being able to locate the views of some negotiators within the concepts of Constitutional 
Contract or Social Contract, identifying those views congruent with the Benchmark 
Agreement proved more difficult. It was found that the nature of a Benchmark Agreement as 
such may not be solely identifiable within the opinions or views expressed by the negotiators, 
specifically at the time leading up to the agreement. A Benchmark Agreement may be more 
easily identifiable after the outcome has been implemented (thus after 1996). The nature of 
the Benchmark Agreement in itself makes it difficult to identify during the initial negotiating 
period as often negotiators seek to conceal this view. Negotiators that have a Benchmark 
Agreement in mind tend toward Constitutional Contract-like agreements which are then 
altered by the dominant party once the power relationship has shifted decisively in their 
favour. 
Also, negotiators can fall into one, two or all of the categories. It became evident that while 
negotiators may be categorised within all three concepts of the framework (Thabo Mbeki), 
their opinions are not necessarily specific to the indicators of one single concept. The 
Constitutional Contract and the Social Contract concepts tended to overlap, as both concepts 
fall within the low-context negotiator framework. At times dispositions to these two concepts 
were indistinguishable. 
It has become evident that the Social Contract may be more easily identifiable in actual 
constitutional politics emerging from the new regime than in the original text, but that the 
negotiators’ opinions on certain clauses and the intention of the original texts help to identify 
the intention of committing to a Social Contract. Several negotiators mentioned the continual 
consensus-seeking in the Constitutional Assembly in the same ‘spirit’ as the preceding 
negotiations. Negotiators from all strata felt personally involved in the drafting of the final 
Constitution, as well as in the upholding of the Constitution. However, whether this political 
culture of continuing compromise within the spirit of negotiation has been fostered in a 
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changing society remains to be studied, as it is part of the ‘so what’ question which is not 
addressed by this study. 
Validation 
On the basis of the findings to the questions above, does the case study validate the said 
conceptual framework devised for classifying interpretations of consensually negotiated 
constitutions? 
Face validity was tested by measuring the concepts by means of indicators. These indicators 
were identified within the views and opinions of the negotiators, validating the concepts. 
Content validity was gained by defining the concepts, elaborating on this definition and 
developing indicators that ‘tap all parts of the definition’ (Neuman, 200:183). Several sources 
of evidence were used, and a clear chain of evidence was established. The conceptual 
framework is supported by previous studies and tested theories. Construct validity was 
established by clearly specifying the conceptual definitions within clear boundaries. Overlaps 
between concepts were later identified as being detrimental to the conceptual framework. 
The definitive findings partially validate the conceptual framework. The problem of 
identifying the Benchmark Agreement during the negotiations leading up to the agreement 
has however become evident. 
7. 3. Insights 
This study has brought significant insight into several concepts, including the Social Contract 
in a changing society. The Social Contract is identifiable within a system that fosters process 
over institutions, with specific focus on the working of the electoral system. The Social 
Contract is vested in the political culture as opposed to in the written text, but the written text 
does facilitate these types of process by entrenching mechanisms for ongoing negotiation and 
revision. However, as has become evident from Leon Wessels’ opinion, while these 
mechanisms exist within the Constitution, it does not mean that they are effectively used. 
Though this study does not address which of the three concepts is ‘better’, it is clear that 
countries seek long-lasting, durable constitutions. Several authors take up this subject, 
including Elkins et al (2009), Sisk (1995) and Horowitz (1991). Characteristics associated 
with the Social Contract, such as flexibility and an inclusive process, tend to be associated 
with longer lasting constitutions. The question remains whether South Africans should be 
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actively seeking to build a Social Contract, and whether a Constitutional Contract can evolve 
into a Social Contract. The Malaysian constitutional bargain serves as an apt example of this 
type of evolution (Haasbroek, 2007). A system based on a Constitutional Contract in 
Malaysia was revised in 1971 in order to promote interethnic coalition. The Malaysian 
electoral system provided a platform for ongoing compromise, and what started out as a 
Constitutional Contract soon evolved into an effective Social Contract which reconciled 
interests of all groups by promoting a system of ongoing negotiations and accommodative 
behaviour (Horowitz, 1991:154-155; and Haasbroek, 2007:82-85). 
An interesting finding regards the formation of the Social Contract. Many indicators of 
building blocks for a Social Contract can be found in the 1996 Constitution. Support for this 
process is also present in the opinions of the some of the negotiators. It is clear that several of 
the negotiators’ views are reconcilable with the concept of the Social Contract and as such 
worked to create circumstances conducive to the formation thereof. The question remains, 
has the Social Contract emerged in South Africa?  Horowitz (1991) does argue that a change 
in the national electoral system to include constituencies (as argued by several negotiators) 
would create circumstances more favourable to the formation of a Social Contract. 
Another insight from this study is into the concept of the Benchmark Agreement. While three 
(Valli Moosa, Thabo Mbeki and Mac Maharaj) negotiators’ opinions can effectively be 
placed within this category, it proved difficult to definitely place either negotiator as 
deliberately agreeing to the outcome in order to change it in the long run, once the power has 
shifted in their favour. A study of political culture later, after 1996, may produce a more 
conclusive result, as well as a study of ANC policy documents, ‘Strategy and Tactics’ (1997; 
2002; 2007; 2012). Negotiators seeking a Benchmark Agreement may make use of promises 
of either a Constitutional Contract or Social Contract in order to advance the agreement. 
7. 4. Questions for further research 
The South African Constitution does not specifically require a proportional-list system. 
Several negotiators mention the possibility of changing this system to include constituencies, 
which would be conducive to the formation of a Social Contract. Asmal (2011) notes that the 
South African electorate was not educated enough/illiterate at the time the electoral system 
was decided (1994). However, in the past 20 years that has changed significantly, with the 
South African literacy rate has risen to more than 90% from an estimate of 61% in 1991, 
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voiding this argument (Pretorius, 2013; and Race Relations Survey 1994/1995:224). Should 
the South African electoral system be revised? The question remains whether political leaders 
will be open to such a suggestion. 
If the electoral system is changed, can a Social Contract develop in South Africa? 
The question may be asked whether new generations of leaders have been instilled with the 
values and beliefs espoused by the original negotiators. While this study is not concerned 
with the current political leaders of South Africa, it is of great significance whether their 
opinions reflect those of their predecessors. 
By looking at policies after 1996, will dispositions representative of the Benchmark 
Agreement approach be more easily identifiable? 
7. 5. Conclusion 
The following figure represents the relationship between the three concepts explored during 
the course of this study. At point A in the diagram, the concept of the Constitutional Contract 
and the Social Contract overlap. Here, traditional indicators of low-context contracts can be 
found, including the written nature of the contract. The overlap at Point B is harder to 
establish. From the research is has become evident that high-context negotiators often use 
Constitutional Contractarian means to produce immediate gains, placating their opponents for 
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Figure 7.1: The Relationship between the Constitutional Contract, the Social Contract 
and the Benchmark Agreement  
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
The nature of a study such as this often results in the asking of more questions, and allows for 
further research. This study sought to answer four research questions and succeeded in doing 
so by meticulous research. The nature of the so-called miraculous South African outcome 
was put under a microscope once more. However, no previous study has identified these 
diverging interpretations of the outcome itself, in the form of the Constitution. It remains to 
be seen whether the South African Constitution can withstand the test of time, and whether 
interpretations will continue to diverge, or will move towards convergence. Future studies of 
the attitudes, opinions, values and beliefs of stakeholders in South Africa, as well as the 
factors that determine such convergence/divergence, can track this process,  
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